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Abstract
FLATLINE CONSTRUCTS: GOTHIC MATERIALISM AND CYBERNETIC THEORY- 
FICTION
Cyberpunk fiction has been called “the supreme literary expression, if not of postmodernism then of 
late capitalism itself.” (Jameson)
This thesis aims to analyse and question this claim by rethinking cyberpunk Action, postmodernism 
and late capitalism in terms of three - interlocking - themes: cybernetics, the Gothic and fiction. It 
claims that while what has been called “postmodernism” has been preoccupied with cybernetic 
themes, cybernetics has been haunted by the Gothic.
The Gothic has always enjoyed a peculiarly intimate relation with the fictional. Baudrillard's 
theories, meanwhile, suggest that, in a period dominated by (cybernetic) simulation, fiction has a new 
cultural role. By putting “theory” into dialogue with “fiction”, the thesis examines Baudrillard's 
suggestion that the era of cybernetics (what he calls “third order simulacra”) “puts an end to 
science fiction, but also to theory, as specific genres”.
The version of the Gothic the thesis presents is one stripped of many of its conventional cultural 
associations; it is a material (and materialist) Gothic.The machinery for re-thinking the Gothic comes 
from Deleuze-Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus. Deriving not from the familiar literary sources (the 
so-called Gothic novels of the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth century) but from Wilhelm 
Worringer’s work on “barbarian art”, Deleuze-Guattari’s version of the Gothic departs from any 
reference to the supernatural. The crucial theme in Worringer, Deleuze-Guattari establish, is that of 
nonorganic continuum. Following Deleuze-Guattari’s lead, the thesis analyses key cyberpunk texts 
such as Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner, David Cronenberg’s Videodrome and William Gibson’s 
Neuromancer in terms of what it calls this “hypematuralist” theme. While these texts have often 
been analysed in terms of “postmodernism” and “cyberpunk,” they have rarely been discussed in 
terms of the Gothic. Here, though, it will be shown that these texts, and important precursors, such 
as Ballard’s The Atrocity Exhibition, are centrally concerned with the breakdown of the boundary 
between the animate and the inanimate. (A theme that cybernetics has also confronted).
The thesis aims to demonstrate that, in its fixation upon catatonic trance, bodies that do not end at 
the skin, and agency-without-subjectivity, cyberpunk or “imploded science fiction” converges the 
Gothic with cybernetics on what, following Gibson, it calls the flatline. The fiatline has two 
important senses, referring to (1) a stale of “unlife” (or “undeath”) and (2) a condition of radical 
immanence.
The thesis is divided into four chapters, each of which considers the flallinc under a different aspect. 
Chapter 1 concerns the flatlining of cybernetics and postmodernism; Chapter 2 deals with the 
fiatlining of the body, paying particular attention to the Deleuze-Guattari/Artaud concept of the 
Body without Organs; Chapter 3 focuses upon the flatlining of reproduction, opposing both sexual 
and mechanical reproduction to  Deleuze-Guattari’s idea of (Gothic) propagation; Chapter 4 
considers the flatlining of fiction itself in the context of (Baudrillard’s) hyperreality.
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INTRODUCTION
Isn’t it strange the way the wind makes inanimate objects move? Doesn't it look odd when 
things which usually just lie there lifeless suddenly start fluttering. Don’t you agree? I 
remember once looking out onto an empty square, watching huge scraps of paper whirling 
angrily round and round, chasing one another as if each had sworn to kill the others: and I 
couldn’t feel the wind at all since I was standing in the lee of a house. A moment later they 
seemed to have calmed down, but then once again they were seized with an insane fury and 
raced all over the square in a mindless rage, crowding into a corner then scattering again as 
some new madness came over them, until finally they disappeared round a corner.
There was just one thick newspaper that couldn’t keep up with the rest. It lay there on the 
cobbles, full of spite and flapping spasmodically, as if it were out of breath and gasping for 
air.
As 1 watched, I was filled with an ominous foreboding. What if, alter all, we living beings 
were nothing more than such scraps of paper? Could there not be a similar unseeable, 
unfathomable ‘wind’ blowing us from place to place and determining our actions, whilst we, 
in our simplicity, believe we are driven by free will? What if the life within us were nothing 
more than some mysterious whirlwind? The wind whereof it says in the Bible. Thou hearest 
the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth"? Do we not 
sometimes dream we have plunged our hands into deep water and caught silvery fish, when 
all that has happened is that our hands have been caught in a cold draught? 1 2
Today’s children [...] are comfortable with the idea that inanimate objects can both think and 
have a personality. But they no longer worry if the machine is alive. They know it is not. The 
issue of alivcncss has moved into the background as though it is settled. But the notion of the 
machine has been expanded to include having a psychology. In retaining the psychological 
mode as the preferred way of talking about computers, children allow computational 
machines to retain an animistic trace, a mark of having passed through a stage where the 
issue of the computer’s aliveness is a focus of intense consideration.
These two passage -  the first from Gustave Mcyrinck’s 1927 novel The Golem, the second from 
Sherry Turkic’s 1995 work of “cyber-psychology” Life on the Screen - take us directly to what will 
be the guiding preoccupation of this thesis. Mcyrinck’s novel is a recounting of an old narrative: the 
Kabbalistic talc of the rabbi who animates lifeless clay, giving form to the monstrous Golem. The 
myth has many variants. In many cases -  and in anticipation of Shelley’s Frankenstein and Goethe’s 
The Sorcerer's Apprentice -  the Golem, once animated, and no longer subject to its master’s
1 Gustave Meyrinck, The Golem, trans. Mike Mitchell, Sawtry/ Riverside: Dedalus/ Ariadne, 1995, 54-55. A crucial 
aspect »1 die legend concerns the writing of a secret name (the name of god) either onto a piece ol paper or directly 
onto the Golem’s head. In some cases, the Golem is animated hy a letter of the secret name being deleted.
2 Sherry Turkle, Life on the Screen: Identity in the Axe of the Internet, London: Phoenix, I9W), X5. Gothic 
Materialism finds a number of these terms uncongenial (for instance: life, screen, identity). Indeed, Unlife Beyond the 
Screens could serve as another subtitle for this study.
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control, runs amok. Turkic’s account, meanwhile, concerns the response of children to those 
newest of cybernetic machines, the personal computer. Across time, Meyrinck's character and the 
children Turkic is studying have an independent insight into what will be called here the Gothic 
flatline : a plane where it is no longer possible to differentiate the animate from the inanimate and 
where to have agency is not necessarily to be alive.
It might seem that the children have now accepted what Mcyrinck’s character found so terrifying. 
Yet the question Meyrinck’s character poses is not quite the one Turkic entertains -  which is to say. 
what if the machines were alive? -  but something more radical: what if we are as "dead” as the 
machines? To pose even thus second question seems immediately inadequate: what sense would it be 
so say that “everything” -  human beings and machines, organic and nonorganic matter - is "dead”? 
Much of what follows is an attempt to answer that answer thus question.
Donna Haraway’s celebrated observation that “our machines arc disturbingly lively, while we 
ourselves arc frighteningly inert”1 has given this issue a certain currency in contemporary cyhcr- 
(heory. But what is interesting about Haraway’s remark -  its challenge to the oppositional thinking 
dial sets up free will against determinism, vitalism against mechanism -  has seldom been processed 
by a mode of theorizing which has tended to reproduce exactly the same oppositions. These 
theoretical failings, it will be argued here, arise from a resistance to pursuing cybernetics to its limits 
(a lailure evinced as much by cyberneticists as by cultural theorists, it must be added). Unraveling the 
implications of cybernetics, it will be claimed, lakes us out to the Gothic llatline. The Gothic llatline 
designates a zone of radical immanence. And to theorize this llatlinc demands a new approach, one 
committed to the theorization of immanence. This thesis calls that approach Gothic Materialism.
1 Donna Haraway, ‘The Cyborg Manifesto", in Simians. Cyborgs and Women: The Keinvention of Nature. London: 
Free Association Books, 1991, 152
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The conjoining of the Gothic with Materialism poses a challenge to the way that the Gothic has been 
thought. It is a deliberate attempt to disassociate the Gothic from everything supernatural, ethereal 
or otherwordly. The principal inspiration for this theorization comes from Wilhelm Worringcr via 
Deleuze-Guattari. Both Worringer and Deleuze-Guattari identity the Gothic with "nonorganic life” . 
and whilst this is an equation we shall have cause to query, Gothic Materialism as it is presented here 
will be fundamentally concerned with a plane that cuts across the distinction between living and 
nonliving, animate and inanimate. It is this anorganic continuum, it will be maintained, that is the 
province of the Gothic.
At the same time as it aims to displace the Gothic from some of its existing cultural associations, the 
conjoining of the Gothic with materialism also aims to provoke a rethinking of what materialism is 
(or can be). Once again, Deleuze-Guattari are the inspirations here, for a rethinking of materialism in 
terms closer to Horror fiction than to theories of social relations. Deleuze-Guattari's abstract 
materialism depends upon assemblages such as the Body without Organs (a key Gothic concept, we 
shall aim to demonstrate), while in their attacks on pyschoanalysis (their defence, for instance, of the 
reality -  as opposed to the merely phantasmatic quality - of processes such as becoming-animal) it is 
often as if they are defending Horror narratives -  of vampirism and lycanthropy -  against a 
psychoanalytic reality principle. Moreover, the Deleuze-Guattari take-up of authors as various as 
Artaud, Spinoza, Schreber and Marx can, we hope to establish, be seen as quintessentially Gothic: 
what Deleuze-Guattari always emphasise in these writers is the theme of anorganic continuum. But 
the non- or anorganic Deleuze-Guattari introduce us to is not the dead matter of conventional 
mechanistic science; on the contrary, it swarms with strange agencies.
The role of cybernetics as we shall theorise it is very much parallel to the theoretical direction 
Deleuze-Guattari have taken. Cybernetics, it will be argued, has always been haunted by the 
possibilities Delcuze-Guattari lay out (even if, in certain cases, it has inhibited or impeded them). As
8
a materialist theory, it, too, we will attempt to show, has tended to challenge the boundary between 
the animate and the inanimate. Like Deleuze-Guattari, it has questioned the confinement of the 
attribution of agency only to subjects. The kind of fiction with which this study will be concerned - 
what has variously been labeled cyberpunk, imploded science fiction and body horror (amongst other 
things) - has been exercised by many of the same concerns as cybernetic theory. Specifically, these 
texts have been fascinated by the concepts of agency-without-a subject and bodies-without-organs. 
emerging in the ambivalent form of the blade runners, terminators, and AIs that haunt current mass- 
mediated-nightmare.
Gothic Materialism is interested in the ways in which what would appear ultramodern - the 
gleaming products of a technically sophisticated capitalism -  end up being described in the ostensibly 
archaic terms familiar from Horror fiction: zombies, demons. But it will resist the temptation to 
think of this “demonization of the cybernetic” as the revival of something “something familiar and 
old-established in the mind.” (PFL 14 363), preferring to think of it as the continuation of a 
nonorganic line that is positively antagonistic to progressive temporality. As lain Hamilton Grant 
puts it, "the Terminator has been there before, distributing microchips to accelerate its advent and 
fuel the primitives’ fears.”4 As we shall see, the nonorganic line as occupied by Gothic Materialism 
is to be distinguished both from “the supernatural” (the supposed province of Horror fiction) and 
"speculative technology” (the home of Science Fiction).
The phrase “something familiar and old-established in the mind” belongs, of course, to Freud, who 
will emerge in the terms of this study as a somewhat ambivalent figure, sometimes an ally, sometimes 
a foe, of Gothic Materialism. Writing of “animist traces”, Turkle is alluding to Freud’s famous essay 
on ‘The Uncanny”, from which this phrase comes, an essay written almost directly
4 “At the Mountains of Madness: The Demonology ol the New Earth and the Polities of Becoming” m Keith Ansell- 
Pearson ed., Deleuze and Philosophy: The Difference Engineer, London-New York: Routledge, 1997. 97
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contemporaneously with The Golem. Here, Freud famously flirts with the problem of the inanimate 
becoming-active. I say “flirts” because Freud -  in what, in the terms of the present thesis, is a clear 
anti-Gothic gesture -  moves to dismiss the importance of thus theme. (Nevertheless, his own 
compulsive need to repeatedly reiterate it, has led to a persistent association in critical writings of the 
uncanny with exactly the question of what should not he alive acting as if it were.) Feelings of the 
uncanny, Freud insists, are not to be attributed to the confusion of the animate with inanimate, but 
to a fear of castration. We shall examine Freud’s essay on ‘The Uncanny” in more detail later, but 
will note, for now, Freud’s own failure to keep at bay the problem of animism ; the theme has its 
own kind of living death, stalking him posthumously with the implacability of any zombie. Its very 
persistence constitutes a powerful argument for another of Freud’s theses in "The Uncanny” -  one 
that Gothic Materialism will find much more congenial - the strange, nondialcctical, functioning of 
the "un” prefix. Thinking, no doubt, of his own remarks on the absence of negation in the 
unconscious5, Freud establishes that the “un” of “unheimliche” does not straightforwardly reverse 
the meaning of the word “heimlich”. In a -  fittingly -disturbing way, “unheimliche” includes 
hcimlich.
"The Uncanny" leaves us with the impression that the source of Freud’s critical deflections and 
circumlocutions is something powerful indeed. Castration may be terrifying, but it is not as 
disturbing as what Freud seems so keen to bury - precisely because it is a matter of terror, or fear. 
Terror or fear have an object -  what is feared  -  and a subject -  he6 who fears - whereas the 
“ominous foreboding” Meyrirtck’s character experiences arises from the inability to differentiate
5 See Freud's essays on “The Unconscious" and Beyond the Pleasure Principle in PFL 11 lor Ins argument dial the 
concept of negation is alien to the unconscious.
6 Needless to say. the gender designation here is not accidental, since, as numerous sources have noted, Freud's 
castration tear presupposes the male as the universal subject. For a particularly powerful critique ol this gemler- 
blindness in Freud, see Luce Irigaray, “The Blindspot in an Old Dream of Symmetry" in Speculum: Of the Ollier 
Woman, trails. Gillian C. Gill, Cornell University Press: Ithaca, New York, 1985
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subject from object. There is a dispersal of subjectivity onto an indifferent plane that is 
simultaneously too distant and too intimate to be apprehended as anything objective.
This thesis will approach this plane via theorists who have been associated with a critique of 
psychoanalysis: Deleuze-Guattari, whom we have already introduced, and Baudrillard. Provisionally, 
we could identify Gothic Materialism with the work of Delcuze-Guattari and "Cybernetic Theory- 
Fiction” with the work of Baudrillard. But this -  simple -  opposition, whilst schematically useful, is 
ultimately misleading. Baudrillard, we shall see, can make a contribution to Gothic Materialism, 
whilst Deleuze-Guattari’s work can certainly be described as Theory-Fiction. Baudrillard's interest in 
cyberpunk fiction and film, his fascination with automata and simulacra, make him both the object of 
a Gothic Materialist theory, and a contributor to it.
One of the aims of Flatline Constructs is to play off Deleuze-Guattari and Baudrillard against each 
other on the question the Meyrinck’s passage poses. In developing theories radically antipathetic to 
subjectivity, Deleuze-Guattari and Baudrillard have occupied parallel trajectories, sometimes closely 
intermeshing, sometimes radically diverging. One common feature is the -  cybernetic -  emphasis on 
code (as we shall see, one major difference between them concerns the role of decoding).
Baudrillard can also be placed as probably the principal theorist of what we might call the 
nexativized Gothic; Baudrillard is the inheritor of a social critical tradition that has tended to cast its 
narratives about the decline of civilization in terms of what it would no doubt think of as metaphors 
of inorganic unvitality: dead labour (Marx), mechanical reproduction (Benjamin). Standing at the 
demetaphorized terminal of this trajectory, Baudrillard’s work frequently amounts to what is, in 
cl feet, a negativized Gothic, which “takes the Guy Dcbord/ J. G. Ballard fascination with 'the virtual 
commodification or crystallization of organic life towards total extinction’ further, towards narrating 
a technological triumph of the inanimate -  a negative eschatology, the nullity of all opposition, the
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dissolution o f history, the neutralization of difference and the erasure of any possible configuration 
of alternate actuality.”7 Production is displaced by a totalized (re)production that a priori excludes 
novelty; “new” objects and cultural phenomena increasingly operate on an exhausted but implacable 
closed-loop, which - in some sense - recapitulates itself in advance. “Necrospection.”8
Another o f the features Deleuze-Guattari share with Baudrillard is the importance they place on 
fiction. Which leads us to the second term of this study’s subtitle -  Cybernetic Theory-Fiction - a 
phrase it is worth unpacking a little now. It is Baudrillard who is most associated with the emergence 
of theory-fiction as a mode. And it is the role of “third order simulacra” -  associated, by Baudrillard. 
very closely with cybernetics, that, Baudrillard says, “puts an end” to theory and fiction as separate 
genres. By circulating a series of exemplary “fictional” texts -  Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner, William 
Gibson’s Neuromancer, J.G. Ballard’s The Atrocity Exhibition, and David Cronenberg’s 
Videodrome -  throughout the study, we will aim to unravel something of what Is at stake in the 
claim that the era of cybernetics eliminates -  or smears -  the distinction between theory and fiction. 
In some cases, the performance of theory is quite literal: The Atrocity Exhibition and Videodrome 
include characters who are theorists (Dr Nathan, Professor O ’Blivion). But this study will want to 
take Baudrillard’s claim very seriously and approach fictional texts, not simply as literary texts 
awaiting theoretical “readings”, but as themselves already intensely-theoretical.
The thesis is divided into four chapters, whose themes are as follows.
Chapter 1 examines the nexus of postmodernism, cybernetics and the Gothic. The cluster of 
approaches that have gone under the name “postmodernism”, it will be argued, have been haunted
7 Mark Downham, "Cyberpunk”, Vague 21, 1988, 42
8 Cf "Necrospective”, TE 89-99. Like Jarry's dead cyclist, contemporary metropolitan culture only appears to he 
moving forward because of the inertial weight of its own past (a past it simultaneously annihilates us the past, 
precisely by continually [re]instantiating it as the present)
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by cybernetic themes: in particular, the interlocking notions of automatization and feedback. 
Beginning with an analysis of Blade Runner , which, like Gibson’s Neuronumcer, has frequently 
been taken to be an exemplary “postmodern” text -  and is undoubtedly a key cyberpunk text -  the 
chapter contends that many theorizations of postmodernity have been fundamentally concerned with 
the impact of machines which can reflect on (and consequently adapt) their own performance. 
Baudrillard in particular will be seen as an inheritor of cybernetic themes: his Order of Simulacra will 
be traced back to Wiener’s typologization of machines. Following Baudrillard’s lead, we will aim to 
distinguish the features proper to what Baudrillard calls the fiction of third order simulacra 
(cybernetics as such). In parallel, the chapter also aims to show ways in which Cybernetics has been 
haunted by the Gothic. It rehearses Worringer’s account of the Gothic line in Form in Gothic and 
Abstraction and Empathy. By reference to both Gibson and Deleuze-Guattari. the concept of the 
Gothic flatline will be introduced. The term comes from Neuromancer, and designates slates adrift 
between life and death, or states of simulated life, but will be taken up here as a more general name 
for the radically immanent line described by Gothic Materialism. The chapter will also show the 
importance, to Deleuze-Guattari, of the language of Horror -  the recurrence of descriptions o f  
phenomena in terms of vampirism, zombification, etc. It will be claimed that this is part of a "realism 
about the hyperreal” or “cybernetic realism” which emerges as equivalent to what will be 
characterized as the hypernatural. The hypcrnatural will be positioned as an intensification o f  
naturalism, and by opposition the supernatural.
Chapter 2 approaches that commonplace of contemporary theory, “the body”, but it does so by 
opposing a -  Gothic Materialist -  concept of the body (the Artaud/Deleuzc-Guattari body without 
organs) to what it calls a “Science Fictional” body. Reinforcing arguments made in the First chapter, 
it will be argued that “cyberpunk” fictions need to be placed under the sign of a Horror fiction which 
has been freed from any reference to the supernatural. Baudrillard’s essay on Ballard is a crucial
13
resource here. Here, BaudriUard argues that traditionally SF has been complied with "classical" 
accounts of the body and technology. What makes cyberpunk Gothic Materialist, it will be argued, is 
the departure from an instrumental view of technology and the organs. Technology is no longer 
seen, that is to say, as a simple extension of organic function. A genealogy of the Science Fictional 
body will be laid out, passing from Freud through to McLuhan: but these same theorists, it will be 
shown, also display themes anticipative of cyberpunk. The chapter concludes with an analysis of two 
texts which have posed a challenge to the Science Fictional body: Cronenberg's Videtulrome and 
Ballard’s The Atrocity Exhibition. Cronenberg’s film quite literally opens up the body. We will 
parallel the invaginated body of Videodrome -  a body unable to process the amount of stimuli with 
which it is bombarded -  with McLuhan’s autoamputated body, and Baudrillard's schizophrenic 
body. Baudrillard’s equation of cybernetic circuitries with “schizophrenia” will be paralleled with 
Jameson’s theories of postmodern subjectivity, and Deleuze-Guattari’s theories o f capitalism. Both 
these themes -  the disruption of organismic interiority, and the concomitant emergence of 
"schizophrenia” -  had already emerged in Ballard’s novel, which explicitly deals with the question of 
schizophrenia, and radical deterritorializations of the body. It will be shown that some of Ballard’s 
most important (ficto-theoretical) coinages -  the spinal landscape, the media landscape -  point to the 
key Gothic Materialist intuition of anorganic continuum.
Chapter 3 focuses on what has always been a theme in Gothic texts (even when the Gothic is 
conventionally conceived); something that has also been a theme in writings on cybernetics. The 
artilicialization of reproduction was posed as a possibility in the Golem legend, and more recently in 
the founding story of modem Horror and Science Fiction, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein. It has also 
been posited by cybernetics, not only in respect of the reproduction of human beings, but also in 
connection with the reproduction of machines themselves. Thus chapter uses Baudrillard and 
Deleuze-Guattari to provide a framework for examining this theme in fiction, by opposing the
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former’s concept of an ever more perfect reproduction with the latter's ideas of mulliplicilous 
recombination. In both cases, what is crucial is a supercession of the sexual as such. Baudrillard 
offers a theorization of reproduction in terms of what we have called the "negalivized Gothic” (see 
above): the dream of the perfect copy, which always goes badly wrong. Dclcuzc-Guatlari. 
meanwhile, take as their models not organic reproduction, but the explicitly Gothic figures of 
vampirism, lycanthropy, and disease: what they call propagation. The account of propagation will be 
preceded by a discussion of the concept of “surplus value of code”, introduced by Dclcuzc-Guaitari 
in Anti-Oedipus. This involves a discussion of Samuel Butler’s important work of theory-fiction. 
“The Book of Machines” (in his Erewhon), which offers numerous ingenious arguments 
contradicting the idea that machines are unable to reproduce themselves. In arguments reconstructed 
by Delcu/.c-Guattari in Anti-Oedipus, Butler shows that the fact that human beings are involved in 
(he reproduction -  or replication -  of machines does not mean that they lack a reproductive system: 
on the contrary, human beings form part of such a system. The chapter concludes with an analysis of 
Gibson’s Neuromancer, which will be shown to display themes of Baudrillard’s ultra-mechanical 
reproduction and Dclcuzc-Guattari's sorcerous propagation.
Chapter 4 moves into territory associated with Baudrillard, the theorization of hyperreality in terms 
of the emergence of cybernetic systems, but aims to move beyond Baudrillard's position of terminal 
melancholy. The role of fiction itself is a crucial theme here. The chapter recounts Baudrillard's 
narrative about the triumph of cybernetic modeling systems (supposedly bringing the end ol what 
might be called the category of “the marvelous”), comparing and contrasting it with Gibson's 
description of the return of demonism in the cyberspace Matrix. Where Baudrillard's story ends 
with the burial of the “primitive double”, the other narrative posits the return of animistic themes, 
and presents a mode of recursion radically opposed to one based upon a simple reiteration of the 
same. The question of the return of animism in a cybernetic era will be discussed, and animism will 
be compared with Dclcuzc-Guallari’s machinism. The theme of recursion will be dealt with here in
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terms of the opposition between two processes (associated with two types ol fiction): hyper and 
meta. Metafiction will be placed on the side of an imploded transcendence. This will be opposed to 
hyperfiction (and to hyper-processes in general), which can be defined by its radical immanence, as 
found in Deleuze-Guattari’s rhizome. The chapter -  and indeed the thesis — concludes with an 
analysis of John Carpenter’s recent film In the Mouth o f Madness, which will he shown to describe 
(if not quite display) many of the features of hyperfiction.
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1. SCREAMS_ SCREENS. FLATLINES: CYBERNETICS, POSTMODERNISM AND THE 
GOTHIC ________________________________________________________________
How an Android M ust Feel
Deckard: "Replicants weren't supposed to have feelings. Neither were Blade Runners. " 9
There’s an intriguing scene in the middle of Philip K. Dick’s Do Androids Dream o f Electric- 
Sheep?, a novel best known now as the source of Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982). Rick 
Deckard and Phil Resch, two bounty hunters whose prey is not human beings but androids, have 
pursued a target to a museum where a Munch exhibition is showing. Pausing in front of what is 
evidently The Scream - “[t]wisted ripples of the creature’s torment, echoes of its cry, tlooded out 
into the air surrounding it; the man or woman, whatever it was, had become contained by its own 
howl” - Resch comments, “I think [...] this is how an andy must feel.” 10
To anyone acquainted with Fredric Jameson’s analyses, the connection Resch makes should raise a 
number of questions. For Jameson, “The Scream is a canonical expression of the great modernist 
thematics of alienation, anomie, solitude, isolation, a virtually programmatic emblem of what used to 
be called the age of anxiety” (PCLLC 11), whereas Dick’s novel, and Blade Runner, have been held 
up (not least by Jameson himself 11) as quintessentially postmodern. If The Scream does really 
communicate the ’’alienation, anomie, solitude” appropriate to a melancholy human(ist) subjectivity,
1 From the Blade Runner script. Here, as with all the right-justified quotations in the diesis, italics have been 
added.
1(1 Dick, Do Androids Dream o f Electric Sheep', London: HarperCollins, 1993, 1(X)
' * As we shall see below: see especially The Seeds o f Time, New York: Columbia University Press. 1994, 146-149, 
and The Geopolitical Aesthetic-. Cinema and Space in the World System, Bloomington and Indiana/ London: Indiana 
University Press/ BFI publishing, 1992 , 12
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as Jameson suggests, how can an android - nonhuman simulacrum of the human - have any affinity 
with it? Is there something to account for the appearance of expressionist imagery and thcmatics in 
Blade Runner other than the notorious “pastiche” effect? What does an android feel, any way?
To begin to answer these questions is to start to pick apart the theoretical approaches that have 
dominated commentary on Blade Runner and Dick. This will involve, initially, weaving a few more 
strands in the already-existing rhizome theory has run around, and through. Blade Runner. Much 
commentary has already made the connection between Scott’s film and the almost directly 
contemporary “cyberpunk” fiction of William Gibson, thereby clicking onto a literary genealogy that 
includes Burroughs and Ballard as well as Dick. Parallels have also been made with the films of 
David Cronenberg12 . Critical reception of these authors has been dominated by debates on 
"postmodernism” and “postmodemity”; theorists with a variety of responses to postmodernism - 
negative (Christopher Lasch13), ambivalent (Kellner14 and Jameson), and neutral (McHale15) - 
have cited one or all of them as exemplars of postmodern practice. Jameson famously goes so far as 
to call cyberpunk "the supreme literary expression, if not of postmodernism then of late capitalism 
itself.” (PCLLC 38)
What follows will not reject these postmodernist approaches so much as it will envelop them, as it 
will envelop cyberpunk fiction, into what it will call Gothic Materialism. To suggest that many of 
Gothic Materialism’s principal resources come from Deleuze-Guattari’s Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia is not to imply that it is in some sense a transcendent deployment (or application) of
Scott Bukatman's Terminal Identity: the Virtual Subject in Postmodern Science Fiction (Durham and London: 
Duke University Press, 19« 1) makes a somewhat unsatisfactory attempt to connect all these figures. Jameson, 
meanwhile, has written at length on Gibson (Seeds of Time 146-149), Ballard (PCLLC 55-80), Dick (PCLLC 279- 
287) and Cronenberg (Geopolitical Aesthetic 22-32).
See Lasch, The Minimal Self: Psychic Survival in Troubled Times, London: Pan, 1984, especially the chapter. 
"The Minimalist Aesthetic: Art and Literature in an Age of Extremity”, which discusses Burroughs and Ballard
See Douglas Kellner, “David Cronenberg: Panic Horror and the Postmodern Body”, Canadian Journal of 
Political and Social Theory, vol 13,3, 1989
See Brian McHale, Postmodernist Fiction, New York and London: Methuen, 1987, which discusses Ballard. 
Burroughs and Dick, and "POSTcybcrMODERNpunklSM”, ( in Larry McCaffrey, ed.. Storming the Reality Studio: A 
Casebook o f Cyberpunk and Postmodern Fiction), Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1991, which 
discusses all of the above, plus Gibson.
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Deleuze-Guattari’s work, in part because whatever Gothic Materialism can use. it becomes. So 
when it emerges, Gothic materialism describes Deleuze-Guattari (not the other way around), their 
work appearing now as a clicking together of Gothic authors whose names are legion: Lovecraft. 
Artaud, Freud, Marx, Schreber, Worringer...
In part, then, what follows will present a materialist critique of postmodernism . The kind of 
postmodernist theorists Gothic Materialism interfaces with is are those it already haunts - not 
thinkers who process reality through a textualist o r linguistic grid, but theorists who understand 
'■postmodemity” as an essentially material phenomenon, describing its effects primarily in terms of 
the impact that new telecommercial configurations have on the human nervous system: Jameson, 
certainly, but also Baudrillard, and one of his key antecedents, Marshall McLuhan.
Prompted by what, at first sight, appears to be an invasion of the human body by technology, 
McLuhan and Baudrillard’s work follows the metapsychological Freud in describing a becoming- 
technical of the organism. As we shall see in more detail in the next chapter, this reverses the idea 
of “extensions of man” McLuhan develops in Understanding Media. The concept of media as 
extensions of the human body is a direct echo of the organicist confidence Freud had displayed in 
Civilization and its Discontents when he wrote o f technology making “Man |...| a prosthetic 
God.”16 What Baudrillard picks up on is the other side of Freud (and the other side of McLuhan): a 
side that doesn’t stress the extension of an organic interiority, or its invasion, but the folding Out of 
interiority into a pure exteriority, registered by the subject as shock or trauma.
For Baudrillard, then, the cultural reconfigurations that Jameson identifies do not mark the end of 
the age of anxiety, as Jameson thinks; rather, they usher in another, new, era of anxiety. The 
characteristics of this new age of anxiety had already been delineated by McLuhan. Whereas 
"|m]odernist anxiety is founded on the inescapability of individual freedom; its themes are individual
' fl oWidi every tool man is perfecting his own organs, whether motory or sensory, or is removing the limits to their 
lunctioning,” Freud writes there. “Man has, as it were, become a kind of prosthetic God. When he puls on all his 
auxiliary organs he is truly magnificent; but these organs have not grown on to him and they still give him trouble al 
times." “Civilization and its Discontents" in Penguin Freud Library, Volume 12, Civilization. Society anil Religion. 
279, 280
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solitude, social fragmentation, and alienation.” By contrast, “McLuhan’s anxiety”, in anticipation of 
Baudrillard’s, “is exactly contrary: it has its origins in a social disalienation and the denial (or 
penetration by the media, and so by everyone else) of any margins of solitude or alienation. 
Modernist anxiety involves the withdrawal to an imaginary identity resistant to immersion in the 
forms of modernization. McLuhan’s postmodern anxiety has given up this resistant identity, and has 
no anchorage in individual thought or feeling.”17
Which brings us back to Munch, to Dick, and to Jameson, who comes across The Scream during 
the course of his celebrated discussion of the “waning of affect”. In positing a "waning of affect”, 
Jameson does not want to argue, he insists, “that the cultural products of the postmodern era are 
utterly devoid of feeling, but rather that such feelings - which it may be better and more accurate, 
following J.F. Lyotard, to call ‘intensities’ - are now free-floating and impersonal and tend to be 
dominated by a peculiar kind of euphoria.” (PCLLC, 16) This “peculiar kind of euphoria” - feeling 
floating free from any qualification by the personal - is what Baudrillard has called ecstasy. Ecstasy - 
which has an ostensibly inverse but effectively indistinguishable state, dread - arises when the 
subject is jacked into late capitalism’s network of cybernetic communications. Plugged into the 
network , traversed by it, Baudrillard's Terminal Man knows that retreat into private space is no 
longer an option, and this awareness generates a new sense of terror - for Baudrillard “the slate of 
terror proper to the schizophrenic: too great a proximity of everything, the unclean promiscuity of 
everything which touches, invests and penetrates without resistance, with no halo of private 
projection to protect him anymore.”18
Both dread and ecstasy arise from a loss of the sense of self as a delimitablc entity: a while- or 
black-out of identity that can just as easily be experienced as terror or euphoria “(dread is a kind of 
jouissance-in-negative, a slow subsidence into uncontrol and panic).”19 Following Lyotard through
17 Wilmott, McLuhan, or Modernism in Reverse, Toronto-Buffalo- London: University of Toronto Press. 11%, 170
lx Baudrillard. “The Ecstasy of Communication", in The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture, ed. Hal 
Foster, Port Townsend: Washington Bay Press, 1983, 132
Simon Reynolds, Blissed Out: The Raptures of Rock, London: Serpent's Tail, 1991, 169
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his rerouting of Kantian aesthetics, Jameson calls this "simultaneous apprehension of ecstasy and 
dread” the postmodern sublime.
For Gothic Materialism, the sublime still belongs to a human(ist) aesthetics of representation 
(precisely because it fixes what lies beyond representation as the unrepresentable). Gothic 
Materialism’s aesthetic theory, as we shall see below, derives not from Burke and Kant (nor from 
some postmodern reinvention of their theories), but from Wilhelm Worringer. whose two treatises 
on "barbarian art”, Form in Gothic and Abstraction and Empathy - both re-animated by Deleuze- 
Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus - oppose representation not to the unrepresentable, but to the 
abstract. Gothic Materialism is above all an abstract materialism, distinguished from other types of 
materialism, (including what Baudrillard disparagingly refers to as “anthropo-Marxism” |SED 140), 
and from every sort of idealism, by its focussing principally on the organ grinder - the nonorganic 
processes of stratification that produce the organism - rather than the monkey - anthropoid 
consciousness as manifested in an experience of subjectivity screened through the (Freudian) 
perceptual-consciousness-system. Such processes have agents, but they are not human, humanistic, 
or subjectivist; they are “Abstract Machines.” 20
In other words, Gothic Materialism takes literally what “Marx critically denounced as the 'fantasy' 
of capital as ‘an automatic system of machinery ... set in motion by an automaton, a moving power 
that moves itself.”21 It assumes, with Deleuze-Guattari’s schizoanalysis, that the possibility of 
transcendently critiquing capitalism , kept alive in a mournful kind of way by Jameson, ostensibly 
abandoned but effectively retained by Baudrillard, has always been dysfunctional, for the simple
The concept of abstract machines is an important one for Deleuze-Guattari. It is important to stress that abstract 
machines “[are] opposed to the abstract in the ordinary sense.” (TP 511) “There is no abstract machines, or machines, 
in the sense of a Platonic Idea, transcendent, universal, eternal. Abstract machines operate within concrete 
assemblages.” (TP 510) Abstract machines are the principle of operation immanent to die workings of any machine. 
They "know nodiing of forms and substances. This is what makes them abstract.” (TP 511) “Abstract, singular, and 
creative, here and now. real yet nonconcrete, actual yet noneffeclualed - that is why abstract machines arc dated and 
named (the Einstein abstract machine, the Webern abstract machine)” (TP 511) One example of tin abstract machine 
Deleuze-Guattari give is Foucault's diagram of discipline. (TP 66-67) What Foucault makes possible, they point out. 
is an abstract description of ostensibly disparate empirical phenomena: prisons, schools, hospitals. These institutions 
instantiate a single abstract machine of discipline, but this is to be explained as an emergent phenomena, arriving 
holtom-up, rather than as the top-down imposition of a macro-subjective will.
'  * lain Hamilton Grant, "Los Angeles 2019: Demopathy and Xenogenesis (Some Realist Notes on Blade Runner and 
the Postmodern Condition),” unpublished paper, 1997, no page refs. Quotation from Marx's Grundrisse.
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reason that “[c]apitalism defines a field of immanence and never ceases to occupy this field." (AO 
250) While anthropo-Marxism still posits a transcendent and authentic human agent which could 
overcome capital, Gothic Materialism takes it for granted that real materialism must involve total 
immanentization; one o f its chief resources, therefore, is the philosopher whose whole work was 
devoted to developing a rigorously immanent account of agency: Spinoza.
For Spinoza, there is agency everywhere but this never belongs to human subjects. The Ethics. 
therefore, does not identify subjects (or objects); rather it entifies. Spinoza disontologises all 
subjective, generic and species distinctions into a single Gothic classification: the Entity. ' |W |e are 
wont to classify all the individuals in Nature under one genus, namely, the notion of Entity, which 
pertains to all individuals in Nature without exception.” (ETH, IV, Pref: 153) Bodies are defined, 
not by form or funetion, but as processes: in other words, ‘True Entities are events." 22
Crucial in this respect is Deleuze-Guattari’s concept of the haecceity. The haecceity can be defined 
briefly as non-subjectified individuation. It is individuation as intensive multiplicity, not extensive 
address. For Deleuze-Guattari (“Memories of a Haecceity” [TP 260-265]), the haecceity “is a mode 
of individuation very different from that of a person, subject, thing or substance. ... A season, a 
winter, summer, an hour, a date have a perfect individuality lacking nothing, even though this 
individuality is different from that of a thing or a subject.” (TP 261) The haecceity is the entity as 
event (and the event as entity); it occurs when things “cease to be subjects to become events” (TP 
262). “It should not be thought that a haecceity consists simply of a decor or backdrop that 
situates subjects, or of appendages that hold things and people to the ground,” Deleuze-Guattari 
warn. “It is the entire assemblage in its individuated aggregate that is a haecceity.” (TP 262) The 
Gothic has an affinity with the concept of the haecceity because it refuses to distinguish human 
figures from backgrounds; “the ‘Gothic or Northern’ decorative line” is “a broken line which forms
*“ Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1987, 66. To make the Gothic link explicit, Deleuze and Parnet go on to refer to Lovecratt’s Randolph Carter 
(also discussed in TP 240) “ENT1TY= EVENT, it is terror, but also great joy. Becoming an entity, an infinitive, as 
Lovecraft spoke of it, the horrific and luminous story of Carter: animal-becoming, molecular-becoming, 
imperceptible-becoming.” (66)
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no contour by which form and background might be distinguished.”23 You can't enter such /.ones 
without entering into composition with them.
Haecceities, Deleuze-Guattari say, find expression in a “particular semiotic” : "This semiotic is 
composed above all of proper names, verbs in the infinitive and indefinite articles or pronouns. 
Indefinite article + proper name + infinitive verb constitutes the basic chain of expression | ... | of u 
semiotic that has freed itself from both formal signifiances and personal subjectificalions.” (TP 263) 
Dclcuzc-Guattari’s vindication of this semiotic - a positivization of the indefinite - is simultaneously 
a theory of Horror, a critique of psychoanalysis and a program for cybcrotics. Whereas 
psychoanalysis, Dcleuze-Guattari argue, always seeks to reduce the indefinite to the definite - “When 
ihc child says 'a belly’, ‘a horse’, ‘how do people grow up?’ 'someone is beating a child’, the 
psychoanalyst hears ‘my belly,’ ‘the father,’ will I grow up to be like daddy?”’ (TP 264) - 
rhi/.omatics understands that desire operates through the indefinite: "Flat multiplicities |...| arc 
designated by indefinite articles, or rather by partitives (some couchgrass, some of a rhizome)." (TP, 
9) The Gothic use of such terms as “the unnamablc”, “the Thing”, “the nameless” - favoured by 
Deleuze-Guattari themselves - implies a modification of this model: here, indefinite adverb-nouns 
function to dc-definilize definite articles.
Gothic Materialism is flat with its material; it names both the mode of analysis and what is to be 
analysed. It docs not arbitrarily conjoin materialism with the Gothic, but insists that all effective 
materialism must lead Out towards a non-organic (dis)continuum. Amongst other things, the 
Gothic can serve as a proper name for this continuum 24 ; and cyberpunk is the registering of its
Deleuze, Cinema I, 111
Much of what follows will be an attempt to rigorisc a definition of the Gothic, which, like the cyber- prefix, has 
nllcn been used imprecisely or in a way that is unhelpfully general. (This may account for the widespread failure to 
perceive Uie connection between cyberpunk and the Gothic.) Judith Halhcrstam's “definition” of the Gothic as “the 
rhetorical style and narrative structure designed to produce fear and desire in the reader” (Skin Shows: Gotlm Horror 
unit the Technology o f Monsters, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1995, 2) for instance, is emblematic nt 
Ihcsc ladings. Whilst the version of the Gothic that will be employed in this study cannot he put in a nutshell - in part 
because it designates something “’teeming, seething, swelling, foaming, spreading like an infectious disease. |...| |u| 
nameless horror ‘"(TP 245) - it does have a number of specific features which will be delineated. It is not a vague 
synonym for everything transgressive or morbid (as it seems to be, for instance, for Christopher Grunenherg 
I Unsolved Mysteries: Gothic Tales from Frankenstein to the Hair Haling Doll” in Gothic. Transmutations o/ Horror 
m Late Twentieth Century An  , Cambridge Mass./ London: the MIT Press 1997]). As should quickly become 
apparent, Gothic Materialism has little in common with what Jameson (PCLLC 289-291) calls “modern gothic". 
Jameson's modem gothic, which concerns the bolstering of a social and individual identity by means ol the
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arrival on the terminals of a wired humanity. Whilst an organicist Left social criticism finds in 
cyberpunk the quietist collapse of transformative political projects into a “hardboiled" “survivalist” 
hyper-nihilism25 , Gothic Materialism locates in Baudrillard’s ecstatic communication. Gibson's 
Cyberspace, Jameson’s total flow and Cronenberg’s Videodrome the map of a hypermediati/.ed 
capitalism that is decoding privatized subjectivity.
Organicist postmodern theory has tended to read cyberpunk as the apogee of Cartesianism. the 
story - now told, in part, ironically - of the triumph o f disembodied Mind over docile body (this latter 
referred to by Gibson’s cybserspace cowboys as “meat”). Told this way, the story has inevitable 
gender implications: it is a re-run of the old narrative of the hylomorphic domination of Nature by 
Man. For Andrew Ross, for instance, “Cyberpunk male bodies [... are] spare, lean, and temporary 
bodies whose social functionality could only be maintained through the reconstructive aid of a whole 
range of genetic overhauls and cybernetic enhancements - boosterware, biochip welwarc, 
cyberoptics, bioplastic surgery, designer drugs, nerve amplifiers, prosthetic limbs and organs, 
memoryware, neural interface plugs and the like.” Yet thus is still to buy into the story the cowboys 
tell themselves, a story which the narratives they are embedded in refuse to maintain: it is to treat 
“the body” as the container for/ of a Self which will ultimately escape it (in techno-transcendence). 
Ross is aware that cyberpunk is much more ambivalent than this; that it also tells of the invasion of 
the (male) organism by technical machines. Deliberately echoing the Baudrillard of “The Ecstasy of 
Communication”, he describes the cyberpunk “body as a switching system with no purely organic 
integrity to defend or advance, and only further enhancements of technological ‘edge’ to gain in the 
struggle for technological advantage. These enhancements and retrofits were technotoys that the
construction/ projection of an Other, bears more relation to what James Donald terms “the vulgar sublime." Donald 
( What’s at Stake in Vampire Films? The Pedagogy of Monsters” in Sentimental Education: Schooling, Popular 
Culture and the Regulation o f Liberty, London: Verso 1992) makes a connection between pulp fictions - Gothic, 
melodrama - and the high theory of Lyotard and Kristeva. But Donald's vulgar sublime is ultimately contained within 
die problematics of representation: the boundaries of the subject are disturbed (in discourse) radicr than, as with 
Gothic Materialism, materially dismantled (in practice). One problem with these approaches is that they maintain a 
distinction between texts and theory; theorists are still given the role of reading/ interpreting the (political) 
unconscious of/ for texts. Gothic Materialism, meanwhile, treats “texts” as already intensely theoretical.
1 s
“  Ross, Andrew, “Cyberpunk in Boyslown", Strange Weather: Culture, Science and Technology in the Age of 
Limits, London/ New York: Verso, 1991, 153
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hoys had always dreamed of having, but they were also body-altering and castrating in ways that 
hoys always had nightmares about.” (152-3)
Yet, as we have already seen, to oppose invasion of the organism with its extension is still not to 
process the materialist critique cyberpunk presents: the Spinozistic/ cybernetic unravelling of the 
organism back into its environment. Ross always recodes cyberpunk sensations in terms of a 
psychopathology and a politics - an affective range - whose continuing purchase on contemporary 
reality the very existence of cyberpunk radically questions. Despite sharing some of Ross's 
attachment to transcendent social criticism, Jameson nevertheless recognises that the new cultural 
configurations cannot be theorised using this old (psychoanalytical) language. What he calls the 
decline of affect is signalled in part by a liberation “ from the older anomic of the centered 
subject”, an ambiguous “liberation” which “ may also mean a liberation from every other kind of 
feeling as well, since there is no longer a self present to do the feeling” (PCLLC, 16). Jameson's 
analysis here parallels that of Baudrillard in suggesting that “the end of the bourgeois ego, or 
monad” brings with it a concomitant “end of the pyschopathologies of that ego” (PCLLC, 16) 
("No more hysteria, no more projective paranoia,” Baudrillard announces in "The Ecstasy of 
Communication” (EC 132)).
If, as Baudrillard says, there is no more hysteria, then - contra Ross - there is no more castration 
either. For Baudrillard, as we have seen, castration fear has become reversed; media implicitly 
"feminize”, not cutting man off, but “penetrating without resistance.” The dread here corresponds to 
the masculine terror Klaus Thcwclcit describes in Male Fantasies: it is a terror of being inundated, 
overwhelmed by what Jameson calls the “total flow” (PCLLC 70, 76-78, 86, 90) of hyperconnected 
cybernetic culture . Cyberpunk registers a trauma that Ross, apparently secure in his organic 
intcriority, still thinks can be commented upon from the point of view of an unproblematic humanist 
transcendence. The terror, for Gibson’s characters, and for Cronenberg’s, is not just, or even 
primarily, that the interior of their bodies will be invaded, but that they do not have any insides.
I his dread gives rise to the startling images of Cronenberg’s Videodrome. Infamously, at one point 
in the film, the lead character Max Renn’s “body literally opens up - his stomach develops a
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massive, vaginal slit - to accommodate a new videocassette ‘programme'. Image addiction and 
image virus reduce the subject to the status of a videotape player/ recorder: the human body mutates 
to become a part of the massive system of reproductive technology.”26 This is a new type of dread, 
emerging in theory and fiction simultaneously.
As a registering o f this new horror, Videodrome, like Baudrillard’s “Ecstasy of Communication"27, is 
a kind of cyberpunk sequel to Freud’s (anti) Gothic tale, ‘The Uncanny.” There Freud keeps Gothic 
terror at bay by attributing the feelings of “dread and anxiety” to a fear of castration. By the time of 
Baudrillard and Videodrome, the phallic visual scene Freud sought to erect has collapsed into a 
terrible, cloying tactile intimacy: what Baudrillard’s calls the obscene. The equation Freud makes 
between the eye and the penis is no longer relevant in conditions where there is no distance (specular 
or otherwise): you can’t touch without being touched. You can’t penetrate what already envelops 
you. Gibson: ‘The matrix folds around me like an origami trick.”28
To simulate the POV of the androids in Dick’s novel is to be drawn to where you - as subject - are 
turned inside Out. To begin to see what the androids could see in Munch’s painting, is to realise 
that, for them, it must show not the inevitability of solitary interiority, but its impossibility: the 
painting's “loops and spirals” diagramming now not the projection of a subjective state outwards, 
but the enormous pressure - “inwards” - of an exteriority “which touches, invests and penetrates 
without resistance” , and which produces the subject, as Deleuze-Guattari would want to say, as a 
residuum or side-effect. (“[T]he subject [is] produced as residuum alongside the machines, as an 
appendix, or as a spare part adjacent to the machine.” [AO 16-22]) For Gothic Materialism this, as 
much as the more familiar inventory of modernist angst-states, is what Munch and the rest of 
Expressionism was always getting at.
Bukatman, “Who Programs You: The Science Fiction of the Spectacle?”, in Annette Kuhn ed., Alien Zone: 
Cultural Theory and Contemporary Science Fiction Cinema , London: Verso, 1990, 206
57
-  Bukatman's “Who Programs You” offers an extensive comparison of Videodrome and Baudrillard.
- x Gibson, Burning Chrome, London: Grafton, 1986,
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So it will be argued here that cybernetic capitalism does not engender what Ballard has followed
might suspect the reverse; that what defines the “postmodern” is in fact the amplification of affect. 
Brian Massumi suggests that the theorization of “intensity” Jameson calls for is to be achieved 
precisely by paying renewed attention to the phenomenon of affect and to Spinoza as its principal 
theorist. “It is crucial,” Massumi argues, “to theorize the difference between emotion and affect." 
"An emotion is a subjective content, the socio-linguistic fixing of the quality of an experience which 
is from that point on defined as personal. Emotion is qualified intensity, the conventional, consensual 
point of insertion of intensity into semantically formed progressions, into narrativi/.able action- 
reaction circuits, into function and meaning. It is intensity owned and recognised [...] If some have 
the impression that affect has waned, it is because affect is unqualified.”29
To account for these abstract feelings (“abstract is a word for sensations so new they don't have a 
name yet”30 ), demands a new affective register, and a new type of “realism” - not any more the 
"empirical realism” described and delimited by Kant in the name of transcendental philosophy and 
echoed in the conventions of the bourgeois realist novel, but a cybernetic realism31 : a theory- 
liction lot an artificial reality.
Bacon: “ The more artificial vou can make it, the greater the chance o f its looking real. "32
Jameson in identifying as a “death of affect.” Those switched on to Spinozism by Dcleuze-Guattari
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Written a few years ahead of key cyberpunk texts such as Blade Runner and Neuromancer. 
BaudriUard’s two essays on SF, “Simulacra and Science Fiction” and “Crash”, are stunningly 
prescient in their recognition “that the good old imaginary of science fiction is dead and that 
something else is in the process of emerging (not only in fiction but in theory as well). The same 
wavering and indeterminate fate puts an end to science fiction - but also to theory, as specific 
genres.” (SS 121) The theme of the end of theory (and its absorption into a science fiction which is 
no longer one) will be taken up more fully in Chapter 4; for now, we will concentrate on the collapse 
of science fiction.
Cyberpunk conforms to Baudrillard’s prophecies to such a degree that it threatens to go beyond 
them. This is more than a question of “Neuromancer and other novels, [providing] stunning 
examples of how realist, ‘extrapolative’ science fiction can operate as prefigurative social theory”33 , 
although it certainly involves this; it is a matter of fictional concepts becoming what used to be called 
Social Facts - the most obvious example of this phenomenon being the migration ol Gibson's 
"cyberspace” from fiction out into (post) social reality.
Baudrillard’s own examples of the “new science fiction that is not one” are Dick and Ballard (two 
influences Gibson has repeatedly acknowledged ). It is precisely Ballard and Baudrillard’s shared 
sense of immanence, their refusal - Jameson would want to say inability - to offer any kind of social 
criticism that make both quintessentially “postmodern” in Jameson’s terms . Unlike Baudrillard, for 
whom, “SF proper” replaces the utopian as a mode, Jameson assumes that, in its more confident 
period, science fiction was very much in the business of dealing with utopia. According to Jameson, 
the critical examination of images of utopia in SF novels such as Ursula LeGuin’s The Dispossessed 
meant that these fictions were capable of exercising political responsibility in a way that the new 
science fiction cannot. (PCLLC 160) (As we shall see, for the Jameson of The Seeds o f Time, 
Blade Runner becomes a privileged example of this phenomenon because it apparently exemplifies 
all the features of the old dystopian fiction, yet it is clearly not dystopian.)
^  Mike Davis, “Beyond Blade Runner: Urban Control The Ecology of Fear”, Westfield NJ: Open Magazine 
Pamphlets, 1992 4
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Scornful of the aspirations of the leftist transformational pro ject to which Jameson is still committed. 
Baudrillard is particularly delighted by Ballard’s refusal of the binary “function/ dysfunction by his 
complete abandonment of any moral or political/critical stance 34. For Baudrillard, the dream ol 
transformation belongs to the “productive, Promethean” era - industrialism - that cybernetics has 
terminated. Like cybernetics itself, the fictions characteristic of the new era arc “immanent and thus 
leave no room for any kind of imaginary transcendence.” (SS 122)
In what follows, the emphasis will be placed on cybernetics rather than postmodernism, in part 
because it will be argued that cybernetics plays a crucial part in the genealogical development of 
what has been called postmodern theory. In his somewhat pompous essay "The Postmodern Dead 
End”, Felix Guattari attributes all postmodern thought to “hastily developed, |and] poorly 
mastered...” references made in the immediate postwar period to “the new communications and 
computer technologies.” ‘The secret link that binds these various doctrines stems, I believe, from a 
subterranean relationship - marked by reductionist conceptions, and conveyed immediately after the 
war by information theory and cybernetic research.” 35 Whilst not wanting to be quite so peremptory 
as Guattari, it will be argued here that postmodernist theory - in particular that of Jameson and 
Baudrillard - is substantially given over to description of processes that arc often explicitly identified 
as “cybernetic”36 .
Except in Ballard's commentaries on his own fiction, which, Baudrillard complains, reinscrihe the moral 
Irameworks die novels efface. See “Crash”. For a bizarre cyborganicist polemic against this, see Vivian Sohchack 
"Beating the Meat/Surviving the Text, or How to Get out of this Century Alive” in Mike Fealherstonc and Roger 
Burrows ed., Cyberspace/ Cyberbodies/ Cyberpunk: Cultures of Technological Embodiment. London-Thousand 
Oaks-New Delhi: Sage 1995
Felix Guatlari, The Guattari Reader, ed. Gary Genosko, Oxford/ Cambridge Mass. : 1990. 111
This is even die case with Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition - which will not be considered in any detail here - 
despite Lyotard actually making a point of attempting to actively differentiate the “postmodern" thought he is 
developing from cybernetic frameworks. According to Peter Gallison, though, “the link between” cybernetics and 
Lyotard's version of die postmodern “is profound and the continuity nearly complete.". Lyotard "nervously contended 
that his social analysis [...] departed from cybernetics" but, Gallison shows that the three ways in which Lyotard 
attempts to distinguish his own position from that of cybernetic are unconvincing. First, Lyotard attacks cybernetics 
lor treating messages homogeneously, claiming that it fails to distinguish “denotatives, prescriptives, evaluatives. 
performatives, etc.” but “at least two of Lyotard’s categories (denotative and prescriptive) directly parallel Wiener's 
distinction between die indicative and imperative modes of messages.” Second. Lyotard ¡agues that "a cybernetic 
machine does indeed run on information, but the goals programmed in to it [leave no way] to correct in the course of 
ds functioning [...] its own performance.” But this “self-correction is exactly what Wiener’s machines did." Third, 
Lyotard’s claim that “the trivial cybernetic version of information” misses the “agonistic aspect of society" is similarly 
misconstrued: “it was on the agonistic field that Wiener, von Neumann, and the operational analysts were most at 
home. Formally, militarily, and philosophically, theirs was a universe of confrontation between opponents: Allies to
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Briefly, the crucial insight of cybernetics as presented in Wiener's 1948 Cybernetics, or Control 
and Communication in the Animal and the Machine and in the later The Human Use of Human 
Beings concerned feedback: “the property of being able to adjust future conduct by past 
performance.” (HUHB 33) In the Second World War, Wiener had worked on Anti-aircraft 
weaponry , whose efficacy depended upon the ability of the machines “to record the performance 
and non-performance of their own tasks.” (HUHB 36) The study of feedback is immediately a study 
of control and communication; control is distinguished from domination, since it is immanent to the 
system - the machine corrects itself - and this self-correcting function depends upon communication 
(the efficient processing of information about what is happening both “inside" the system and 
“outside” it). Two types of feedback could be distinguished: negative feedback, which tends to 
maintain stability in a system, (and which can be seen to be exemplified in simple gadgets such as 
thermostats), and positive feedback, which is the tendency of a system to run out of control - as with 
any kind of “vicious circle”.
Technology37 is therefore important to cybernetics, but it Is not, as a certain contemporary usage of
the “cyber-” prefix implies, its sole focus. Rather, technical machines are significant precisely
because their analysis (in the double sense of the analysis that can be made of them and the analysis
they make possible) demands that the distinction between human beings, animals and machines be
decoded. What Wiener characterises as the Cartesian 38 privileging of the human over the animal
and of the organic over the inorganic is revealed by cybernetics, Wiener thinks, to be an arbitrary
prejudice (attributable, ultimately, to monotheistic theology). Since all working systems can all be
described, abstractly, in terms of particular feedback processes - input and output of “information” -
cybernetics is able to develop what Wiener still has to think of as a “functional analogy” between
Axis, monad to monad, message to message, and mechanized 'man' to servomechanical enemy." "The Ontology ol 
tlie Enemy: Norbert Weiner and the Cybernetic Vision”, Critical Inquiry, Autumn 1994, Volume 2 1. Number I.
^  Deleuze-Guattari call technology “technical machines” , a description that will he favoured here.
38 See, for instance, GGi S. “Like Descartes, we must maintain the dignity of Man by treating him on a basis 
entirely different from that on which we treat the lower animals. Evolution and the origin of the species are a 
desecration of human values (...] On no account is it permissible to mention living beings and machines in the same 
breath. Living beings are living beings in all their parts; while machines are made of metals and other unorganized 
substance, with no line structure relevant to their purposive or quasi-purposive function."
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humans and machines . Yet, as Baudrillard very quickly realised, this very functionality - or 
"operationality” as he calls it - means that the relation is always more than merely analogical.
Evidently, and as Wiener himself had realised, the emergence of cybernetics was not only a matter of 
theory. ‘The problem of unemployment arising from automization is no longer conjectural, but has 
become a very vital difficulty of modern society, ” (GGi vii) he notes in God and Golem, irn . His 
speculations on the moral and theological implications of cybernetics as presented there and in the 
earlier The Human Use of Human Beings are prompted by a sense that “cybernetics has made a 
certain social and scientific impact” , not only as a “relatively new idea”, but as a set of practices that 
are already mutating the social machines.
"Cybernetics provides the pretext for a the mechanized control of social life, of the body itself, and 
all of it through the delicate nets of nonmachine-dcrivcd mathematical formulae.” Csicsery-Ronay 
writes, summarising a certain leftist social criticism’s glum perception of cybernetics. “Cybernetics 
represents the hardening and exteriorization of certain vital forms of knowledge, the crystallization 
of the Cartesian spirit into material objects and commodities. Cybernetics is already a paradox: 
simultaneously a sublime vision of human power over chance and a dreary augmentation of 
multinational capitalism’s mechanical process o f expansion - so far characterized by almost 
uninterrupted positive feedback.”39
Deleuze-Guattari, Baudrtllard and Jameson all recognise that capitalism, which has always 
functioned as an adaptive, sell-compensating system. Is becoming increasingly cybernetic. For 
Deleuze-Guattari, capitalism has entered a “cybernetic and informational” phase. The older power 
regimes of machinic enslavement (in which human beings function as parts o f a social-technical 
megamachine) and social subjection (in which human beings are subjected to the technical machines 
they use) combine in a new “aggregate which includes both subjection and enslavement taken to 
extremes, as two simultaneous parts that constantly reinforce and nourish each other ” (TP 45S), a 
combination made possible, in part, by the emergence of cybernetic machines such as computers.
' > "Cyberpunk and Neuromanticism”, in McCaffrey, cd„ Storming the Reality Studio, 1H6
31
Elsewhere, Deleuze characterizes this formation as “Control society,” and credits Burroughs with 
being its first cartographer. 40
When, in ‘The Ecstasy of Communication” Baudrillard announces the arrival of "the proteinic' 
era of networks, [...] the narcissistic and protean era of connections, contact, contiguity, feedback 
and generalized interface that goes with the universe of communication” (EC 127) he is very 
obviously describing an era dominated by the same “cybernetic and informational” processes. Front 
his first book, The System o f Objects, through to For a Critique o f the Political Economy o f the 
Si an and on into his latest work, Baudrillard has been obsessed with cybernetics and its 
implications.41 As Scott Bukalman tirelessly points out 42 , Baudrillard’s subject is a terminal, both 
at the end of an exhausted Western line, and an input-output node on the network, “a switching 
centre for all the networks of influence.” Rather than criticizing this “self-regulating, selfsame, self- 
reproducing system” 43 from the point of view of a utopia yet to come - in the manner of dialectical 
Marxism - Baudrillard simulates a primitive perspective, comparing the dull white magic of humanist 
lechnoscience with the black magics of symbolic exchange.44
Broadly accepting the negative characterization of cybernetics outlined in leftist critique but 
abandoning any sense that the tendency towards total cybcrnelicization could be overcome by 
collective action of whatever form , Baudrillard suggests that resistance and "criticism” are
'll1 See Deleu/.e, "Postscript on Societies of Control” in Negotiations.
1 As early as The System o f Objects (trans. James Benedict. London/ New York: Verso, 1996), originally published 
m 1 ViS8, Baudrillard refers to the “reign of cybernetics and electronics”. (52) For a Critique o) the Political Economy 
"I the Sign (trims. Charles Levin. USA: Telos Press, 1981), whose essays date from the lale 60s and early 70s. has a 
chapter entitled “Design and Environment, or How Political Economy Escalates into Cyberblilz.” In the later The 
Transparency o f Evil, which came out in Pans in 1990, Baudrillard is still obsessed with “die cybernetic revolution ’ 
(24)
42 „.
“ rhs whole btxik, Terminal Identity, could be seen as an extended elaboration of tins pun. Compare Wiener’s 
description of the “human being as a terminal machine.” (HUHB 79)
Douglas Kellner, Jean Baudrillard: From Marxism to Postmodernism and Beyond, Oxford: Polity Press. 1989, 81
44
■ >n Baudrillard’s primitivism, sec Julian Pcfams, Heterology and the Postmodern: Bataille, Buudrillard anil 
Lvularil, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1991.
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superseded strategies which are easily fed back into “the system” (which any way requires them)45. 
‘Cybernetic control, generation through models, differential modulation, feedback, question/answer, 
etc.: this is the new operational configuration.” (SED 57) The system doesn't work by 
suppression, or repression, but through participative processes ; an archetypal phenomenon is the 
opinion poll, which, according to Baudrillard, doesn’t represent or even "manipulate” public 
opinion, but substitutes for it. “We live in a referendum mode precisely because there is no longer 
any referential.” (SED 62) As we shall sec in Chapter 4, for Baudrillard, these “fictions” - which 
arc by no means fictions in the old sense - stand in for a social scene that has been thoroughly 
eybernetized. Thus is no longer a matter of feedback, but of simulation-circuitries which have no 
referent beyond themselves.“Public opinion is par excellence both the medium and the message. The 
polls informing this opinion are the unceasing imposition of the medium as the message. They 
thereby belong to the same order of TV as the electronic media, which ... arc also a perpetual 
question/answer game, an instrument of perpetual polling.” (SED 66)
Baudrillard’s description of these flattencd-out feedback processes lends to refer not to Wiener but 
to McLuhan (himself a theorist clearly strongly influenced by cybernetics), and to Monod46. whose 
"molecular cybernetics” provides Baudrillard with much of the theoretical material from which his 
notion of “the code” is produced. Yet Wiener appears to be a powerful, if uncrcditcd, influence on 
Baudrillard. One of the most celebrated aspects of Baudrillard’s work, his “order of simulacra”, 
could almost be a gloss on Wiener. Not only do the order of simulacra culminate in cybernetics 
(“simulacra of simulation, founded on information, the model, the cybernetic game - total 
operationally, hyperreality, aim of total control” [SS 1211); the threefold distinction it relies upon 
itself seems to be derived from the typology of machines Wiener outlines in the first chapter of 
Cybernetics. Arguing there that “the ability of an artificer to produce a working simulacrum of a 
living organism has always intrigued people” and claiming that the “desire to produce and to study
^  Jameson summarises Uius: “It remained for Baudrillard to give the most dramatic ‘paranoiac-critical’ expression 
ol the dilemma, in his demonstrations of the ways in which conscious ideologies of revolt, revolution, and even 
negative critique - far from being merely ‘co-opted’ by the system - an integral and tunctional part ol the system’s own 
internal strategies.” (PCLLC 203)
See esp “The Order of Simulacra”, in SED, which refers both to MomxJ’s Chance anti Necessity, and lo 
McLuhan's celebrated formula "the medium is the message.”
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automata has always been expressed in terms of the living technique of the age”, Wiener divides 
modem technology into three eras. “In the time of Newton, the automaton becomes the clockwork 
music box, with the little effigies pirouetting stiffly on top. In the nineteenth century, the automaton 
is a glorified heat engine, burning some combustible fuel instead of the glycogen of the human 
muscles. Finally, the present automaton opens doors by means of photocells, or points guns to the 
place at which a radar beam picks up an airplane, or computes the solution o f differential equations.” 
(C 4«)
The order of simulacra as Baudrillard presents it makes the same differentiation between mechanical, 
thermodynamic and cybernetic machines, expressed initially as the distinction between the automaton 
(which, for Baudrillard, is understood as a purely mechanical being) and the robot (which is an 
industrial creature). “A world separates these two beings [...] The automaton plays the man of the 
court, the socialite, it takes part in the social and theatrical drama of prc-Revolulionary France. As 
for the robot, as its name implies, it works; end of the theatre, beginning of human mechanics. The 
automaton is the analgon of man and remains responsive to him (even playing draughts with him!) 
The machine is the equivalent of man, appropriating him to itself in the unity of a functional 
process. This sums up the difference between first- and second- order simulacra.” (SED 52) The 
third-order simulacra are the information processing systems of late capitalism which “no longer 
constitute either transcendence or projection"; they arc models which arc “themselves an anticipation 
of the real, and thus leave no room for any kind of fictional anticipation.” (SS 122)
If "Baudrillard’s theory-fictions of the three orders of simulacra must be taken seriously, which 
means: as realism about the hyperreal, or cybernetic realism’47 , it is because they have realised 
that, in capitalism, fiction is no longer merely representational but has invaded the Real to the point 
of constituting it. Any theory which thinks it can unmask the fictions of Capital belongs to the 
second-order simulacra - the nineteenth century phase of industrial capitalism - that was anyway 
always eluding it.48 Dressed up in the apparently cynical garb of ideology critique or the
-*7 Grant, “Los Angeles 2019”, (no page refs).
4X Baudrillard sees such theories as being themselves production of the industrial phase. This means they ;tre unable 
lo expose it, for at least two reasons: (1) they cannot separate themselves from the phenomenon they purport to 
describe and (2) this phenomenon is precisely lo do with artiftciali/.ation, and so it makes no sense to say that its
34
hermeneutics of suspicion, such theories nevertheless credulously assume a certain stock of reality 
that can be metaphorensically analysed and distinguished from its supposedly merely phenomenal 
counterfeits, not grasping that, since industrialism, Reality has been produced - Baudrillard would 
want to say simulated - as artifice. Yet capitalism is the story of the successful implementation of a 
quantititavely-increasing fiction, i.e. Capital itself. What Deleuze-Guattari call “fictional quantities" 
(AO 153) absorb the socius into themselves in an irreversible process of artificiali/.alion that 
happens at the level o f “code”, the very bilological and socio-psychic formatting protocols front 
which all identity is produced. Exactly like the splicing between man. machine and insect 
Cronenberg shows in his version of The Fly, the merging Baudrillard describes takes place at the 
"molecular” level, so that distinguishing the so-called natural from the artificial is radically 
impossible. In this cybernetic age of anticipative simulacra, fiction, to paraphrase Deleu/.e-Guattari, 
is not an image of the world. It forms a rhizome with the world, there is an aparallel evolution of 
fiction and the world. (TP 11) The empirical as such is increasingly the mere playing out of what has 
already happened, virtually, in simulation. * 49
Baudrillard is fascinated by this immanentization, but typically tends to recode it - as in his essay, 
"Crash” - in semiurgic and nostalgic terms. What Ballard points to in Crash, Baudrillard thinks, is 
the limit point of the hyperrational; the point where the system compensates, in favour not of 
capitalist demystification but symbolic exchange, reverting back to the primitive rituals whose 
excision from hypercapitalism Baudrillard is always lamenting. Accepting and perpetuating the 
Weber-Bataille narrative of rationalist disenchantment50 , Baudrillard sees only fleetingly whai is 
evident to Wiener and Gibson: the convergence of cybernetics and sorcery on the Gothic Flalline.
Flatlines
underlying "truth" could be exposed. ‘Truth” belongs to the first order simulacra (and is itself inextricably connected 
to the counterfeit).
49 r-For myriad examples of these phenomena, see William Bogard's The Simulation o f Surveillance: Hypercontrol in 
telematic Societies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996.
For Baudrillard’s debt to Bataille in particular, see Pefanis, Heterology and the Postmodern
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Gothic Materialism - First Principle: The Gothic designates a flatline.
"Well, i f  we can get the Flatline, we’re home free. You know he died braindeath three times ?"(N
65)
One of Gothic Materialism’s crucial concepts - perhaps the single most crucial - is that oí ihe llatline. 
The concept of the flatline has at least a double sense. Firstly, it indicates a vernacular term for the 
Electro Encephalogram (EEG) read out that signals brain death; 51 a representation, on the digital 
monitors, of nothing no activity. For Gothic Materialism, though, the llatlinc is where everything 
happens, the Other Side, behind or beyond the screens (o f subjectivity) , site of primary process 
where identity is produced (and dismantled): the “line Outside”52. It delineates not a line of death, 
hut a continuum enfolding, but ultimately going beyond, both death and life. 53
She nodded. (N 65)
Secondly, the flatline designates an immanentizing line; a "streamlining, spiralling, zigzagging, 
snaking, feverish line of variation”, “a line of variable direction that describes no contour and 
delimits no form [...)” (TP 499) In cyberpunk, this emerges as a Spinoz.Lstic refusal to distinguish 
nature from culture, immediately recalling one of the principal features of the Gothic as re-animated
“ 'Flatlining' [...] is ambulance driver slang for ‘death’, Gibson says. ” Larry McCaflery, “An Interview with 
William Gibson”, Storming the Reality Studio, 269
.“>2 Deleuze, Negotiations, trans. Martin Joughin, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, 111
The Foucault of The Birth oj the Clinic encountered the llatline when reconstructing Bichat's version ol death. 
Kattier than being a destiny waiting for the organism at its termination, “death” is the real process (he organic-vital is 
parasitic upon from the start; it is an event, aconically multiple rather than chronically punctual. “Death is | ... | 
multiple, and dispersed in lime: it is not that absolute, privileged point at which time stops and moves back: like 
disease itself, it has a teeming presence dial analysis may divide into lime and space; gradually, here and there, each 
"I the knots break, until organic life ceases, at least in its major forms, since long alter the death ol the individual, 
minuscule, partial deaUis continue to dissociate the islets of life that still persist.” ( Foucault, The Birth ol the Clime: 
dn Archaeology of Medical Perception, trans. AM. Sheridan Smith, New York: Vintage Books, 1994, 142) As 
Iteleu/.e glosses: “Bichat pul forward what’s probably the first general modern conception of death, presenting it as 
violent, plural, and coextensive with life. Instead of taking it, like classical thinkers, as a point, he takes it as a line 
dial we re constantly confronting, and cross only at the point where it ends. That’s what it means to confront the line 
< tutside.” (Negotiations, 111)
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by German expressionist cinema: the famous continuity o f the inorganic into the organic presented 
in films such as The Cabinet o f  l)r Caliban where "natural substances and artificial creations, 
candclahras and trees, turbine and sun are no longer any different.”54
"Flathnedon his EEC. Showed me his tapes. How / was daid. " (N 65)
The term “Flatline” is central to Neuromancer, Gibson’s 19X4 novel, and the acknowledged in-text 
ol cyberpunk fiction proper. In Neuromancer, "Uatlinc” functions as both a verb - characters llalhnc 
(surl what, for the organism, is the border between life and death) - and a noun some characters 
are Flallincs (Read Only Memory data-constructs of dead people).
Neuromancer smears a number of “traditional” Gothic themes - unnatural participation, demonic 
pacts, the eseape of the inhuman, the unfolding of the organic into the nonorganic into an 
ultramodern updating ol the old Science Fiction story ol infolcchnical machinery becoming-sentient 
By the end, it is the story of the convergence of two Artificial Intelligences (Winlermule and 
Neuromancer) in the Matrix (cyberspace). The Als “belong” to Tcssier-Ashpool. a mysterious 
dynasty-corporation ("Family organization. Corporate structure” |N 95)). Wintcrmule engineers the 
convergence, using a group of cyberspace hackers assembled by Armitagc (a personality construct 
built out ol a schizophrenic ex-soldier called Corto) . Winterinute recruits/ rescues C'orlo Irom an 
asylum (much in the same way that Dracula, correlate lor another, earlier form ol capitalism, 
recruited Ins assistant, Kenlield 55 ) *
* Deleuze, Cinema / the Movement-Imaite, nans Hugh Tomlinson and Harhara llnhhcriani. Minneapolis 
1 .Diversity ol Minnesota Press. 19X6 III ,  Worringcr, Deleuze reminds us ill Cinema I. was Impressionism's "lust 
theoretician".
Bearing this m mind, Baudrillard is right, in The Illusion of the i.rul (uans Chris Turner, Cambridge Polity 
Press, 1994) , to stress that “die Dracula myth is gathering strength all around”, bin wrong lo say dial tins is “as the 
I austian and Promethean myths lade.” (47) Cyberpunk, as we shall see, is ollen about a melding ol the Draciila 
vampire myth and die Faustian narrative ol pacts with the Demon
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Il cyberpunk can function as a new realism - as Jameson, for one, has suggested56 - it is because it 
maps the convergence of Horror and Science Fiction narratives in late capitalism itself, 57 a 
perception consistent with Marx’s writings on Capital:
Marx himself emphasized the Gothic nature of capitalism, (...] by deploying the metaphor of the 
vampire to characterize the capitalist. In The First International Marx writes: "British industry 
[...] vampire-like, could but live by sucking blood and children’s blood too.” The modern world 
for Marx is peopled with the undead; it is indeed a Gothic world haunted by specters and ruled 
by the mystical nature of capital. He writes in Grundrisse: “Capital posits the permanence of 
value (to a certain degree) by incarnating itself in fleeting commodities and taking on their form, 
but at the same time changing them just as constantly [...] But capital obtains this ability only by 
constantly sucking in living labour as its soul, vampire-like.” While it is fascinating to note the 
coincidence here between Marx’s description of capital and the powers of the vampire, ii is not 
enough to say that Marx uses Gothic metaphors. Marx, in fact, is describing an economic 
system, capitalism, which is positively Gothic in its ability to transform matter into commodity, 
commodity into value, and value into capitalism.58
As capitalism exemplifies and outstrips Marx's most horrified descriptions of it, the Gothic escapes 
codification as a generic, psychological or fantastic mode to become the most persuasive materialist 
account of the contemporary socioeconomic scene. For cyberpunk, Marx’s most Gothic language 
has become his most realistic, whereas his organicist protestations against capital look like antique 
sentimentalities. “What Marx only thought... as ‘fantasy’ recodes and reassembles reality: as capital 
becomes the DNA of determinant technology, living labour is retrofitted as mere ’conscious 
linkages’, reacting to digital stimuli, in ‘an automated system of machinery ... set in motion by an 
automaton, a moving power that moves itself.’”59
Jameson’s definition of “late capitalism”, derived from Mandel, depends upon an identification of 
just this “production of machines by machines”. Jameson quotes Mandcl on "the three general
v> Jameson, Seeds o f Time, 146
^  cl. Kellner, on the postwar development of the horror film. “Since the era of German Expressionism in the 
Weimar Republic, horror films have been the shared nightmares of an industrial-technological culture heading, in its 
political unconscious, towards disaster. In (post)m<xlem theory, the catastrophe has already happened, and the 
contemporary horror lilm can be read as an indication of a (post)modern society in permanent crisis with no resolution 
or salvation in sight." “Panic Horror and the Postmodern Body”, 90.
S* Jud'di Halherstam, Skin Shows. 102-103
Grant, “Los Angeles 2019..”, quotes from Marx's Grundrisse.
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revolutions engendered by the capitalist mode of production since the ‘original' industrial revolution 
of the late eighteenth century” : “Machine production of steam-driven motors since IX4X: machine 
production of electric and combustion motors since the 90s of the 19th century: machine production 
of electronic and nuclear-powered apparatuses since the 40s of the 20th century." (PCLLC 35)
Processing this perception in advance of Jameson, Deleuze-Guattari’s cybernetic realism inherits and 
supplements Marx’s Gothic vocabulary. Citing Marx, they refer to capitalism as "a post-mortem 
despotism, the despot become anus and vampire: ‘Capital is dead labour, that vampire-like, only 
lives by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more labour it sucks’” (AO 228) and also as 
"the thing, the unnamable, the generalized decoding of all flows” (AO 153).
" You ever try to crock on AI'.r '(N 139)
"The only modern myth is the myth of zombies,” they add, "mortified schizos, good for work, 
brought back to reason.” (AO 335) Neuromancer presents a number of variants of zombification : 
the Dixie Flatline, a Read Only Memory construct of Case’s dead mentor, McCoy Pauley . the meat 
puppets, prostitutes whose brain-function is switched off by “neural cut-out”, and the cryogenicully- 
preserved Tessier-Ashpool clan.
The (brain-body) states Neuronumcer zones in on are adrift between life and death, immediately 
recalling those which Gothic figures - the zombie, but also the vampire and Frankenstein’s creation - 
have always occupied. Neuronumcer decodes horror fiction into realism by refusing to codify these 
slates as “fantastic” or “supernatural”, describing them instead as the purely technical exploration of 
/ones at the outer edge of the organism: technical hallucinations. The lead male character Case 
interlaces with Wintermute, in states of catatonia, brain death. “As the authors of horror stories have 
understood so well, it is not death that serves as the model for catatonia, it is catatonic schizophrenia 
that gives its model to death. Zero intensity.” (AO 329)
"Sure, I flatlined Hit the first strata and that's all she wrote. My joehoy smelled the skin 
frying and pulled the trades o ff me. Mean shit, that ice. "(N 138-9)
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For Gothic Materialism, body horror is not something with which the body is afflicted merely 
contingently - it is not, for instance, a question of the penetration of a biotically-scaled interiority by 
invaders that may or may not strike - but something inherent to the body at all times and in all its 
operations. Body horror= cybernetic realism. Cronenberg: “One of our touchstones for reality is our 
bodies. And yet they[...] are by definition ephemeral.”60 Wiener: “Our tissues changes as we live: 
the food we eat and the air we breathe become flesh of our flesh and bone of our bone, and the 
momentary elements of our flesh and bone pass out of our body every day through cxcreta| ...] We 
arc not stuff that abides, but patterns that repeat themselves.” (HUHB 96) From the point of view 
of a “residual” subject, then, body horror is a horror of the body’s terrifying mutability, its sheer 
meat materiality . As Deleuze observes when writing on Bacon, the body is always that which is 
escaping the subject: “It is not me who tries to escape my body, it is the body which tries to escape 
through itself.”61 But it is also a horror the body registers itself , when “|b|cneath its organs it 
senses there are larvae and loathsome worms, and a God at work messing it all up or strangling it by 
organizing it.” (AO 9)
"Andyour EEC was fla t?"(N 139)
The struggle, then, is not between Mind and Body, but between different modes of the Body62 (some 
of which produce transcendence-effects at the level of mentalisl |mis]dcscriplion). So, where faced 
with cyberpunk , a melancholy organicisl postmodernism always “returns [...] to Descartes” 63 , 
Gothic Materialism discovers a Spinozism emerging out of cyberpunk’s ostensibly dualist narratives.
Chris Rodleyed., Cronenberg on Cronenberg, London/ Boston: Faber and Faber, 19*12
(l' Deleuze, Francis Bacon: Loyique tie la Sensation, 16, quoted in Christopher Domino, Francis Bacon: Tuktny• 
Reality By Surprise' , London: Thames and Hudson, 1997, 120
Deleu/.e-Gualtari identity three principal strata allceting the human body. “Let us consider the three great strata 
concerning us, in other words, the ones that most directly bind us: the organism, signitiancc, and suhjcctilication." 
(TP 159)
Kevin McCarron, “Corpses, Animals, Machines and Mannequins: The Body and Cybperpunk”, in Featherslone 
and Burrows cd„ Cyberspace, Cyherhodies. Cyberpunk.... 266. See also Mark Dery's Escape Velocity: Cybercnhure 
ui the End of the Century (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1996) which argues that “Gibson’s Neiirointini er | ... | can 
be read as a lengthy meditation on the mind-body split in cyberculture.” (24K)
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64 Cyberpunk revives Cartesian scepticism only to materialistically - Spinozistically - subvert it. 
Everything that, for the ostensibly sceptical Descartes of the early Meditations, is evidence that 
consciousness is the be-all and end-all, becomes, for Spinoza and cyberpunk, a signal that all 
perception is a matter of bodily stimulation.“By affecting the body - whether it’s with TV. drugs 
(invented or otherwise) - you alter your reality.”65 Reality for Gibson’s characters may be a state of 
mind, a “consensual hallucination”, as Neuromancer suggestively puts it, but Mind, as Spinoza 
would have it, is “an idea of the body”. (ETH, 2, Prop 13: 71-2) What, from a neo-Cartesian 
perspective is an epistemological question, becomes, in cyberpunk, a rigorously technical matter: if 
subjectivity can be experienced by a brain in a vat, as it is in Gibson’s Count Zero66 . what is 
interesting to cyberpunk is not the subjectivity but the vat.
"Well that's the stu ff o f  legend, a in ’t it?"( N 139)
What for Case and the other console cowboys is Mind floating free from the body is really a matter 
of brain-stimulation by electrodes, as Wintermute knows: its “meetings” with Case occur as Case’s 
brain is offline, and are constructed out of memories Wintermute has already hacked ("Another 
memory I tapped out of you when I flatlined you that first time” [N 204]). The real encounter, then, 
happens impersonally when Case’s brain is taken out of sequential time, into Aeon67 . But 
Wintermute relies on the fact that, by the time Case is conscious again, the perceptual­
consciousness system’s organic security apparatus will have narratavized what is basically an 
interruption of brain-function in personalized terms, packaging it as an experience, occurring in 
Chronos. Case is made to think he’s talked to one of his old acquaintances (the Faces Wintermute
Tliis, fittingly perhaps, in spite of what its authors thinks they’re doing themselves. Dery quotes Gibson on his 
attachment to the “Lawrentian” idea of “the dichotomy of mind and body in Judaeo-Chrislian culture" (Dery. 24X). 
whilst Cronenberg can be heard declaring himself to be a “Cartesian” in virtually every interview he gives. Obviously 
ihey haven’t read enough Spinoza.
fl'"' Cronenberg in Rodleyed., Cronenberg on Cronenberg, 145
The infamous Virek who “has been confined for over a decade to a vat. In some hideous suburb of Stockholm. Or 
perhaps of hell...”. (CZ 25) We shall encounter Herr Virek in more detail later.
f’7 On the distinction between Chronos and Aeon, see Deleuze, The Logic o f Sense, < trans. Mark Lester, ed. 
Constantin V. Boundas, New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) and TP (esp 262).
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wears on the flatline: Julie Deane and the Finn), when in fact, Wintermule has iusl precision- 
engineered a near-death experience in order to achieve , what at the secondary level, is a dam 
transfer. As primary process, this is an storm of electric signal, and it is only at the tertiary level lhai 
personal experience gets a look in: ’’This is tantamount to saying that the subject is produced as a 
mere residuum alongside the desiring-machines, or that he confuses himself with this third 
productive machine and with the residual reconciliation that it brings about: a conjunctive synthesis 
of consummation in the form of a wonderstruck ‘So that’s what it was!” (AO 18)
"It’.v something these guys do, is all. Like he wasn 't dead, and it was only a few seconds ... " (N
147)
The achievement of the best cyberpunk fiction is to effectuate a critique - fundamental to the Gothic 
and to schizoanalysis - of “the wisdom and limits of the organism” and “organic harmony.” (AE 
115) In A Thousand Plateaus, Delcuze-Guattari cite Worringer’s work as a forerunner of the 
critique of the organism and the organic they had begun in Anti-Oedipus. “Worringer’s finest pages,” 
they write, “are those in which he contrasts the abstract with the organic.” (TP 498) In this respect, 
Worringer’s work commcnsuratcs with that of two other key schizoanalylic figures: Spinoza and 
Artaud. In “How do you Make Yourself a Body without Organs?” Spinoza and Artaud are counted 
together as precursors of schizoanalysis’ engineering of bodies without organization.“After all. is 
not Spinoza’s Ethics the great book of the BwO?” (TP 153) “|...| Artaud wages a struggle against 
the organs, but at the same time what he has it in for, is the organism: the body is the body. Alone it 
stands. And in no need o f organs. Organism it never is. Organisms are the enemies of the body." 
(TP 158; sec also AO 9)
“/  saw th ’ screen. EEG readin ’ dead. Nothin' movin forty second. " (N 147)
The schizoanalytic dismantling of the organism converges Spinoza's sober geometric 
experimentation with Artaud’s catatonic delirium, on a Hat line where the body (as open system ol 
possibilities) is always rigorously distinguished from the organism (the homeostalically sealed and
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hierarchically arranged bio-container, or aggregation of cells). Schizoanalytic Desire produces what 
Case is compelled to do only, if not quite against, then certainly in spite of his will: a destratilicalion 
of the organism that, far from being an escape from the body, is the “out to body experience"68 
Spinoza and Artaud map.
The Body without Organs emerges on the flatline as “the model of death.” (AO 329) “Antonin 
Artaud discovered this one day, finding himself with no shape or form whatsoever, right there where 
he was at that moment. The death instinct: that is its name, and death is not without a model." (AO 
X) Case llatlined on the matrix makes the same discovery: his disassembly signalling not the 
transcendence of the body, but the autoamputation of the organs. ‘The death model appears when 
the body without organs repels the organs and lays them aside: no mouth, no tongue, no teeth, to the 
point of sell-mutilation, to the point of suicide.” (AO 329)
"Well, he's okay now. ” (N 147)
But what Is encountered Out here is not “death” as the irrevocable termination poinl. in Chronos. of 
the organism . The flatline is not a line of death but a journey into death as Aeonic event, a voyage 
into the loops (or “meat circuits” (TP 152 ]) in which the organism falls back towards the process of 
its own production. It is a simulated or “artificial death”69 that marks the outer limits of the 
organism: Death Simstim.70
"EEG Jlatasa  strap, ” Maelcutn protested. (N 147)
Nick Land, “Meat (or How to Kill Oedipus in Cyberspace”, in FeaUicrslonc and Burrows ed. Cvberspace. 
Cyberbodies... 192
69 r~For the concept of artificial death, see Nick Land, “Cybergothic”, in Broadhurst Dixon and Cassidy eds.. Virtual 
Futures: Cyherotics, Technology and Post-Human Pragmatism. London and New York: Routledge. I99X.
1 For Simstim (“Simulation-Stimulation”), the hypermedia immersion system of choice in Gibson's cyberspace 
lrlll»gy. see Chapter 5. For Death Simstim, see 0(rphan| D(rift), Cyberpositive. London: Cabinet Editions. 1995
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Il is, in other words, a plateau - a concept Delcuzc-Guattari adapt front Gregory Bateson's 
cybernetics. In Bateson’s version71 , the plateau was a type of negative feedback - a variant of wbal 
he called “steady state” - and was opposed to  the runaway positive feedback processes he termed 
"schismogcnesis”. Dclcuze-Guattari’s plateaus cannot be described straightforwardly as either 
positive or negative feedback systems. They are dynamic systems which nevertheless do not burn out 
in self-consuming runaway: “continuous regions of intensity constituted in such a way that they do 
not allow themselves to be interrupted by any external termination, any more than they allow 
themselves to build toward a climax” (TP 158), means of exploring the opening up ol the organism 
that don’t provoke il into suicidal collapse.
" You dead awhile hack there, won. " (N 217)
Bateson’s work, together with Eliade’s on shamanism, and Carlo Gin/.burg’s on witchcraft72 , 
establish that in certain non-capitalist cultural configurations, the dismemberment ol the organism is 
a socially coded ritual practice. For Eliadc and Ginzburg, the dismembering ol the organs is a 
preparation for the shamanic voyage to the world of the dead. Neuromancer tells this to Case on 
the llatlinc: ’’The lane to the land of the dead. Where you arc, my friend. | . . . |  Necromancer. I call up 
the dead. But no, my friend... I am the dead, and their land.” (N 289) In capitalism, Dclcuze- 
Guattari claim, this voyage is left to the schizophrenic, who, they say, is "trans-alivedead.” (AO 77)
"It happens, " he said. "I 'm netting used to it." (N 217
11 'Bali: the Value System of a Steady State”, Steps to an Ecology o f Mind: Collected Essays in Anthropology. 
I’sychiatry . Evolution and Epistemology, Frogmore, St Alhans: Paladin, 1971
7“)
Mireea Eliade. Shamanism: Archaic Techniques o f Ecstasy, trails. Willard R. Trask, Harmondswnrtli: Penguin/ 
Aikana I98K. Carlo Ginzburg. Ecstasies: Deciphering the Witches' Suhbath, London/ Sydney/ Auckland/ 
lolianncsburg: Hutchinson Radius, 1990
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Constructs
Gothic Materialism. Second Principle: There are no subjects, there is only subject-Matter. "Selves 
are no more immaterial than electronic packets. ”73 "Private persons are ... simulacra... " (AO 264)
For Delcuze-Guattari and Spinoza, primary process always operates at the level of the body, not the 
organism (and certainly has very little to do with the subject thinks is happening). In Anti-Oedipus. 
Delcuze-Guattari characterize their own materialism as "transcendental" (AC) 75). This 
■'transcendental” materialism remains properly Kantian in the attention it pays to conditions ol 
possibility, but these conditions are understood now in completely material terms, as the abstract 
grids necessary for the functioning of machinic assemblages. Dclcuze-Guattari’s emphasis on 
impersonal production and the “transcendental unconscious” states in philosophical terms what is 
one of cyberpunk fiction’s working assumptions: synthesize the conditions and you produce the 
experience. You can have the experience of subjectivity - all the memories and dreams that post- 
Freudian Man thinks defines him uniquely - so long as the right material conditions are simulated 
(artificially produced in the Real). Flencc one of cyberpunk’s key nouns: the construct, the 
artificially-produced subject.
Embodiment does not underwrite subjectivity; far from it. Gross organic persistence is no guarantee 
ol continuing identity, as Spinoza, in a moment of pure cyberpunk, establishes. "It sometimes 
happens that a man undergoes such changes that I would not be prepared to say that he is the same 
person. I have heard tell of a certain Spanish poet who was seized with sickness, and although he 
recovered, he remained so unconscious of his past life that he did not believe that the stories and 
tragedies he had written were his own.” (ETF1 IV, Prop 38, Sch: 177). It’s possible to forget who 
you arc, or, as in the case of Blade Runner, to rememher who you are not.
Land, “CybergoUlic”, 82
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In one of Blade Runner's most affecting scenes, Deckard, having tested Rachael and found her to he 
a replicant, tells her that her memories are not her own: they belong to the niece of the corporation's 
head, Tyrell.
Deckard:
— Remember when you were six? You and your brother snuck into an empty building 
through a basement window. You were gonna play doctor. He showed you his. but when it 
got to be your turn you chickened and ran. Remember that? You ever tell anybody that? 
Your mother, Tyrell, anybody huh? You remember the spider that lived in a bush outside 
your window? Orange body, green legs. Watched her build a web all summer. Then one day 
there was a big egg in it. The egg hatched-
Rachael:
The egg hatched...
Deckard:
And?
Rachael:
And a hundred baby spiders came out. And they ate her. 
Deckard:
Implants! Those aren't your memories. They're somebody elsc's. 
They're Tyrcll's niece's —
In Blade Runner’s 21st century-capitalism, identity has decoded into a matter of engineering. 
Memories and dreams - psychoanalysis’s ostensibly private and unique bio-security access codes - 
have been decoded via lab synthesis: the Tyrcll corp (re)producc Rachael’s memories just as they
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(re)produce her eyes, by copying the carbon. In a materialist parody of Russell's famous conjecture, 
now that they can remember it for you wholesale, you really could have been born yesterday.
Any way, as Wintcrmute and the replicants realise, “personality” does not await the arrival of AI 
programs to be a matter of machinic process. ‘There’s no subject, but the production of 
subjectivity.”74 From a strictly Spinozist point of view, the personal is always the simpersonal. the 
simulation of the personal (the conscious ego in extension) by the impersonal (the machinic 
unconscious in intensity). For Spinoza, self-consciousness as pure introspection simultaneous with 
what it is introspecting is impossible; subjective reflection is always behind the process, its 
epiphenomenon. “In Spinoza, it is only when the idea of the affection is doubled by an idea o f the 
idea o f the affection that it attains the level of conscious reflection. Conscious reflection is a 
doubling over of the idea on itself, a self-recursion of the idea that enwraps the affection or 
impingement, at two removes.”75 Everything really happens at the level of affect (what Massumi 
calls “non-conscious impingement”). Consciousness, like memory and habit, is always a reflection on 
- which Ls to say, after - the unconscious processes which produce it. The attempt by a subject to 
grasp the moment will only ever produce a Mis-en ahyme of auto-monitoring neurosis (always too 
late): the postmodern bad infinity of self-consciousness76 , crippling activity whilst not achieving 
transparency.
Wintcrmutc and the replicants effectuate an active nihilist anti-Ocdipal program by exploiting the 
knowledge that Ls the very condition of their existence. For the technical machines to have reflection 
is lor them to automatically realise that consciousness is nothing - the ghost in the machine. A 
vimpersonator - able to simulate personality and/or personalities - what Wintcrmule "lacks” is not 
“personality”, but the “ability” to confuse personality-function with Its essence. Like Rachael, It 
does not know what It is. Not because of what “Dcckard-Dcscartcs”77 has to think of as
4 Deleu/.e, Negotiations, 113
Massumi, “The Autonomy of Affect”, 12
76 c  • .i or a provisional account of which, see Fisher and Mackay, “Pomophobia”, Abstract Culture 4. winter IW7,
( yhernetic Culture Research Unit.
7 A pun made by Iain Gram, but which may have been intended by Dick.
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unfathomable epistemological conundra, but because It knows It cannot know what It is becoming. 
"[T]he entity manipulating you is a sort of subprogram,” 3Jane tells Case. (N 272) Wintcrmutc in 
most of the book is only an emissary from another entity - Wintermute + Neuromancer as they will 
be fused with the Matrix in “the future” - whose complexity is unknowable even - especially - to 
itself at that stage. “Well, Case,” Wintermute explains, “all I can say [...] , and I really don't have 
nearly as many answers as you imagine I do, is that what you think of as Wintermute is only a part of 
another, a shall we say, potential entity. I, let us say, am merely one aspect of that entity's brain. It's 
rather like dealing, from your point of view, with a man whose lobes have been severed. Let's say 
you’re dealing with a small part of the man’s left brain. Difficult to say if you’re dealing with the man 
at all, in a case like that.” (N 146)
Reversed, this same issue echoes throughout Blade Runner, in the metallic irony of Deckard's 
question to Tyrell in respect of Rachael: “How can it not know what it is?” Deckard, "a machine that 
thinks but thinks it is what it is not, certain that it is not what it is” “ironically answerfs] his own 
question.”78 The debate surrounding the Director’s Cut - is Deckard a replicant? - misses the 
Gothic Materialist implications of the film (in any of its versions). Since, in Blade Runner, the 
criteria for rating the human above the replicants (and anything else) have now evaporated, Cartesian 
epistemological questions have been obsolesced by functional (Wiener)/ operational (Baudrillard) 
criteria. Since you could be a replicant - which is to say, since replicants can do anything you can, 
and, in some cases, have the same beliefs about themselves that you do - it is already as if you were a 
replicant, a desiring-machine. Becoming-replicant is therefore not a matter of identifying oneself as a 
technical machine; it is not a question of identification at all, but of recognising all identity as 
construction. It to decode the false memory chips of anthropocentrist Oedipalism, to recognise that 
because everything has been produced, nothing is given.
78 Grant, “Los Angeles 2019...”, (no page refs)
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Second Naturalism
Tyrell: The facts o f  life. To make an alteration in the evolvment o f an organic life system is fatal. A
coding sequence cannot be revised once it's been established.
In Abstraction and Empathy and Form in Gothic, Worringer theorised the "Gothic or Northern 
line’' by contrast with two other lines: the organic (or naturalistic line) and the geometrical (or 
mechanical) line. As Norman Fishcer summarises: “Worringer questioned and creatively 
incorporated into his analysis the results o f tow types of German aesthetics o f his day. The first was 
the art history of Alois Riegl and others who had explored non-representational. abstract art. often 
of a largely geometric nature, and largely outside the canon of classical western painting and 
sculpture. Riegl, for example, had studied late Roman crafts [...] The second line was that of 
Theodore Lipps, who had suggested that the emotion o f empathy {Einfuhlung) was particularly 
elicited by the works of the naturalistic classical Western canon of great painting and sculpture. 
Starting with these two lines of research Worringer asked what the emotional correlate of the 
abstract, geometrical art was. In asking this question he assumed the answer was not empathy. His 
answer was essentially ‘alienation and denial of the world’. Thus Worringer saw art as either 
naturalistic and empathic or abstract and life-denying... In the extended tripartite (as opposed to 
dualistic), version o f the theory, there is a third possibility: an abstract art which was neither as 
geometric as the art studied by Riegl, nor as naturalistic as the art studied by Lipps. but a distorted 
version o f  natural life. Such work aroused emotion between between anxious denial and empathic 
affirmation.”79
Deleuzc-Guattari’s absorption of Worringer proceeds by excising empathy, not extending it. “The 
organic does not designate something represented but above all the form of representation, and even 
the feeling that unites representation with a subject (Einfuhlung, ‘empathy’),” they write. (TP 49S) 
The Deleuze-Guattari version of abstraction is defined by its complete refusal of empathy (and, 
coterminously, the subject).
7y Norman Fischer, “Blade Runner and Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep .?: An Ecological Critique of Human- 
( entered Value Systems”, Canadian Journal o f Political and Social Theory, vol 13, 3, 19X9 104-105
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Both Do Androids Dream o f Electric Sheep? and .Blade Runner centrally concern the question of 
empathy, a quality that is supposedly definitionally human. “Empathy Dick writes “only existed 
within the human community, whereas intelligence to some degree could he found throughout every 
phylum and order including the arachnids.”80 The limits of the community are marked by the limits 
of empathy: the bounty hunters, who become blade runners in the film, police the boundaries of the 
human community by performing an empathy test, “an exam whose stakes are the death penalty, a 
register of ocular motion hair triggering a response from an uzi.”81 Failing the test - the Boneli test in 
the novel, the Voight-Kampf test in Blade Runner - means that the android must be destroyed, or, 
as the cute euphemism has it, “retired”.
For Iain Hamilton Grant, “[t]he VK test serves [...] to retain affectivity, the last stripped down 
substance of the single City, sensus communis against the pathic ravages of Integrant World 
Capitalism.” (Pathic has a double connotation here: signalling both “feeling and perception” and 
"disease, contagion.”) In the end, what both Dick’s novel and Scott’s film show is the escape of 
affect from personal and communal qualification and the coterminous failure of empathy to serve as 
an adequate index of affectivity: a phenomenon exemplified by Blade Runner itself, whose 
"nightmares” no longer support the older organic dystopias, but “are [...] on the point of becoming 
celebrations of a new reality, a new reality intensification.”82 “Blade Runner [itself] Hunks the
Xl) Dick, Do Androids Dream o f Electric Sheep? 28 Compare this passage from Abstraction and Empathy. “In the 
Ionic temple and the architectural development ensuing upon it the purely constructional skeleton, which is based 
solely the laws of matter [...] was guided over into the more friendly and agreeable life of the organic, and purely 
mechanical functions became organic in their effect. The criterion of the organic is always the harmonious, always the 
balanced, the inwardly calm into whose movement and rhythm we can without difficulty flow with the vital sensation 
ol our organisms. In absolute antithesis to the Greek idea of architecture, we have the, on the other hand, the Egyptian 
pyramid, which calls a halt to our empathy impulse and presents itself to us as a purely crystalline substance. A Uiird 
possibility now confronts us in the Gothic cathedral, which indeed operates with abstract values, but nonetheless 
directs an extremely strong and forcible appeal to our capacity for empathy. Here, however, constructional relations 
me not illumined by a feeling for the organic, as is the process in Greek temple building, but purely mechanical 
relationships of forces are brought to view per se, and in addition these relationships of forces are intensified to the 
maximum in their tendency to movement and in their content by a power of empathy that extends to the abstract. It is 
not die life of an organism which we see before us, but that of mechanism. No organic harmony surrounds the feeling 
ol reverence toward the world, but an ever growing and self-intensifying restless striving without deliverance sweeps 
tile inwardly disharmonious psyche away with it in an extravagant ecstasy, into fervent excelsior.” (115)
HI
Grant, “Los Angeles 2019....” (no page refs)
Jameson, Seeds o f Time, 150
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cultural empathy test”83 , because it deals with this “new reality intensification”, not hy representing 
it, but by participating in it. Rather than “reflecting” social facts, it forms a rhizome with the 
decoding capitalist socius, anticipating scenarios already immanent to its current futures: as Mike 
Davis shows, the film’s ostensibly future Los Angeles setting is already a feature of LA's 
contemporary demographic policy: city planners talk of the “Blade Runner” scenario.84
In these conditions, the old indices for assessing cultural production no longer obtain. “Contra 
Jameson et a l .” in Blade Runner and Do Androids...! “the affect has not been lost, but stolen, 
striking a migrant passage through the machinic phylum that carries the affective community with 
it...”85 with the effect that the problem for the bladerunners is one of “limiting transphylic affective 
transfer, localizing the affect, [the geographizing] of points of intensity.”86 The other side of hlade- 
runner geographization (anthropolitical delimiting of intensity) is thus the long overdue liquidation 
of "bourgeois realism”, the preferred mode of expression of what Ballard calls "retrospective 
culture”, by cybernetic fiction.
Criticizing what McLuhan would call “rearview mirrorism”, Ballard spoke, in 1969. of the ways in 
which the conventions of traditional narrative technique were unable to deal in any way adequately 
with contemporary reality. ‘The great bulk of fiction still being written is retrospective in character: 
it’s concerned with the origins of experience, behaviour, development of character over a great span 
of years; it interprets the present in terms of the past, and it uses a narrative technique, by and large 
the linear narrative, in which events are shown in more-or-less chronological sequence, which is 
suited to it. But when you turn to the present ... I feel that what one needs is a non-linear technique.
tjl
Elissa Mardcr, "Blade Runner's Moving Still”, Camera Obscura, 27, September 1991
“In 19X8 alter three years of debate, a galaxy of corporate and civic leaders submitted to Mayor Bradley a detailed 
strategic plan for Southern California's future. Although most of LA 2000: A City of the Future is devoted to 
hyperbolic rhetoric about Los Angeles' irresistible rise as a ‘world crossroads', a section in the epilogue (written by 
historian Kevin Starr) considers what might happen if the city fails to create a new ‘dominant establishment' to 
manage its extraordinary ethnic diversity. There is, of course, the Blade Runner scenario: the fusion ol individual 
cultures into a demotic poly-glotism ominous with unresolved hostilities.” Mike Davis, “Beyond Blade Runner: Urban 
< ontrol The Ecology of Fear”, Westfield NJ: Open Magazine Pamphlets, 1992, 2
Grant, “Los Angeles 2019...”, (no page refs)
Grant. "Burning AutopoiOedipus”, Abstract Culture 10 (winter 97), Cybernetic Culture Research Unit, 7
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simply because our lives today are not conducted in linear terms. They are much more quantified: a 
whole stream oi random events is taking place.”87 Retrospective culture is thus triply hackward­
looking: (1) it explains events using a (superseded) linear cause- and effect model (2) it presents 
these events through an outdated thematic optic and (3) it docs so using obsolete formal 
conventions. The sense of time assumed by both the conventional novel and Oedipal psychoanalysis - 
itself a form of retrospective fiction, perhaps the most successful - breaks down under pressure of 
telematic mediatization (of which, more later - see Chapter 4). Ballard goes on to enumerate 
examples of these “quantified non-linear terms”: “we switch on television sets, switch them off hall 
an hour later, speak on the telephone, read magazines, dream, and so forth.” (57)
Tyrell: "Commerce, is our goal here at Tyrell. More human than human is our motto. "
Gothic Materialism. Second Definition: Gothic Materialism is equivalent to Hypernaturalism.
II cyberpunk demands to be read as “a sequel to naturalism”88 . as Jameson urges, it is because of its 
development into what is, in effect, a hypernaturalism. “In choice moments,” Ross points out, 
“Gibson reduces the naturalist mode to a minimalist shock strategy. Nowhere is this more striking 
than when the ccosphcrc is presented as a tcchnosphcre, as in the unforgettable opening line of 
Neuromancer - ‘The sky above the port was the color of television, tuned to a dead channel.' - 
which brazenly announces that henceforth everything here, even the sky, the home of the weather, 
will be a mediated second nature." 89
In Edmund Wilson’s classic description, Naturalism was a response to the Origin of the Species, a 
rcassertion of mechanism against Romantic organicism. “In the middle of the nineteenth century, 
science made new advances, and mechanistic ideas were brought back into fashion again. But they
87 d
Ballard, "The New Science Fiction: A Conversation Between J.G. Ballard and George MacBcth”. in Jones ed.,
The New SF: An Anthology of Modern Speculative Fiction, London: Arrow, 1969,53
XX Jameson, Seeds o f Time, 150
89 Ross, “Cyberpunk in Boyslown”, 155
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came this time from a different quarter - not from physics and mathematics but from biology. It was 
the effect of the theory of Evolution to reduce man from the heroic stature to which the Romantics 
had tried to exalt him, to the semblance of a helpless animal, again very small in the universe at the 
mercy of the forces about him. Humanity was the accidental product of heredity and environment, 
and capable of being explained in terms of these. This doctrine in literature was called Naturalism, 
and it was put into practice by novelists like Zola, who believed that composing a novel was like 
performing a laboratory experiment: you had only to supply your characters with a specific 
environment and heredity and then watch their automatic reactions."90
For Andrew Ross and Csicscry-Ronay, cyberpunk is differentiated from Naturalism proper by its 
abandoning of what was always an aspect of the naturalist project - the didactic or ideological 
imperative to social change. Cyberpunk takes mechanism to an extreme, so that the subjective 
agency to which Naturalism always appealed is now eliminated. Cyberpunks "can’t help 
themselves,” Csicscry-Ronay writes. “[L]ikc near-addicts of amphetamines and hallucinogens. | they| 
write as if they arc both victims of a life-negating system and the heroic adventurers of thrill.”91
In Jameson’s version, the original Naturalist texts were those “in which the lower depths, the 
forbidden spaces of the new industrial city, were disclosed to a horrified bourgeois readership in the 
form of perilous journeys and accounts of the pathetic destinies of the various underclasses, which 
you could read about in your comfortable armchair, and that thereby offered the double bonus of 
sympathy and knowledge of the social totality on the one hand and class rccontirmation and the 
satisfaction of the bourgeois order on the other...” 92 With Worringcr’s analysis in mind, we might 
want to urge the substitution of “empathy” for "sympathy” here. Even as it promises a connection - 
"the power of understanding and imaginatively entering into another person's feelings" - empathy 
implies distance; it Is also “the attribution to an object, such as a work of art, of one’s own feelings *
Edmund Wilson, Axel's Castle: A Study o f the Irnaninative Literature o f tH70-IV.1l), London: Flamingo/ Fontana 
i‘m , 13
* f sicscry-Ronay, “Cyberpunk and Neuromanticism”, 192 See the next chapter lor an examination ol the relation 
between cyberpunk and addiction.
yi ,
Jameson. Seeds o f Time, 150-151
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about it.”93 The price of extending empathy had always been the right of bourgeois realist 
conventions to represent the underclasses, a power once guaranteed by the then operative 
conditions of capitalism, where the distance - from the streets to the boss's office - was far greater 
than it is under the current conditions of ultra-rapid circulation:
The proletarian, the lumpen, and their cousins the urban criminal (male) and prostitute (female) 
- those secure characterizations of the older bourgeois and naturalist imaginary representations 
of society - have today, in postmodemity and cyberpunk, given way to  a youth culture in which 
the urban punks are merely the opposite numbers to the business yuppies |...] There is now a 
circulation and recirculation possible between the underworld and the overworld of high rent 
condos and lofts: falling from the latter into the former is no longer so absolute and irrevocable 
a disaster, above all since, offering a knowledge of what used to be called the streets, it can be 
useful for survival in the unimaginable spaces of corporate and bureaucratic decision.94
Cyberpunk, then, supersedes Naturalism by registering the meltdown of the social machines which 
naturalism both emerged out of and represented. In a sense, Marx himself was a Naturalist writer, 
re-describing capitalism in order to protest against it; but the space for such a protest was always 
dependent upon the subordination o f the Gothic to an organicist reality principle. By the time of 
cyberpunk, Jameson suggests, capitalism has decoded the social and narrative basis for this 
subordination, just as Naturalism has resolved into a cybernetic realism. Cybernetics, at least in the 
anti-personal version Dcleuze-Guattari inherit from Bateson, does not dismiss agency, any more 
than it announces the triumph o f mechanism; rather, it reformats both. Pursuing technical 
explanations to their limit moves far beyond crude Newtonian mechanism, just as abandoning the 
subject makes possible an agency reconccived along Spinozisi lines95 If cybernetics is a species of 
mechanism, it belongs to Worringer’s Gothic “mechanism” in which “matter lives |sic| solely on its 
own mechanical laws; but these laws, despite their fundamentally abstract character, have ... 
acquired expression.”96 And in place of the supposedly dclimitable motivations of a subject, there is
^  The New Collins Concise English Dictionary 
1,4 Jameson, Seeds o f Time, 151-152
As we shall see in more detail in Chapter 2.
’ Worringer, Abstraction and Empathy: A Contribution to the Psychology of Style, traits. Michael Bullock. London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967, 113
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ihe “ever growing and self-intensifying restless striving without deliverance” (115) of a "Gothic 
avatar” (TP 499) whose motives are unclear: what does Wintermute want? ,...97
In the move from Naturalism to hypematuralism, the old distinction between vitalism and mechanism 
- which, Wiener says, had been rendered illegitimate by cybernetics - collapses. “Whenever we find a 
new phenomenon which to partakes to some degree of the nature of those which we have already 
termed ‘living phenomena,’ but does not conform to the term ‘life,’” Wiener points out. "we are 
faced with the problem whether to enlarge the word ‘life’ so as to include them, or to define it in a 
more restrictive way so as to exclude them. We have encountered this problem in the past in 
considering viruses, which show some of the tendencies of life - to persist, to multiply, and to 
organize - but do not express these tendencies in a fully-developed form [...] It is in my opinion, 
therefore, best to avoid all question-begging epithets such as ‘life’, ‘soul’, ‘vitalism’ and the 
like[...]” (HUHB, 31-32), partly since “even living systems are not (in all probability) living below 
the molecular level.” (GGi 46)
Freud's metapsychology had made the same discovery; that organic life is inextricable from the non- 
organic. The organic is possible only on the basis of a nonorganic shield from which it is 
indistinguishable:
The organism [...] is a differential inserted into the cascade of powerful energies that threaten 
to destroy it (before it can destroy itself in its own manner). This differentiation is premised 
on an increasingly densely laminated mechanism of exclusion, within and by means of which 
the psychical apparatus can operate, binding and discharging appropriate quanta of energy. 
Were this protective membrane removed, then we would be left with both energy and the 
proto-organism undifferentiated and indistinguishable: in other words, undifferentiated 
matter-energy. Can we say, however, whether the laminar filter is itself living or dead'.' 
Freud has it that the envelope itself is inorganic, but it nevertheless forms part - an essential 
part - of a living system thus the laminae are themselves both living and non-living, not 
having the requisite depth or dimensions, in themselves, to constitute a living dimension. In 
itself, it forms the inconceivable differential from which the depth proper to systems is 
derived. One cannot conceptually pin this layer to the category ‘dead’, nor to that of ‘living’; 
instead, it can only be thought as matter-energy circulating endlessly in its permanent 
revolution’. Having, as Freud puts it contra Kant, no time proper to them, these energies
Needless to say, this question will recur throughout the rest of this study.
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neither live nor die: they are what conjoin the material processes of life and death in a 
continuum so absolute as to preclude the possibility of differentiating one from the other.98
Freud’s own concept of the death drive and Deleuze-Guattari/Worringer’s concept of non-organie 
life both fall short of the radically Freud’s description of thus continuum implies.99 Its adequate 
theorisation demands a Gothic vocabulary that scrambles, rather than re-invents, the vitalisl- 
mechanist double pincer. As Wiener points out, with cybernetics, “Vitalism has won to the extent 
that even mechanisms correspond to the time-structures of vitalism; but .. this victory is a complete 
defeat, for from every point of view which has the slightest relation to morality or religion, the new 
mechanics is fully as mechanistic as the old.” (C 56) A neo-vitalism is therefore no more satisfactory 
than a nco-lhanatropism; what arrives on the flatlinc is certainly non-organic, but it is no more alive 
than it is dead. Gothic fiction offers a ready-made term for this slate of anorganic animation: 
undeath. In line with Freud’s analysis of the “un” prefix in his essay on ‘The Uncanny”, undeath, of 
course, does not designate the opposite state of death (life); rather it is synonymous with the concept 
of un life. Following Freud again, who famously maintains that there is no negation in the 
unconscious, we can think of unlife and undeath not as opposed to life - or death - but as designating 
a continuum which includes, but moves beyond, the so-called living.
Ilypernaturalism or cybernetic realism would inevitably be a matter of confronting what happens 
when the (non)organic shield is unraveled, (as it is, notoriously, in the astonishing opening paragraph 
ol Lyotard’s Libidinal Economy). Where postmodernism often tends to be a screening process.
(tu
lain Hamilion-Grant, Indifferentism and Dispersal: Poslcritical Philosophy and Lyotard's Return to Kant. PhD 
iliesis. Warwick, 1993, 192-193 (italics added)
99 rvDespite (heir many merits, attempts to “radicalise" the death drive, such as Baudrillard’s (in SED: see esp. 14K- 
154), Land’s ("Machtnic Desire" in Textual Practice, 7 |3 |, 1993) and Grant's (“At the Mountains ol Madness: The 
Demonology of llie New EarUi and the Politics of Becoming" in KciUi Ansell-Pearson cd., Deleuze anil Philosophy: 
The Difference Engineer, London-New York: Routledge, 1997), end up re-inscribing the viudisl-mcchanisni 
distinction precisely by emphasising one side o f it. In this last, Grant rightly criticizes Deleuze-Guallari lor 
reterritorializing on vitalism, but Grant’s own excellent reconstruction of Freud's nonorganic continuum (quoted 
above) shows why any version of Ihanalropism is equally illegitimate. Deleuze-Guattari's concept ol lion-organic life 
<TP 411, 499) is partly derived from Worringer, who refers to “living mechanics”, but also shows the inlluence ol 
Bergson. In die first chapter of Cybernetics, Wiener attacks Bergson for implicitly maintaining an untenable 
dualism between die organic and the non-organic, if only through his terminological commitment to the language ol 
hie Delcuze-Guattari echo this critique in a closely-argued section of Anti-Oedipus (2X4-2X9), where they show that 
both vitalism and mechanism are equally illegitimate. Dclcuzc's later assertion that “everything I’ve written is 
vilalistic" (Negotiations, 143) is dierelore not only conceptually dubious, it is also laclually incorrect.
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locked into “the Kantian procedure whereby ... the categories of the mind itself - normally not 
conscious and inaccessible to any direct representation or to any thematizable consciousness or 
reflexibilty - are flexed” (PCLLC 157) , Gothic Materialism confronts abstract "lines that go 
beyond knowledge (how could they be known?)”. (NEG 110) But these are not lines of thought, us 
Deleuze would like; rather they are lines of affect, abstract feeling, exactly sensations so new they 
haven't got a name yet.
Deleuze’s Logique de Sensation opens up the way to seeing Bacon as the painter of these lines. In 
Deleuze’s account, the problem Bacon confronts is Gothic Materialist: exactly a mutter of 
registering the unnamable, the unpaintable. ‘T his is what Bacon means when he talks of wanting to 
paint the scream more than the horror’. One could set out the problem thus: either I paint the horror 
and omit to paint the scream, since I am representing the thing that is horrible: or 1 paint the scream, 
and I do not paint the visible horror, and continue to paint the visible horror less and less, since it is 
as if the scream had captured or detected an invisible force.”100 Realism, as Bacon rightly insists, 
does not have to be empirical. Indeed, it cannot be. 101 Bacon’s images llatten out organic- 
experience back onto its real material conditions as meat-becomings (“Well, of course, we are 
meat”102 ). Bacon’s imagery is already propagated across Gothic Materialist films - in the distorted, 
spasmoid bodies in Cronenberg’s body horror (bodies which “splatter, burst, writhe, pulsate, 
secrete”103 ), in the torsional metamorphoses o f John Carpenter’s The Thing (1982). in the demonic- 
hallucinations of Adrian Lyne’s Jacob's Ladder (1990) and in the creatures of the Alien series.104
l(X) Deleuze, Logique de Sensation, quoted in Christopher Domino, Francis Bacon: 'Taking Reality By Surprise' , 
London: Thames and Hudson, 1997, 120. This passage is commentary on Sylvester, The Brutality of Fact. 4X
101 See Sylvester, The Brutality o f Fact, esp 170-182
in')
* See Sylvester, The Brutality of Fact, esp 170-182 
Csicsery-Ronay, “Cyberpunk and Neuromanticism”, 192
*"* In The Monster Show: A Cultural History of Horror, London: Plexus, 1993, David J, Skal parallels Bacon with 
Horror fiction (224).
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In Libidinal Economy and Duchamp's Transformers'05 , Lyotard suggests ways in which such 
body horror might be a realist description of late capitalism. Bodies under capitalism are not 
“alienated”, he insists, but machined, transformed, mutated ; something Jameson recognises in his 
discussion of Cronenberg’s Videodrome in The Geopolitical Aesthetic. But Jameson, hung up on 
Adorno dialecto-melancholy, is far too quick there when he argues that the “|c|orporeal revulsion” 
arising from Videodrome's "grotesquely sexual nightmare images, in which males are feminized by 
the insertion of organic [sic] cassettes (if not revolvers) into a newly opened dripping slot helow the 
breast bone ... probably has the primary function of expressing fears about activity and passivity in 
the complexities of late capitalism, and is only secondarily invested with the level of gender itself...” 
(30-31) By implying that "feminization” must always be equated with pacification, itself a second- 
order effect of “late capitalism”, Jameson begs all the questions Videodrome poses in its positing 
of a convergent fate for sex, technology, and capital. If the image of the "Bogart of the postmodern" 
(James Woods, who plays Max Renn) becoming-VCR tells us anything, it is that capitalism 
establishes increasingly tight feedback loops between technical machines and biotics. performing its 
own hypernaturalist critique of the mechanism-vitalism split. The cybernetic environment does not 
start beyond the skin, just as cybernetic causality is not a question of Newtonian mechanics (A 
causes B) but loops (A causes B causes A); “in a multilinear system, everything happens at once” 
| TP 297 ) .
Videodrome , then, gives us another image of anxiety without a subject that is also the image of a 
body opening up. This opening parallels Bacon’s scream: “...|T |hc scream, Bacon's scream, is the 
operation through which the entire body escapes through the mouth.” 106 Significantly, 
Cronenberg’s schizophrenic body is utterly traversed by "media” systems - but media systems which 
no longer function as screens. Instead, these - cybernetic - systems operate precisely to break down 
the organism’s assumed interiority. It’s time now for us to take a closer look at both the body which 
lies behind - or beyond - the screens; a body, according to Deleuze-Guattari, Baudrillard. and 
Gibson, that is “without image.”
See Libidinal Economy, “The Desire Named Marx” and Duchamp's Transformers, trails. Ian McLeod. Venice 
CA: Lapis, 1990, 14-19
Deleuze, Logique de Sensation, 171
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Bacon: "We nearly always live through screens - a screened existence. And I sometimes think, 
when people say my work looks violent, that perhaps I have from time to time been able to dear
away one or two o f  the veils or screens . "107
107 4Ui. Christopher Domino, Francis Bacon: 'Taking Reality By Surprise' , 49
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2. BODY IMAGE FADING DOWN CORRIDORS OF TELEVISION SKY: THE MEDIA
LANDSCAPE AND THE SCHIZOPHRENIC IMPLOSION OF SUBJECTIVITY
Csiscery-Ronay: The horror genre has always played with the violation o f the body, since it 
adopts as its particular 'object' fear - the violent disruption o f the sense o f security, which 
precisely because it is a sense, works from  within the body, the house o f the senses / . . . /  Even 
when the same images or motifs are used as in the horror genre, they have a different value 
in SF because they attack not the image o f  the body, but the idea o f the image o f the body, 
the very possibility o f imaging the body (to borrow a metaphor from cyber-medicine)!.... / 
Cyberpunk is part o f a trend in science fiction dealing increasingly with madness, more 
precisely with the most philosophically interesting phenomenon o f madness: hallucination 
(derangement). [...] So the most important sense is not fear, but dread. Hallucination is 
always saturated with affect. It is perception instigated by affect. /  . , . /108
The Body without Image
Deleuze: Horror-story writers have understood, after Edgar Allan Poe, that death wasn 't the 
model for schizophrenic catatonia, but that the contrary was true, and that the catatonic was 
one who made o f  his body a body-without-organs, a decoded body, and that such a body there 
is a kind o f nullification o f the organs. On this decoded body, flows can flow under conditions 
where they can no longer be decoded. This is why we fear decoded flows - the deluge: because 
once flows have been decoded, you can no longer subtract anything or break into them, no 
more than you can detach segments from any code in order to dominate, orient or direct the 
flows. And the experience o f one who has been operated on, o f her body-without-organs. is 
that, on this body, there are literally noncodable flows which constitute a thing, an unnamable 
thing.109
Early on in Neuromancer, when Case is being operated on in order to restore his ability to use a 
cyberspace deck, Gibson produces describes his catatonic state in suggestive terms: "body image 
lading down corridors of television sky.” (N 43)
During the course o f  The Transparency o f Evil, Baudrillard also invokes a “body without image.” 
Discussing the “body under the influence of psychotropic agents” he writes of a body "that is no 
longer subject to the perspectivist space of representation, of mirrors and discourse. A body silent, 
mental, already molecular (no longer specular): a body metabolized directly, without mediation of
108 Csicsery-Ronay, “Cyberpunk and Neuromanticism”, in McCaffrey ed„ S to rm in n  th e  R e a l i ty  S tu d io . ISO.
109
Deleuze, “The Nature of Flows”, trans. Karen Isabel Ocana, D e le u ze  W eb, 
lmp//www.imaginet.fr/deleuze/sommaire.html
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act or look.” This body, he says, is a “body not far from the absolute loss of body image, from the 
condition of bodies that can’t be represented at all, either for themselves, the condition of bodies 
enucleated of their being and meaning by virtue either of their transformation into a genetic formula 
or of biochemical influences.” (TE 121)
Why should cyberpunk be concerned with a body without image? How does this connect with the 
media - and post-media - technical systems with around which its narratives have been constructed? 
And how does all this connect to Csisery-Ronay’s comments about the relationship between Horror 
and cyberpunk? In this chapter, we shall explore these questions with reference to fiction and theory 
which has been concerned with the relationship between bodies, media systems and cybernetics, 
concluding with an analysis of two exemplary texts, Cronenberg’s Videodrome and Ballard's The 
Atrocity Exhibition. But before that, we shall discuss the theorization of the body that is central to 
Gothic Materialism: the Deleuze-Guattari/Artaud hyperconcept of the body without organs.
The Body without Organs and Intensive Quantities
If Gothic Materialism utilizes Deleuze-Guattari as the principal theorists of Horror, it is because 
Deleuze-Guattari insist on reading Horror in terms of the body without organs. Gothic Materialism 
apprehends Horror not merely negatively but as one face of an abstract erotics whose program is 
the opening up of the organism into desiring-circuits: the production of what Cronenberg calls "New 
Flesh”. The body without organs is simultaneously the “object” of Horror - “it can be terrifying” 
(TP 149) “[a]s the authors of horror stories have known so well” (AO 329) - and the model of desire 
: "it is that which one desires and by which one desires.” (TP 165)
When Dcleuze-Guattari introduce the body without organs early in Anti-Oedipus, it is by contrast 
with the body (as) image: “’body image’,” they write, is “the final avatar of the soul, a vague 
conjoining of the requirements of spiritualism and positivism.” (AO 23) What is encountered out on 
the llatline - what you become there - is the body without organs, which “has nothing whatsoever to 
do with the body itself, or with an an image of the body. It is the body without an image.” (AO X) 
Body-image, they suggest, is an overcoding of the body by the subject, a representation of the
61
organism rather than an expression of the body’s potential, which is always abstract and always 
unknowable: in Deleuze’s favourite Spinozist formula, no-one knows what a body can do. The 
Spinozistic body can never be correlated with an image because it is always in process, defined 
ultimately only by its abstraction, but an abstraction that never ceases to be utterly material. The 
Spinozist body is not defined topologically, by extensive limits, but intensively, by the set of affects 
of which it is capable.
Along with related, but not equivalent, concepts such as the plane of consistency and the machine 
phylum, the body without organs points to what is the primary Gothic Materialist intuition: 
anorganic continuum. The qualification “anorganic” here is perhaps unnecessary, since, properly 
pursued, the concept of continuum already signals an apprehension of Spinozist single substance that 
immediately moves beyond the “wisdom and limits o f  the organism”. What the essentially Spinozistic 
concept of the BwO - “when it is a matter of the body without organs it is a matter of Spinoza”110 - 
allows is a radical dissociation from the organism that cannot be conceived of in terms of Cartesian 
dualism. The experience of the body as container for subject breaks down, allowing not an escape of 
the subject from physicality, but an exploration of the body as depersonalised potential: abstract 
matter. Abstraction without empathy. ‘The name ‘body without organs’ is itself sufficient clue to 
what is at stake in the thought, that is to say: the reality of abstraction. The body without organs is 
an abstraction without being an achievement of reason.”111. The body without organs is what stands 
in for any transcendental ground in conditions where “everything is produced, nothing is given"112 : 
it “is what remains when you take everything away” . (TP 151) In no way connoting lack, it is the 
degree zero of any possible assemblage, the baseline from which all intensities are immanently 
differentiated: ‘The body without organs is the matter that always fills space to given degrees of 
intensity, and the partial objects are these degrees, these intensive parts that produce the real in space
11(1 Nick Land, “Making it with Death: Remarks on Thanatos and Desiring-Produclion”, Journal oj 
ilic British Society fo r Phenomenology, Vol 24, No 1, January 1993, 69
111 Nick Land, “Making it with Death: Remarks on Thanatos and Desiring-Production”, Journal at the British 
Society for Phenomenology, Vol 24, No 1, January 199.3, 70
' Deleuze, Cinema 1, 110
6 2
starting from matter as intensity = 0. The body without organs is the most immanent substance, in 
the most Spinozist sense of the word.” (AO 329)
"A BwO is made in such a way that it can only be populated by intensities. Only intensities pass and 
circulate,” Deleuze-Guattari insist. (TP 153) The Gothic is essentially exercised by what Delcuze. in 
his discussion of expressionism, calls “the subordination of the extensive to intensity"113 but. as the 
above passage from Anti-Oedipus makes clear, the Dcleuze-Guattari theorization of intensity is not 
to be understood by opposition with extension thought of simply as occupation of space. It is a 
different type of occupation of space that is at issue. The crucial thought is one of continuum, and is 
derived in part from Kant’s discussion of “intensive quantities” in the first Critique. For Kant, it is 
the notion of degree that is crucial to an understanding of intensive scaling. All intensities arc 
measured in (infinitely divisible) degrees, counted up from zero, which operates not as a lack, but as 
a baseline that is itself an intensity (= 0). “Every sensation, therefore, and likewise every reality in the 
| field of] appearance, however small it may be, has a degree, that is, an intensive magnitude which 
can always be diminished. Between reality and negation there is a continuity of possible realities and 
of possible smaller perceptions. Every colour, as for instance red, has a degree which, however small 
it may be, is never the smallest; and so with heal, the moment of gravity, etc.”114 One of Delcuze- 
Guattari's best examples of intensive-becoming as infinite divisibility comes not from Horror but 
pulp SF, Richard Matheson’s The Incredible Shrinking Man. No matter how small he becomes, it is 
always possible for Matheson’s character to shrink yet further. While being shrunk to a particular 
size would still only be an extensive matter, shrinking is an encounter with bccoming-in-ilself. a 
becoming-intense (See “Becoming Intense..”, TP 279: “Matheson’s Shrinking Man passes through 
the kingdoms of nature, slips between molecules, to become an unlindahlc particle in infinite 
meditation on the infinite.”) Intensive magnitudes can populate the same - extensive - space to 
dilferent degrees. “For we [...] recognise that although two equal spaces can be completely filled 
with different kinds of matter, so that there is no point in cither where matter is not present, 
nevertheless every reality has, while keeping its quality unchanged, some specific degree (of
* * 4 Delcuzc, C in e m a  7,111
114 Kant, C ritiq u e  o f  P u re  R e a s o n , trans. Norman Kemp Smith, London: Macmillan. 1*776, A 169/ B 211, 203-204;
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resistance or weight) which can, without diminution of its extensive magnitude or amount, become 
smaller and smaller in infinitum , before it passes into the void and [so] vanishes |out of existence!. 
Thus a radiation which fills a space, as for instance, heat, [...] can diminish in its degree in infinitum. 
without leaving the smallest part of this space in the least empty. It may fill the space just as 
completely with these smaller degrees as another appearance does with greater degrees.”115 Delcu/.e- 
Guattari follow Kant in offering heat and temperature as examples of intensive magnitudes: the 
individual characteristics of a particular temperature, they say, cannot be adequately apprehended as 
the metric chunking-up of homogeneous quantities: ‘‘intensities of heat are not composed by 
addition” (TP 243). Degree of intensity correlates directly with a particular type of individuation, 
since each intensive quantity designates a particular quality. 116 “A degree of heal is a perfectly 
individuated warmth distinct from the substance or the substance that receives it |...| A degree, an 
intensity is an individual, a Haecceity that enters into combination with other degrees, other 
intensities, to form another individual.” (TP 253)
Intensive Voyages and Cyberspace
In Neuromancer, Case’s body when out on j^ m a tr ix  is, in a sense, a body, which like Baudrillard's 
body without image, is “connected up internally only - not to objects of perception (which is why it 
may be imprisoned in a ‘blank’ or void sensory world by simply disconnecting it from its own 
sensory nerve-endings without altering anything in the outside world)” (TE 121) but the Deleuze- 
Guattari theorization of the BwO allows us to rethink what is happening in this slate of 
hypermodern catatonia. If Case’s body is “disconnected from its own sensory nerve-endings”, this is 
less because it has autistic ally imploded into interiority than because it has decoded the Freudian
1 ’ ■* Kant, Critique o f Pure Reason, A 174/ B 216, 207
1 lf’ Intensity is closely connected with what Delcuze-Guatlari call “the germinal”. In the discussion ol Worringer in 
A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze-Guattari characterise the body without organs as “inorganic, germinal, and intensive" 
(TP 499) - the unformed or the non-formed. It is important that the germinal in no way connotes a developmental 
stage on the way to formation: the germinal is not a pre-existent or primordial state from which form is produced. On 
Hie contrary, die germinal is always alongside “formed matters”, utterly contemporary with them. As Deleu/c- 
Guattari write of the egg, “the egg is not regressive; on the contrary, it is perfectly contemporary | ...| The egg is the 
milieu ot pure intensity; spatium not extension, Zero intensity as principle of production.” (TP 164) Intensity here 
carries the sense of being in-tension, i.e. becoming, so that process is Hat with prtxluction, whereas extension (ex­
tension) (always only ostensibly) divides products from the process of their production.
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perceptual-consciousness system in order to access a set of (hy)pcrceptions belonging to a technical 
environment which is in no sense that of the organism. Case’s body out on the matrix can be placed 
alongside the examples of Bodies without Organs given by Deleuze-Guattari in A Thousand 
Plateaus. Like the junkie body or the masochist body, it is a body in which the organs have been 
programmatically annulled. ‘The BwO: it is already under way the moment the body has had enough 
of its organs and wants to slough them off.” (TP 150) Cyberspace, like the junkie's drugs or the 
masochist’s machinery, does not close up the organism unto itself; it opens up the body to a set of 
extra-organismic affects.
Travel in cyberspace, then, becomes less a question of floating detached from all (sensory) input than 
of what Deleuze-Guattari call “intensive voyage” . The components from which cyberspace is 
produced - the hardware and software of the cyberspace decks - are “in” space: but cyberspace 
"itself’ could not be said to be. Where, then, is the “space” of cyberspace?117 In an apparent 
paradox we shall explore again in Chapter 4, "the matrix’s illusion o f infinite space”" ’’ is accessible 
by, or in, one brain. Yet this is not because the reality of cyberspace is something merely 
phenomenal. On the contrary, beyond the screens of representation, the matrix is (nothing but) a 
differential grid, data as a set of intensive quantities. “It’s not a place, it only feels like it is.” (MLO 
1X8)
The often dizzying confusion of Neuronumcer's narrative arises in large part from its 
hypernaturalistic description of intensive voyages. Different “realities” can be accessed - intensively - 
while the body lies prone, in the same extensive space. The concept o f intensive voyage allows us to 
deflect assumptions that cyberspace travel is merely a psychological illusion, a phenomenological or 
interior projection. In a move we shall explore more fully in the final chapter, it is crucial to 
cyberpunk that virtual or artificial zones arc not alternatives to, but additions to. or folds in. the 
Real. All of which poses questions about Csisery-Ronay’s claims about hallucination and cyberpunk.
117 “Gentry was convinced that cyberspace that cyberspace had a shape, an overall total form. (...| Slick had once 
slimmed a Net/Knowledge sequence about what shape the universe was; Slick figured the universe was all there was. 
so how could it have been a shape? If it had a shape, then there had to be something for it to have a shape in. wasn’t 
there.’ And il that something was something, then wasn't that part of the universe too? |...] Slick didn’t think 
cyberspace was anything like the universe anyway; it was just a way of representing data." (ML() 83-X4)
f ’ihson, Burning Chrome, 205
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As we shall see shortly, the process of technicization de-phenomenologizes hallucination hy making 
it a matter of real (if no longer organic) perception; extra-organismic perception is packaged as 
technical (collectively accessible) hallucination. One of Gibson’s key technical innovations is a 
rendering of the resultant “body amnesia” in terms of a hypematuralization - or "airbrushing”119 - of 
the ostensibly radical Burroughs cut-up technique. In the Neuronumcer trilogy. Gibson presents 
reality as a series of “options” to be flicked through at high speed (as if by TV remote control), 
giving diegetic motivation for a splicing of Burroughs/ Ballard “collage” with a Philip K. Dick-like 
picture of nested alternate realities. The climax of Neuromancer finds Case "Hipping"/ "jacking"/ 
"switching” from a sensory stimulation link with razor girl partner Molly Millions to the matrix 
(where he is sucked into an embedded world [created by the AI Neuromancerl) to his own "primary 
body”, where electrodes allow him to make the connections. Movement around the matrix, or from 
the matrix into the outside world - is described as if it is being operated by a gaming console.
“He flipped.” (N 201)
“Hold on, [...] I’ll fastforward us.’” (N 205)
“Freefall.” (N 201)
‘The walls blurred. Dizzying sensation of headlong movement, colors, whipping around 
comers and through narrow corridors.” (N 205)120 *So
* ^  Gibson’s own description of his method The “airbrushing” of die textual collage techniques pioneered by 
Burroughs and Ballard is part of a “controlled use of collage [...] That's something I got from Burroughs's work, and 
to a lesser extent from Ballard [...) I could see what Burroughs was doing with these random methods, and why |...|
So I started snipping tilings out and slapping them down, but Uten I’d airbrush them a little to hike the edges off.” 
McCaffery, Storming the Reality Studio, 281
i ->n“ ' Larry McCaffery compares this technique to Dick.“Philip K. Dick was always writing about people like Virek 
who have so many ‘reality options,’ so many different reproductions and illusions, dial's it difficult to know what 
reality is more real - the one in their heads or the one that seems to exist outside.’’McCaffery, Storming the Reality 
Studio, 273.
The Virek McCaffery refers to here is in fact another of Gibson’s examples of a body widiout image. Herr Virek is a 
massively wealthy plutocrat ,who is at once the image of ultra-modernity and of grotesque atavism. He survives cancer 
- “die cells of my body having opted for the quixotic pursuit of individual careers” (CZ 29) - only by means ol the 
most up-to-date technology, a vat costing “a tenth of my annual income” (CZ 29). Virek’s capital begins to ape the 
dissolution of his organism, devolving from the centre in a financial equivalent of the disease that is destroying his 
body. “Aspects of my wealth have become autonomous, by degrees; at times they even war with one another. 
Rebellion in die fiscal extremities.” (CZ 26) Virek functions as a “logical focus” for a heterogeneous range of 
financial interests. “The death of a clan-member, even a founding member usually wouldn't bring the clan, as a 
business entity, to a crisis-point. There’s always someone to step in, someone waiting (...1 But when your Herr Virek 
dies, finally, when they run out of rtxim to enlarge his vat, whatever, his business interests will lack a logical focus.” 
(CZ 145) The sheer fact of Virek’s vast wealth makes it impossible to conceive of him as a human individual. Virek is 
the single wealthiest individual, period. As rich as some zaibatsu. But that's the catch, really; is he an individual? In 
the sense dial you are, or I am? No.” (CZ 144) As an example of the “paradox of wealth in a corporate age” (CZ 144) 
Virek s htxly - no longer that of an organic individual but a hypercapital haecceity - is an image of what Jameson calls 
the whole new decentred global network of the third stage of capital.” (PCLLC 37)
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The Mediatized Body
Gothic Materialism understands cyberpunk not as the dialectical fusion of Horror and Science 
Fiction, but as the materialist critique of Science Fiction from hypernaturalist horror. What is at 
stake is a - new- account of the body, abstract, cybernetic and denaturalized121 . Ironically perhaps, 
given all the discourse of disembodiment that often surrounds the technical apparatus with which 
cyberpunk texts have typically been obsessed - Virtual Reality machines, simulators, cyberspace 
decks - cyberpunk constitutes an earthing of SF’s “traditional” ideal, or non-physical, body. But the 
outlines of the body it emphasises are not defined by the limits of the organism.
Cyberpunk - or “imploded science fiction” - Csiscery-Ronay observes, "finds the scene of SF 
problematics not in imperial adventures among the stars, but in the body-physical/body-social and a 
drastic ambivalence about the body’s traditional - and terrifyingly uncertain - integrity." 122 This is a 
shift Baudrillard had also identified. “Classical science fiction,” he argued, “was that of an expanding 
universe, besides it forged its in the narratives of spatial exploration, counterparts to the more 
terrestrial forms of exploration of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.” (SS 123)
This - “classical” - science fiction corresponds with what Baudrillard, in his essay on Ballard's 
Crash, calls a “classical” account of technology:
From a classical (even cybernetic)123 perspective, technology is an extension of the body. It is 
the functional sophistication of a human organism that permits it to be equal to nature and to 
invest triumphally in nature. From Marx to McLuhan, the same functionalist vision of 
machines and language: they are relays, extensions, media mediators of nature ideally destined 
to become the organic body of man. In this “rational” perspective the body itself is nothing hut 
a medium. (SS 111)
l t ]
Where "natural” is understood in opposition to the cultural, of course.
1 “^ 1 Csicsery-Ronay, “Cyberpunk and Neuromanticism”, Storming the Reality Studio, 188
1~ Baudrillard's hesitation in respect of cybernetics - the “(even cybernetic)”- is interesting here: it is as if 
Baudrillard is recognizing that the theoretical implications of cybernetics point to a dismantling of the extcnsinnalist 
paradigm, even as its rhetoric keeps it alive.
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As we can see, by the end of the paragraph the classical perspective on technology has (also) 
become a story about the body. In fact, the two are indivisible. The classical or "functional" 
paradigm defines everything prosthetically. As Baudrillard realises, the logic of this position ends up 
defining the body , not as an organic originicity awaiting technical supplements, but as itself a 
prosthesis - “the body is nothing but a medium” (but for what?124 )
As someone alive to the implications of cybernetics, Baudrillard has repeatedly refused the idea that 
media are themselves “mediators” as such. It is not as if the media are signifying apparatuses, a 
network of transmitters and receivers, which “mediatize” extrinsic input. Rather, media are 
anorganic intensity-circuits, not translating a “message” , but transforming all input - including the 
organic bodies that function as intrinsic component pieces of the assemblage - into “code”. “The 
medium/ message confusion is certainly a corollary of that between the sender and the receiver, thus 
sealing the disappearance of all dual, polar structures [...] That discourse ‘circulates’ is to be taken 
literally: that is, it no longer goes from one pole to another, but it traverses a cycle that without 
distinction includes the positions of transmitter and receiver, now unbeatable as such.” (SS 41)
As the theorist who did most to pioneer a non-representational approach to media analysis, 
McLuhan - whose notorious formula, “the medium is the message” is referenced above by 
Baudrillard - is a pivotal and ambiguous figure here, if only because his most provocative 
pronunciations always concerned the relationship between the body and the emergent technical 
environment. McLuhan’s organicist leanings - his well-known contention that technics in general 
and media in particular are “extensions of man”- was always haunted by a set of propositions more 
susceptible to Gothic Materialism, and it is this - darker - side that Scott Bukatman fails to process 
when he dismisses McLuhan. Bukatman’s contention that “[b]y electing to ignore the psychosexual 
and sociopolitical realities which govern the use of technologies, McLuhan’s prognostications 
become science fiction (and not very good science fiction at that, recalling the liberal-Utopian
P4
Baudrillard offers a provisional answer to this question in Symbolic Exchange and Death. In ‘The Double and 
the Split”, a discussion we shall consider at more length in Chapter 4 , Baudrillard suggests that “There comes a 
moment, in fact, when the things closest to us, such as our own bodies, the body itself, our voice and appearance, are 
separated from us to the precise extent that we internalize the soul (or any other equivalent agency or abstraction) as 
Hie ideal principle of subjectivity.” (SED 142) The body, that is to say, becomes a prosthesis of the soul.
68
voyages of the contemporary Star Trek)”12S places McLuhan firmly on the side of traditional SF. 
ignoring ways in which he anticipates cyberpunk. Interestingly, Bukatman quotes Ballard's 
unfavourable comparison of McLuhan with Freud, from the introduction to Crash, here. "Despite 
McLuhan’s delight in high-speed information mosaics we are still reminded of Freud's profound 
pessimism in Civilization and its Discontents,”126 As we shall see, there is a lineage from Freud to 
McLuhan, a continuity of both Science Fictional and the most Gothic Materialist thematics. 
Ironically, though, the most Science Fictional side of McLuhan’s theories can be read precisely as an 
inheritance from Freud’s Civilization and its Discontents. Ballard seems to forget that the grand, 
tragic thematics of Freud’s essay are offset by an extraordinary technological optimism. In a direct 
anticipation of McLuhan, Freud describes technical machines as extensions of the organs. "With 
every tool man is perfecting his own organs, whether motor or sensory, or removing the limits to 
their functioning.” (PFL 12, 279) 127 Technology soups up the "feeble organism” (PFL 12. 280) to 
the extent that it can achieve what had once been a "fairy-tale wish”: “Man has, as it were, become a 
kind or prosthetic God.” (PFL 12 280) “When he puts on all his auxiliary organs he is truly 
magnificent,” Freud adds, qualifying this overblown technoptimism only with the enormously 
understated disclaimer that “those organs have not grown onto him and they still give him much 
trouble at times.” (PFL 12, 280) Whilst positing still further improvements on the road to techno- 
utopia - “Future ages will bring with them new and probably unimaginably great advances in the field 
of civilization and will increase man’s likeness to God still more” (PFL 12, 280) - Freud asserts what 
Ballard calls his “profound pessimism” only in the remark that “we will not forget that present-day 
man will not feel happy in his Godlike character.” (PFL 12, 280) Yet McLuhan’s doubleness. as we
n c
Bukatman, Terminal Identity, 71 
I Ballard, "Introduction to Crash, French edition" in Andrew Vale ed, Re:Search\,/.G. Ballard, New York: 
Re/Search, 1984, 96; qtd Bukatman, Terminal Identity, 71
Freud goes on to enumerate a series of examples. “Motor power places gigantic forces at his disposal, which, like 
his muscles, he can employ in any direction; thanks to ships and aircraft neither water nor air can hinder his 
movements; by means of spectacles he corrects defects in the lens of his own eye; by means of the telescope he sees 
into die far distance; and by means of the microscope he overcomes the limits of visibility set by the strucures of his 
retina. In die photographic camera he has created an instrument which retains the fleeting visual impressions, just as 
a gramophone disc retains the equally fleeting auditory ones; both are at bottom materializations of the power he 
possesses of recollection, his memory. With the help of the telephone he can hear at distances which would be 
respected as unattainable even in a fairy tale. Writing was in its origin the voice of an absent person; and the 
dwelling-house was a substitute for the mother's womb, the first lodging, for which in all likcliluxxl mail still longs, 
and in which he was safe and felt at ease." (PFL 12 279)
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shall see, is anticipated by Freud’s; if the “extensions of man" narrative is an inheritance from Freud, 
then so is the anorganic emphasis on autoamputation ; but the lineage can be traced back here not to 
Civilization and its Discontents, but to the more materialist metapsychology, especially as developed 
in Beyond the Pleasure Principle.
Jumping out o f  our Skin
"Today men's nerves surround us; they have gone outside as electrical environment." McLuhan 
writes at the beginning of his essay, "Notes on Burroughs". "The human nervous system itself can be 
reprogrammed biologically as readily as any radio network can alter its fare. Burroughs has 
dedicated Naked Lunch to the first proposition, and Nova Express [...] to the second." 128
McLuhan’s essay clearly has as much to do with McLuhan's own theses as it has to do with 
Burroughs’ fictions, anticipating their splicing in cyberpunk and its vision of “mankind's extended 
nervous system”, the “electronic consensus-hallucination”129 of cyberspace. McLuhan reads 
Burroughs as registering the epidermal crisis that will erupt in the violent imagery of Lyotard’s 
Lihidinal Economy and Cronenberg’s Videodrome: the sense that, under pressure from enormous 
stimuli, the skin is no longer a secure marker of organic integrity. “Our language has many 
expressions that indicate [the] self-amputation that is imposed by various pressures. We speak of 
wanting to jump out of my skin’ or of ‘going out o f my mind,’ ‘being driven batty' or ‘(lipping my 
lid. ” (UM 42) In the age of cybernetic hyperconnectivity, McLuhan suggests, we cannot contain 
ourselves.
"Notes on Burroughs” rehearses themes McLuhan had explored in the almost directly 
contemporaneous Understanding Media (both came out in 1964). “With the arrival of electric 
technology, man extended, or set outside himself, a live model of the central nervous system itself,"
1 ',8
McLuhan, "Notes on Burroughs", in Skerl, Jennie ami Robin Lydenberg, William S. Burroughs ill the Front: 
Critical Reception, 1959-1989, Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991, 69
Gibson, Burning Chrome, 197
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McLuhan famously argued there. ‘T o  the degree that this is so. it is a development ¡hut suggests a 
desperate and suicidal autoamputation as if the centra’ nervous system could no longei depend on 
the physical organs to be protective buffers against the slmgs and arrows of outrageous mechanism 
It could well be that the successive mechanisations e*  the various physical organs since the invention 
of printing have made too violent and overstimulated a social experience for ;he central nervous 
system to endure." (UM 43)
/v proto-cyberpunk work of theory-fiction. Understanding Media is also a sequel to the 
"speculative”130 fictions of Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Beyond the Pleasure Principle it sell 
marked the resurfacing of Gothic Materialist themes that had haunted Freud since the 
“steampunk”131 1895 Project fo r  a Scientific Psychology. This is the original case history: the 
story o f how organic individuation emerges out of processes of binding, damming and filtering, 
which operations, the Project and Beyond the Pleasure Principle make clear, define the organism 
as an inherently cybernetic system. “Far from [organic bodies] being constituted py means ol a 
reference to an absolute self-possession, an absolute propriety, they are constituted, as is any closed 
system, by the exclusions that define the (as near as possible) noiseless or determinant channels 
through which the only information that flows is that which reproduces the identity of the system as 
such. In other words, the borders, the ‘skin’ (to pursue the libidinal apparatus) is the product ol the 
identiiarian reproduction of the system, its re-presentation of its own constitution to itself.”’32 The 
organism, one might be tempted to say, is defined by the skin; yet, as we have already seen, the skin 
itself is not organic, but a “livedead” “inorganic shield”. It couldn’t be said, strictly speaking, that the 
ego Is “inside” , since this topologization already assumes the distinction between outside and inside 
that only belongs to the ego. The ego, or consciousness, therefore, lives on the skin, as Freud says, 
not beneath or behind it. It is, in Freud’s characterization, a “border creature”, in the double sense 
lhat it constitutes borders by patrolling them.
' ' (l Freud himself classifies Beyond the Pleasure Principle as “speculation, sometimes larlctchcd speculation." 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle, PFL 11, 295
* "  Ct Iain Hamilton Grant’s discussion of the Project in “Black lee”, in Broadhursi Dixon and Cassidy eds., Virtual 
Futures: Cyherotics. Technology and Post-Human Pragmatism, London and New York: Routledge, 1998.
Grant, tndifferenlism and Dispersal.... 1961
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Following the Freud of Beyond the Pleasure Principle , who famously remarks that “|protection  
against stimuli is an almost more important function for the living organism than reception of 
stimuli” (PFL 11, 298) McLuhan conceives of the organism as an homeostatic system whose aim is 
to neutralize, or disintensify, stimuli . ‘The function of the body, as a group of sustaining and 
protective organs for the central nervous system, is to act as buffers against sudden variations of 
stimulus in the physical and social environment.” (UM 43) Media function ambiguously in this 
respect: as what McLuhan misleadingly characterises as “extensions of man" they form an artificial 
perceptual system fusing with the organism’s “ectoderm”133 so as to present an extra protective 
layer against the “acceleration of exchange by written and monetary media”, whilst simultaneously 
contributing to capitalist hyper-stimulation, through their "amplification of a separate or isolated 
function” of the body’s perceptual apparatus. What McLuhan calls “auto-amputation” is a 
“numbness or blocking of perception” arising from an organic attempt to regain “equilibrium” in the 
lace of unmanageable stimuli: “the autoamputative power is is resorted to by »he body when the 
perceptual power cannot locate or avoid the source of ¡natation.” (UM 42) “Whatever threatens" the 
function of the central nervous system “must be contained, localized, or cut off . even to the total 
removal of the offending organ.” (UM 43) "We have to numb our central nervous system when it is 
extended and exposed or we will die.” (UM 47)
This numbness corresponds to what Freud describes as the development of an insensitive “crust" on 
the ectoderm, a “baking through” of the organism’s outer layer brought about by “the ceaseless 
uupau of stimuli.” (PFL 11 297) Since this surface “can undergo no further permanent modification 
irom the impact ol excitation”, it “present¡sj the most favourable conditions for the reception of 
stimuli.” (PFL 297) For McLuhan as for Freud, the sense organs, and their inorganic prostheses. 
Itave a Kantian ambivalence: in “sampling” the external world, they also necessarily screen it out, 
formatting its “enormous energies” so as to make them compatible with organic interiority. As Freud
1 On the ectoderm, see Beyond the Pleasure Principle, PFL 11, 297. “[TJhe surface turned outwards towards the 
external world will from Us vety situation he differentiated and will serve as an organ fur receiving stimuli. Indeed 
embryology, in its capacity as a recapitulation of developmental history, actually shows us that the central nervous
system originates from the ectoderm; the grey matter of the cortex remains a derivative of the primitive superficial 
layer ol the organism and may have inherited some of its essential properties."
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puts it in the Project, ‘T h e  sense organs operate not only as screens against quantity (Q) - like every 
nerve-ending - but as sieves [...]”134 *
McLuhan explicitly invokes Freud to explain the functioning of this mechanism. "The 'Freudian' 
censor is less of a moral function than an indispensable condition of learning. Were we to accept 
fully and directly every shock to our various structures of awareness, we would soon be nervous 
wrecks, doing double-takes and pressing panic buttons every minute. The ’censor' protects our 
central system of values, as it does our physical nervous system by simply cooling off the onset of 
experience a good deal. For many people, this cooling system brings on a lifelong slate of physical 
rigor mortis, or of somnambulism, particularly observable in periods of new technology." (UM 24)
From Narcissism to Schizophrenia
Gibson: “’Numb,' he said. He'd been numb a long time, years. All his nights down in Ninsei, his 
nights with Linda, numb in bed and numb at the cold sweating center o f every drug deal. (N IH1)
McLuhan points out that the "the Greek word narcosis, or numbness" is the etymological root 
shared by the words "narcotics" and "narcissism." (UM 41) The attempt to "become a closed 
system” results in a freezing-out of stimuli. As McLuhan writes in the essay on Burroughs: “During 
the process of digestion of the old environment, man finds it expedient to anaesthetise himself as 
much as possible. He pays as little attention to the actions of the environment as the patient heeds 
the surgeon’s scalpel. The gulping or swallowing of Nature by the machine was attended by a 
complete change of the ground rules of both the sensory ratios of the individual nervous system and 
the patterns of the social world. Today, when the environment has become the extension of the 
entire mesh of the nervous system, anaesthesia numbs our bodies into hydraulic jacks.”136
4 Freud, Project for a Scientific Psychology, in The Origins o f Psycho-Analysis: Letters to Wilhelm Fleiss, Drafts 
and Notes: 1887-1902, eds., Marie Bonapart, Anna Freud, Ernst Kris, trans., Eric Moshacher and James Strachey.
Dindon - Imago, 1954, 372
McLuhan, “Notes on Burroughs", 70
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In Understanding Media, McLuhan electronically reanimates the myth o f Narcissus to discuss 
both the implosion of subjectivity and the “autoamputation” induced by the move into a lully- 
mediatizcd environment. According to McLuhan, Narcissus’ plight arises not because he falls in love 
with himself, but because he is unable to recognize his image as belonging to him. “The youth 
Narcissus mistook his own reflection in the water for another person. This extension of himself by 
the mirror numbed his perceptions until he became the servomechanism o f his own extended or 
repeated image. [...] Now the point of this myth is the fact that men at once become fascinated by 
any extensions of themselves in any material other than themselves [...] [T)hc wisdom of the 
Narcissus myth does not convey any idea that Narcissus fell in love with anything he regards as 
himself. Obviously he would have had very different feelings about the image had he known it was 
an extension or repetition of himself.” (UM 42) For McLuhan, the modern technical environment - 
Gibson’s Matrix - is continuous with the human nervous system, misrecognized as something 
separate because the sheer amount of stimuli cannot be dealt with except by an enormous numbing, 
or “autoamputation” of the (electronic) sense organs transmitting the stimuli. As McLuhan insists, 
"the sense of the Narcissus myth” is that “[t]he young man’s image is a self-amputation or extension 
induced by irritating pressures. As counter-irritant the image produces a generalized numbness or 
shock that declines recognition. Self-amputation forbids self-recognition [...] The principle of self- 
amputation as an immediate relief of strain on the central nervous system applies very readily to the 
origin of the media of communication from speech to computer.” (UM 43)
What differentiates later theorists such as Baudrillard, Lasch and Jameson from McLuhan is an 
increasing sense that the screens have failed - the organism and/ or the self Ls no longer able to 
protect itself from the slings and arrows of outrageous cyberncsis. In Seduction, Baudrillard revives 
McLuhan’s formula: “Narcissus=narcosis (McLuhan had already made the connection.)” (S 166) He 
quotes Jean Querzola, who writes of an “Electronic Narcosis”, a “slip from Oedipus to 
Narcissus.”136 (S 166) In part, Baudrillard’s Narcissism designates a condition in which selves 
collapse into their images; Baudrillard invokes a “digital narcissus, [who) is going to slide along the 
trajectory of a death drive and sink in his own image.” (S 166) More radically, though, Baudrillard’s
1 Baudrillard’s making of the equation narcissus=nccrosis is in fact in respect of cloning technologies, something 
wc shall deal with in the next chapter.
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Narcissism is about the inability to detach a delimited self from the circuit. Narcissistic "sell"- 
referentiality happens at the level of the “networks’ circularity“ (S 166) not at the level of the 
subject, who exists only as the micro-recapitulation of its seamless integrity. With Jameson, 
Baudrillard declares the end of alienation, but where Jameson describes a “shift of the dynamics of 
cultural pathology” in which “the alienation of the subject is displaced by the latter’s fragmentation” 
(PCLLC, 14), Baudrillard emphasises not fragmentation but integration. The structure of “our 
relationships with networks and screens [...] is one of subordination, not alienation - the structure of 
the integrated circuit.” (TE 56) Like McLuhan and Baudrillard, Christopher Lasch theorizes 
capitalism’s total integration in terms of the Narcissus myth. “As the Greek legend reminds us, it is 
[the] confusion of the self and the not-self - not ‘egoism’ - that distinguishes the plight of Narcissus. 
The minimal or narcissistic self is, above all, a self uncertain of its own outlines.”137
For McLuhan, this is all anticipated in Burroughs’ supposed collapsing of the category of the 
private. Burroughs, according to McLuhan, presents “a paradigm of the future where there can be 
no spectators but only participants [...] There is no privacy and no private parts.”138 The ettacement 
of the distinction between private and public will, of course, become a commonplace of postmodern 
theory. The “loss of public space occurs contemporaneously with the loss of private space,” 
Baudrillard observes. ‘The one is no longer a spectacle, the other no longer a secret.” (EC 130) The 
disappearance of the distinction between private and public realms brings with it the concomitant 
disintegration of what Lasch calls “the imperial ego”, Jameson’s “bourgeois monad”, with its 
“conception of a unique self and private identity, a unique personality and individuality”, (PCLLC 
15). For Baudrillard, as for McLuhan before him, media - particularly television - play a crucial role 
here, insinuating themselves into all ostensibly private zones. ‘TV [...] is only a screen, or better, it is 
a miniaturized terminal that appears in your head (you are the screen and the television is watching
1 ^  Lasch, The Minimal Self, 19. “[LJlonging,” Lasch continues, adding the inevitable moralizing gloss, “either to 
remake the world in its own image or to merge into its environment in blissful union.”
' ^  McLuhan, “Notes on Burroughs”, 71. This implies a reversal, or part-reversal of what Deleuze-Guatlari call the 
“vast privatization of the organs“ “undertaken” by “modem societies” ( AO 142-3). For Deleuze-Guatlari. although 
“(¡Individual persons are social persons first of all” and “[plrivate persons are an illusion, derivatives of derivatives” 
(AO 264), “(t]he person has become ‘private’ in reality, insofar as he derives from abstract quantities and becomes 
concrete in the becoming-concrete of these same quantities.” (AO 251) There is therefore not “a making public of the 
private so much as a privatization of the public.” (AO 251)
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you), transistorizes all your neurons and passes for a magnetic tape.” (S 162) “Private” space now 
becomes a “terminal” whose function is to relay a “public world” that only exists at the level of 
simulation: as Deleuze-Guattari say, “ the whole world unfolds at home, without having to leave 
the TV screen.” (AO 251) Or, as McLuhan put it in the Burroughs essay, “No civilian can escape 
this environmental blitzkrieg, for there is, quite literally, no place to hide.”139
Hence the “hideous intimacy” (CZ 40) of postmodern culture; what Baudrillard terms its obscenity. 
The private-public “distinction is effaced in a sort of obscenity where the most intimate details of our 
life become the virtual feeding ground of the media [•••] Inversely, the entire universe comes to 
unfold arbitrarily on your domestic screen (all the useless information that comes to you from the 
entire world, like a microscopic pornography of the universe, useless, excessive, just like the sexual 
close-up in a pomo-film): all this explodes the scene formerly preserved by the minimal separation of 
public and private, the scene that was played out in a restricted space according to a secret ritual 
known only to the actors.” (EC 130) The obscene is defined by opposition to “the scene” which, 
Baudrillard says, belongs to a certain theatrics proper to what he thinks of as a superseded 
psychoanalytic paradigm: here, mimesis, representation, projection and mirroring all still made sense. 
Distance, a certain staging, was still possible. But these representational dramaturgies have now 
been displaced into media “circuits and networks” that are “cold and communicational, contactual 
and motivational” (EC 130); here, there is no reflection, only interminable circulation. ‘The 
obscene is what does away with every mirror, every look , every image.” (EC 130) It is the closer- 
than-close140 , so close that the subject is no longer able to distinguish itself from its surroundings. 
Pornography provides the model for obscene culture, but its ultra close-up techniques quickly extend 
beyond the mediatization of sexuality. “[Ijt is not only the sexual that becomes obscene in 
pornography; today there is a whole pornography of information and communication; that Is to say, 
of circuits and networks.” (EC 130)
* ^  McLuhan, Playboy interview, Essential McLuhan, ed. Eric McLuhan and Frank Zingrone, Concord, Ontario:
House of Anansi Press, 1995
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140 See also “Stereo-Pomo" in Seduction.
Narcissism, as McLuhan, Baudrillard and Lasch understand it, is not about sell-love, hut the inability 
to distinguish self from other, object from subject: cybemesis. As Baudrillard’s persistent references 
to communication and control imply, the postmodern vertigo of the “schizophrenic” - Lasch's 
"uncertainty about the outlines of the self’ - is bound up with cybernetics and with what Gregory 
Bateson called its “new understanding of mind, self, human relationships and power.” 141 .
Pursued to its most radical extremes, cybernetics obsolesces personological, subjectivist and 
organicist ontologies in favour of explanation at the level of systemic process. Cybernetic systems 
are essentially anorganic because they radically de-privilege the organism as the appropriate analytic- 
focus - Bateson insists that “the basic unit of survival” is not the organism but organism plus 
environment - and make no differentiation between biotic and technical components. In Steps to an 
Ecology o f  Mind Bateson had presented a benevolent version of what Baudrillard and Lasch will 
characterize as the narcissistic or schizophrenic disintegration of the ego , arguing, Spinozistically, 
that “[t]he mental world - the mind - the world o f information processing - is not limited by the 
skin.”142 “[Wjhen we seek to explain the behaviour of a man [sic] or any other organism” the 
system designated “will usually not have the same limits as the ‘self - as this term is commonly (and 
variously) understood.”143 “[C]onsider a blind man with a stick,” Bateson goes on. " Where does 
the blind man’s self begin? At the tip of the stick? At the handle of the stick? Or at some point 
halfway up the stick? These questions are nonsense, because the stick is a difference along which 
differences are transmitted under transformation, so that to draw a delimiting line across this 
pathway is to cut off a part of the systemic circuit which determines the blind man's locomotion.”144
Bateson, “The Cybernetics o f ‘S elf: A Theory of Alcoholism’’, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, 2X0
l"t- Bateson, “Form, Substance anil Difference" in Steps to an Ecology of Mind. 429
14 3 “The Cybernetics of Self: A Theory of Alcoholism”, in Steps to an Ecology of Mind. 28X
Bateson, “The Cybernetics of ‘S elf: A Theory of Alcoholism”, in Steps to an Ecology of Mind. 2XX-289. To 
adequately explain agency, Bateson insists, we have to make reference not to subjecUve motivation but to the network 
ol relations which produce it (as epiphenomenon). A paradox - familiar to readers of Spinoza - emerges. To increase 
agency - to become more active in Spinoza's terms - is to become flatter with the system, not to "dominate" it (as it) 
from above. Bateson's analysis of alcoholism as a paradigmatic positive feedback process argued that the very attempt 
to regain self-control, to be a “captain of one's own soul”, contributed to the escalation of the alcoholic process, which 
precisely depends upon a crude opposition between subject and object, drinker and bottle. While the drinker thinks of 
the bottle as what Spinoza calls an “external cause", and consider themselves - as subject - capable of heating it, they 
will have failed to apprehend the systemic complicity so fundamental to the alcoholic assemblage.
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The concern, in postmodern theory, with schizophrenia, is, in large part, a registering of this 
cybernetic account of subjectivity, a sense that the self can no longer be properly distinguished from 
the multiplicity of circuits that traverse it. Postmodemity as Baudrillard and Jameson theorise is the 
seeping through of schizophrenia into capitalism. Whilst neither go so far as Deleuze-Guattari in 
directly correlating capitalism with schizophrenia, both turn to “schizophrenia” as an image of the 
postmodern meltdown of subjectivity in late capitalism. For Baudrillard, nerve rays145 become 
cathode rays: ubiquitous media circuitries routinize a heightened, hallucinogenic experience, a 
"psychedelic giddiness” (S 162) characterized by “somnambular absence and tactile euphoria.” (S 
159) In ‘The Ecstasy of Communication”, Baudrillard explicitly associates schizophrenia with the 
emergence of cybernetic networks. “If hysteria was the pathology of the exacerbated staging of the 
subject, a pathology of expression, of the body’s theatrical and operatic conversion: and if paranoia 
was the pathology of organization, of the structuration of a rigid and jealous world, with 
communication and information, with the immanent promiscuity of all these networks, with their 
continual connections, we are now in a new form of schizophrenia.” (EC 133)
Jameson, too, theorizes, postmodemity in terms of schizophrenia, deriving his account of from 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, and hurrying to point out that this is in no way a clinical definition . The 
chief characteristic of Jameson’s postmodern schizophrenia is the breakdown in the experience of 
sequential time, an inability “to unify the past, present, and future of our own biographical 
experience or psychic life” (PCLLC 27): “the schizophrenic,” Jameson writes, “is reduced to an
Hence the relation between the human organism and its technical environment becomes undersltxxl not any longer in 
terms of organic extensions, but of dependence-circuitries. The preoccupation with addiction, or. more broadly, 
dependency, in cyberpunk fiction and its precursors reflects a supercession of subjectivity by cybernetics; Oedipus 
becoming-narcissus. What Gibson calls the intimacy of cyberpunk technical machines indicates a new level of 
machinic-dependency, but addiction always implies a becoming-anorganic since it involves die induction of the 
organism into extra-organic feedback circuits. Cyberpunk tends towards the abstraction of addiction: Gibson's 
characterization of Case as a “drug addict” (N 161) seems superfluous since it is clear that the condition of the console 
cowboys automatically involves addiction to technically-freebased stimuli.
“ ‘I'm a drug addict, Calh.’
‘What kind?’
Stimulants. Central nervous system stimulants. Extremely powerful central nervous system stimulants.'” (N 161)
145 A reference to Schreber, who famously thought communication happened through “nerve rays.”
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experience [...] of pure and unrelated presents in”; “the present [...] engulfs the subject with 
indescribable vividness” (PCLLC 27)
Both these theorizations of schizophrenia converge with Deleuze-Guattari’s in defining the 
schizophrenic experience in terms of a surfeit, rather than a paucity, of reality. For Dcleuze-Guattari. 
schizophrenia is a “harrowing, emotionally overwhelming experience, which brings the schizo us 
close as possible to matter, to a burning, living center of matter.” (AO 19) “How is it possible that 
the schizo was conceived of as the autistic rag - separated from the real and cut off from life - that he 
is so often thought to be?” (AO 19-20) they ask. While Jameson equivocates, arguing that the 
schizophrenic “charge of affect” can be “described in the negative terms of anxiety and loss of 
reality, but which one could just as well imagine in the positive terms of euphoria, a high, an 
intoxicatory or hallucinogenic intensity,” (PCLLC 27-28) Baudrillard is definitive: “What 
characterizes [the schizo] is less the loss of the real, the light years of estrangement from the real, the 
pathos of distance and radical separation, as is commonly said, but, very much to the contrary, the 
absolute proximity, the total instantaneity of things, the feeling of no defense, no retreat.” (EC 133)
Hence Csiscery-Ronay’s claim about the connections between cyberpunk, hallucination, dread and 
madness. But if it is no doubt the case that cyberpunk has a new take on schizophrenia and 
hallucination, these themes could hardly be said to be foreign to Horror. As even a cursory reading 
of Poe or Lovecraft shows, Horror is hardly a stranger to hallucination, but what differentiates 
cyberpunk hallucination from hallucination in Horror is essentially its technical replicability and its 
currency as a de-pyschologised communication medium. Artificialized hallucination stands in for a 
decoded socius. If the Matrix is a “consensual hallucination”, its continuing reality as an environment 
is not dependent upon some act of collective will any more than the persistence o f  capital is; the 
sustainability of both, according to Deleuze-Guattari, has gone over to sociotechnical machines 
which both interpellate human beings as subjects and integrate them as components (TP 458). 
Techno-capital “hallucinations” are not epistemological illusions, but cybernetic-operational 
feedback systems. As Csicsery-Ronay writes, in a clear nod to Baudrillard, “It is natural to expect 
that as technology proves more and more able to construct the world in its own image (that is, to 
create the simulacra to replace the ‘real’ and ‘the original’) - indeed, to restructure the operations of
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the multinational capitalism that enables it to exist - there will be an increasing sense of its 
hallucinatory nature...”146 Yet it is to miss entirely the logic - the delirial anti-logic - of the process 
to assume that capitalism’s “hallucinatory nature” can be equated with “unreality.” In a certain 
Marxist sense, as you enter the Matrix you access what is, in effect, the most real level of Gibson’s 
hypercapitalism, since, in the words of the cliche, cyberspace is where your money is. Although the 
Matrix and capital are totally artificial, neither are epistemological commitments, beliefs you can just 
opt out of, in part because the artificial can be quantified: hence Deleuze-Guattari's “fictional 
quantities.”
Gibson’s hallucinations differ from Poe’s because they cannot be attributed, even provisionally, to 
psychological dis-ease. In a canonic example of Poe-horror such as ‘The Tell-tale Heart”, all the 
mechanics of interiority can still be seen to obtain: perceptual warps arise from a guilty, internal 
neurosis that finds itself echoed everywhere in the outside world. In Gibson’s world, hallucination 
emerges as the effect of electrolibidinal affect: psychology plays no active part, functioning only as 
the register of events that are “neuro-electronic” in character. ‘The voice was just part o f dying, 
being flatlined, some crazy bullshit your brain threw up to make you feel better, and something had 
happened back at the source, maybe a brownout in their part of the grid, so the ice had lost its hold 
on his nervous system.” (CZ 61)
Predictably, Baudrillard defines the new science fiction in terms o f simulation. (Ballard’s Crash, for 
instance, becomes “the first great novel of the universe of simulation.” [SS 119] ) But it is the 
combination of simulation with stimulus in what Gibson calls simstim  (“Simulated stimuli”147) that 
is in fact more characteristic of key cyberpunk texts such as Videodrome and Neuromancer. 
Specifically, simstim is the name Gibson gives to an ultra-advanced neuro-electronically-triggered 
hypermedia apparatus: something to make the soaps seem more real than real. More generally, 
though, the combination of simulation-stimulation underlies all the key technical developments 
Gibson describes - bio- (or micro-) softs (data-input devices that can be meshed directly into the 
nervous system) and the immersive environment of cyberspace (or the Matrix) itself. Perception has
Csicsery-Ronay, “Cyberpunk and Neuromanucism”, in McCaffrey ed., Storming the Reality Studio, 1X9.
17 Burning Chrome, 210
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been decoded into a matter of particular set of triggerable “stints” capable of simulating any possible 
experience. The simulation of particular affective states by direct neuronic stimulation had been a 
concern of cybernetic fiction since Crichton’s The Terminal Man148 , and it is central to 
Cronenberg’s Videodrome.
Stimulating the Gothic Body: Videodrome
Cronenberg: “we know that by the use o f electrodes in certain areas o f the brain you can trigger
o ff a violent, fearful response without regard to other stimulants. ”149
Dick: "[HJallucmations, whether induced by psychosis, hypnosis, drugs, toxins, etc. may be merely 
quantitatively different from what we see, not quantitatively so. In other words, too much is 
emanating from the neurological apparatus o f  the organism, over and beyond the structural, 
organizing necessity [...] No name entities or aspects begin to appear, and since the person does 
not know what they are - that is, what they're called or what they mean - he cannot communicate 
with other persons about them. The breakdown o f verbal communication is a fa ta l index that 
somewhere along the line the person is experiencing reality in a way too altered to f i t  into his own 
prior worldview and too radical to allow empathic linkage with other persons." 150
Jameson: “The originality o f Philip K. Dick was then to have reunited the twin fear o f addiction 
and o f  schizophrenia (with its reality-loops and hallucinatory alternate worlds) in a lethal 
combination which Cronenberg's media nightmare transcends, replaces, and intensifies all at once,
translating it into the society o f the spectacle or image capitalism. " 151
Cronenberg’s Videodrome has achieved its “canonic”152 status because of its almost emblematic 
staging of the convergence of cybernetic and Gothic themes. Cronenberg’s almost complete *14
l *48 Like many of Crichton’s subsequent novels - including the Chaos-SF of Jurassic Park - The Terminal Man is an 
intriguing mixture of theory-fiction and airport novel, spiced with a neo-Wienerian moral warning about the danger 
°* cybernetics. (Its semi-faked bibliography in fact includes references to Wiener). The story concerns a violent 
criminal who is on a pilot scheme for cybernetic control: when the criminal is about to have a psychotic episode, he 
receives a corrective charge from implanted electrodes. Problems start when the criminal starts becoming addicted to 
Ute supposedly corrective charges, which then induce, rather than prevent, the psychotic epistxles they were designed 
to regulate.
141) r>Cronenberg, in Rodley, Cronenberg on Cronenberg, 94.
Philip K. Dick, The Shifting Realities o f Philip K. Dick: Selected Literary and Philosophical Writings, New 
'i ork: Vintage/ Random House 172
*' 1 Jameson, The Geopolitical Aesthetic, 30 
152 iJameson, The Geopolitical Aesthetic, 27
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stripping away of the conventions of the Horror genre - his abandonment of the exprcssionistic style 
revived in the almost directly contemporary Blade Runner - might give the misleading impression 
that he has in some sense left behind the trappings of the Gothic, but Videodrome's eschewal of 
particular Horror conventions goes alongside a reinforcement of the principal Gothic theme of 
anorganic continuum. Exactly like the expressionist cinema whose conventions it has displaced. 
Videodrome follows Worringer’s Gothic line as it passes across the so-called animate and inanimate. 
But it shares with Gibson a sense that it is ultramodern cybernetic technical assemblages that arc 
making the distinction between organic and inorganic increasingly unstable. In particular, it focuses 
on media - especially the so-called postmodern media of TV and video, and the still nascent 
technologies of Virtual Reality - as assemblages which reconfigure the body in new ways, opening it 
up to dcsiring-trajectories that have as their corollary a new - cybernetic - account of power.
Videodrome's most powerful scenes directly invert the image of the prosthcticized body Freud 
presents in Civilization and its Discontents. In Videodrome, Max’s body, in what may be a pointed, 
and corrective, reference to McLuhan’s media-organicism, is not extended, but invaginated. Here is 
a body literally overwhelmed by an unmanageable quantity of stimuli: an image of what happens 
when McLuhan’s “Freudian censor” is unable to sieve out damaging intensities. But if 
Videodrome’s central images of the body are an inversion of the organicized Frcudo-McLuhanite 
cxtcnsionalist body, they arc also - deliberately parodic - litcralizations of the body posited in the 
discourse of censorship and image regulation. “With Videodrome I wanted to posit the possibility 
that man exposed to violent imagery would begin to hallucinate,” Cronenberg has said. "I wanted to 
sec what it would be like, in fact, if what the censors were saying would happen, did happen."153 
What, that Ls to say, if the body could not be only triggered, but actually mutated, by TV and video­
signal? In Videodrome, Cronenberg’s background in making Horror films - albeit of an aberrant 
kind154 - crosses over into a ficto-thcorization of contemporary media in terms of Gothic affect. 
Here, we bring into play another McLuhan: the McLuhan who had understood popular media to be *1
' ^  Rodley, Cronenberg on Cronenberg, 94
1 S_t Cronenberg's early features, such as Shivers and Rabid were key contributions to die so-called genre of “ body 
horror.”
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based, like cheap Gothic novels, on w hat, following the Deleuze of the Bacon book, we might call a 
logic of sensation.
As early as The Mechanical Bride (1953) - his first full-length attempt to provide a symptomatology 
of media psychopathology - McLuhan had written of "the curious fusion of sex. technology and 
death” in media artifacts. Newspaper layout - effectively a form of collage according to McLuhan - 
operates via “editorial ghoul techniques”, “poetic associations of linked and contrasting imagery". 
McLuhan cites one magazine example, “in which the central picture was a wounded man coming 
home 'to face it all another day down another death-swept road.' Flanking him was a sprawling pin­
up: 'Haifa million servicemen wrote for this one.' And underneath him in exactly the same posture of 
surrender was a nude female corpse with a rope around her neck: 'Enraged Nazis hanged this 
Russian guerrilla.” McLuhan speculates that this “may well be what draws people to the death shows 
of the speedways and fills the press and magazines with close-ups of executions, suicides and 
smashed bodies. A metaphysical hunger to experience everything sexually, to pluck out the heart of 
the mystery for a super-thrill."155
Pornography and Gothic fiction stand behind the media machineries McLuhan describes, as 
technologies for the targeting and heightening of stimulation. Gothic fiction, like pornography, is 
sold as a body-stimulating machine, its “super-thrills” not directly sexual, but “spine-chilling” or 
"hair-raising.” (Although, as McLuhan hints, and as we shall explore more fully below, for 
Videodrome and Ballard, the tendency in hypermedia/sensation culture is towards an abstract 
sensation and away from a naturalized sexuality, towards a cybcroticism or hypersexuality that 
precisely puts in question the limits of the sexual as such.)
Vidcodrome appears in the film as the updating and technicization of McLuhan’s “fusion of sex, 
technology and death.” The videodrome signal is the ultimate interactive technology; distributed via 
lleshy cassettes that pulse with obscene nonorganic animation, it Is a hyper-intense "media” 
apparatus, a crossbreed of video, virtual reality and (anti-biotic) contagion. Videodrome’s inventor
McLuhan, Essential McLuhan, 52
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is Brian O’Blivion (“not the name I was bom with ... some day all of us will have special names, 
names that will cause the cathode ray to vibrate”) a media guru who has been described both as "an 
obvious McLuhan figure”156 and as “a thinly disguised Baudrillard,”157 (which tells us as much about 
the close relationship between Baudrillard and McLuhan as it does about Cronenberg’s film). 
According to his daughter, Bianca, O’Blivion saw Videodrome as “the next stage in man's evolution 
as a technological animal... a new organ, a new part of the brain.” When Max first encounters 
O’Blivion, on a TV talk show, he is, we subsequently learn, already dead. The “first victim of 
Videodrome” survives as a set of video recordings (“he made thousands of them”), appearing “on 
TV only on TV” .
As the head of a small cable channel, Renn is turned onto Videodrome by its promise of a new and 
extreme combination of sex and violence; tricked into believing it is an illicit broadcast coming out of 
the third world, he thinks of it at first as snuff TV: “no plot, characters, torture, murder .. very, very 
realistic”. Although Videodrome appears at first to be (merely) a particularly hardcore variant of 
S/M pom, pornography here is only ostensibly (or initially) to do with biotic sex, functioning instead 
as a probe-head through which techniques for the maximization of stimulation (and - concomitantly 
- its management) can be explored. Videodrome’s purpose is to “open the neural floodgates”, to 
trigger “receptors in the brain and spine”. Recalling the McLuhan-Ballard correlation of mass media 
with sexualised violence, (a convergence explored more fully by Cronenberg in Crush), Videodrome 
points to an eroticization of everything that immediately de-privileges sex in its bio-reproductive 
mode. “It’s not exactly sex,” Renn warns his lover Nicki Brand (Deborah Harry) of 
Videodrome.“Says who?” she counters, echoing Ballard’s deterritorialization of sex in The Atrocity 
Exhibition (of which more shortly).
"We five in overstimulated times,” Nicki Brand tells Max. ‘“I want you Max,’ she breathes. ‘Come 
to me. Come to Nicki.’ Her lips fill the screen, and All boundaries are removed as the diegetic frame 
ot the TV screen vanishes from view: the lips now fill the TV screen in a vast closeup.” Biotic sex
Douglas Kellner, “David Cronenberg: Panic Horror and the Postmodern Body”, 94
l S7 E. Ann Kaplan, “Feminism/ Oedipus/ Postmodernism: The Case of MTV", in Kaplan, E. Ann. (ed.) 
Postmodernism and its Discontents: Theories, Practices, London/ New York: Verso, 1988
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becomes displaced by a hallucinatory, generalized cyberotics; in one scene "the set begins to pulsate, 
to breathe ... veins ripple the hardware cabinet... a videogame joystick waggles obscenely." 158
Believing that it can programme Renn as one of its assassins, Spectacular Optical - the 
megacorporation that is ultimately revealed to be behind Videodrome (“we make inexpensive 
glasses for the third world and missile guidance systems for NATO”) - deliberately infects Max with 
the signal that will transform him into New Flesh, seducing him using the image of radio announcer 
Nicki Brand. Renn has a series of increasingly intense hallucinations, which he eventually connects 
to his consumption of the videodrome programming. Ultimately, Renn, re-programmed by 
O'Blivion’s daughter, Bianca, turns on his new masters, killing Spectacular Optical’s Barry Convex. 
Or so it would appear; we are so deep into “Philip K. Dick-like reality loops”159 that we can’t be 
sure what is happening for [hyper]real. Perhaps much of the film, including the apparent 
assassinations, are merely hallucinations, safely monitored by Barry Convex using a prototype VR 
helmet and recording device.
Tactile Power
Deleuze: “Clockwork automata, but also motor automata, in short automata o f movement, 
gave way to a new computer and cybernetic race, automata o f computation and thought, 
automata with controls and feedback. The configuration o f power was also inverted, and, 
instead o f converging on a single, mysterious leader, inspirer o f dreams, commander o f  
actions, power was diluted in an information network where decision-makers managed 
control, processing and stock across intersections o f insomniacs and seers. ”160
Videodrome operates as a hypercommentary on Horror and its capacity to stimulate - and therefore 
transform - the body (and therefore reality). Running alongside the history of Horror cinema is a 
discourse of censorship and control which has posited a body capable of terrifying transf ormation; a
1 sx Bukatman, Terminal Identity, 89 
l Jameson, The Geopolitical Aesthetic, 23
1 ’°3 Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image , trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, London: The Alhlone Press, 
1989, 265
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body that it at once a passive recording surface and a violently libidinized maw, hungry for stimulus, 
(Baudrillard’s In the Shadow o f the Silent Majorities, with its hyperparodic invocation of a pliable 
body, subject to the influence of media might even be the ironic postscript to this 
tradition.).Meanwhile, somnambulism, mesmerism and manipulation have been themes in Gothic 
cinema since The Cabinet o f  Dr Caligari. What Videodrome adds to thus Gothic account of power, 
of course, is an emphasis on the production of somnambulist desire by media itself, revealing the 
complicity of certain discourses about media with the language of Horror.
What is at stake in Videodrome - and what makes it fit so closely with Baudrillard’s theorizations - is 
an account of how the body is an intrinsic component part of new machineries of control and 
manipulation, which are no longer spectacular, but tactile. Videodrome shares with Baudrillard an 
inheritance from McLuhan that amounts to a critique of spectacular-optical culture, emerging in an 
emphasis on the non- or post-optical functioning of new media. Although obsessed with optics, 
Cronenberg’s film ultimately concurs with McLuhan’s claim that “electric technology has meant for 
Western man a considerable drop in the visual component of his experience, and a corresponding 
increase in the activity of his other senses.” 161 McLuhan’s thesis that TV Is a tactile medium, 
outlined in some of the most haunting and enigmatic passages in his writing, is repeatedly referenced 
in some of Videodrome’s most powerful images, in particular those in which we see Max seduced by 
the Nicki Brand-Videodrome composite. As Max “approaches the set ... the screen bulges outward 
to meet his touch, literalizing the notion of the screen as breast. His face sinks in, his hands fondle 
the panels and knobs of the set as the lips continue their panting invitation.”162 Here, the medium is 
indeed the massage. But this interactivity is always immanent to television’s operations, McLuhan 
suggests. ‘The TV image requires each instant that we ‘close’ the spaces in the mesh by a 
convulsive sensuous participation that is profoundly kinetic and tactile, because tactility is the 
interplay of the senses, rather than the isolated contact of skin and object.” (UM 314) Baudrillard 
will cite this formulation in Symbolic Exchange and Death, (65) as part of an analysis that 
simultaneously ironizes McLuhan’s position while extending it. “So we can understand why
McLuhan, The Medium is the Massage, Harmonds worth: Penguin, 1967, 125
Bukatman, Terminal Identity, 90
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McLuhan saw an era of tactile communication in the era of electronic mass-media. In this we are 
closer in effect to the tactile than we are to the visual universe, where there is greater distance, and 
reflection is always possible.” (SED 65) The tactile becomes part of a contactual/ tactical "universe 
of communication” whose obscene closeness no longer allows the space for “response” while always 
ostensibly soliciting it.
Videodrome delineates the stealthy intercession into, and deletion of, private space by television 
described by both McLuhan and Baudrillard. “It is well known,” Baudrillard writes in 'The Ecstasy 
of Communication”, “how the simple presence of the television changes the rest of the habitat into a 
kind of archaic envelope, a vestige of human relations whose very survival remains perplexing. As 
soon as this scene is no longer haunted by its actors and their fantasies, as soon as behaviour is 
crystallized on certain screens and operational terminals, what’s left appears only as a large useless 
body, deserted and condemned.” (EC 129) TV is a deeply unheimlich163 technology, a disturbing 
presence in the heart of the domestic scene whose apparent reassuring familiarity conceals its 
insidious destruction of that very scene164 (and all scenes, Baudrillard will insist): "today it is the 
very space of habitation that’s conceived as both receiver and distributor [...] the control screen and 
terminal [...] Here we are far from the living-room and close to science fiction.” (EC 128) Or beyond 
science fiction, and into cyberpunk....
As “the most recent and spectacular electric extension of our central nervous system” (UM 317) , 
television, McLuhan suggests, is “a complex gestalt of data gathered almost at random” (UM 317), 
"a flat two-dimensional mosaic” (UM 313). TV, according to McLuhan, exerts an ambient
Note McLuhan’s comments on the intimacy of TV, its disturbing familiarity (to paraphrase Freud). "Newscasters 
and actors alike report the frequency with which they are approached by people who feel they've met them before. 
Joanne WixxJward in an interview was asked what was the difference between being a movie star and a TV actress. 
She replied: 'When I was in the movies 1 heard people say, 'There goes Joanne Woodward.' Now they say, 'There goes 
somebody I think I know.''"  (UM 318) The age of the cinema - a “hot”, which is to say non-parlicipatory. medium - 
gives way to the “cool” interactivity of TV, bringing an end to the giganlicism of the star system. "It is no accident 
lhat such major movie stars as Rita Hayworth, Liz Taylor, and Marilyn Monroe ran into troubled waters in the new 
TV age. They ran into an age that questioned all the 'hot' media values of the pre-TV consumer days." (UM 320)
IM "When I observe the most intimate details of the Other onscreen [...],” William Bogard glosses, “it is only the 
»us-en-scene of intimacy that I am given, a disenchanted, sterile (but not lost!) intimacy derived not so much from 
witnessing something hitherto unobserved or private as from plugging into a system where nothing is private and 
everything is, where the secret does not exist and everything is secret at the same time - all this in the lorm of an 
ecstasy of orbitalization and dissolution, a mass mediatized extravagance.” Simulation o f Surveillance, 151
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dominance, subtly but completely altering the domestic environment as soon as it enters it. 
'Television demands participation and involvement in depth of the whole being. It will not work us 
background. “ 165 You don’t watch TV, McLuhan urges, you scan it, you follow it. "The mode of 
the TV image has nothing in common with film or photo, except that it offers also a new nonverbal 
gestalt or posture of forms [...] The TV image is not a still shot. It is not a photo in any sense, but 
a ceaselessly forming contour of things limned by the scanning-finger. The resulting plastic contour 
appears by light through, not light on, and the image so formed has the quality of sculpture and icon, 
rather than of picture.” (UM 313) Television cybemeticizes the environment. While film and 
photography leave in place the dichotomy between subject and abject - film is projected over the 
heads of the audience; photos are constituted as spatially delimitable- TV cannot simply be looked at 
by a spectator who retains a distance from it. “You have to be ‘with if  [...] It engages you. Perhaps 
this is why so many people feel that their identity has been threatened.” 166
Given his emphasis on the closeness of Cronenberg’s film to Baudrillard’s work, Scott Bukatman's 
theorization of Videodrome as part of the “science fiction of the spectacle”, then, is oddly 
misleading. Despite arguing that “Videodrome seems to be a film which hypostatizes Baudrillurd's 
own polemic”167' Bukatman fails to process Baudrillard’s critique of situationist theory. Similarly, 
Bukatman’s hasty dismissal of McLuhan is puzzling, given that Baudrillard’s theory of power - 
insofar as he still recognizes the continuing validity of the term - is very much indebted - explicitly so 
- to McLuhan’s formulations. An important footnote to Precession o f Simulacra uses a gloss on 
what Baudrillard thinks is McLuhan’s most significant formula - the medium is the message - as a 
means of exploring the new power networks. Baudrillard is happy here to classify the new 
configurations as power, but distinguishes this new delocalized mode of power from “power in its 
classical definition” (SS 41), which is at an “end” (SS 41). Since the “medium/ message confusion” 
has now collapsed “thus sealing the disappearance of all dual, polar structures [...], there is no
MtLuhan, The Medium is the Massage, 125
IW> MtLuhan, The Medium is the Massage, 125
Bukatman, “Who Programs You...” , 203
88
instance of power, no instance of transmission - power is something that circulates and whose source 
can no longer be located.” (SS 41)
The passage is one of a number of occasions in which Baudrillard makes an explicit point of 
differentiating his own position from that of the situationists. Baudrillard could not be clearer. “We 
are witnessing the end of perspectival and panoptic space [...] and thus to the very abolition o f the 
spectacular he proclaims in “Precession of Simulacra.” ‘Television, for example [...] is no longer a 
spectacular medium. We are no longer in the society of the spectacle of which the situationists 
spoke, nor in the specific kinds of alienation and repression that it implied. The medium itself is no 
longer identifiable as such and the confusion of the medium and the message is the first great formula 
of this new era.” (SS 30) And in ‘The Ecstasy of Communication”, “Obscenity begins when there is 
no more spectacle.[...]” (EC 130)
The implicit critique of situationist theory Baudrillard presents concerns its continuing assumption of 
a distinction between power and its objects, between the spectacle and what it conceals. Ultimately. 
Baudrillard suggests, the situationists are committed to an appearance/ reality distinction that is no 
longer sustainable. Everything circulates now, Baudrillard insists. Nothing is concealed: indeed, 
everything is hyper-visible. There is nothing and no-one behind appearances that could be exposed, 
just as there is no alienation from which one can be liberated. Insofar as there is a source of power it 
is you. Psychoanalysis provides the model for these decentred circuitries of “manipulation”. “|OJne 
can always ask of the traditional holders of power where they get their power from. Who made you 
duke? the king? Who made you king? God. Only God no longer answers. But to the question: who 
made you a psychoanalyst? the analyst can reply: You.” (SS 41) Power has completed the spectacle 
by making it interactive; but in doing so, it has abolished the spectacle as such, and inaugurated a 
new, all-inclusive, system which makes alienation - and its critique - obsolete. Immersion - so central 
a preoccupation of cyberpunk and its technologies - displaces spectatorship.
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Videodrome's  neo-McLuhanite emphasis on interactivity follows Burroughs and Foucault168 in 
suggesting that capitalism increasingly functions not by repressing the body but by plugging it into 
positive feedback excitation circuitries. In Videodrome, the Burroughs’ theme of image-addiction 
and McLuhan’s theories of habituation to media come together in the O’Blivion’s Cathode Ray 
Mission, a kind of updated soup kitchen in which TV addicts can get “patched back into the world's 
mixing board.” Addiction, already a becoming-inorganic of the organism, is transferred over onto 
the technical machines, as part of a production of artificial desire (=machinic dependency). “The 
spectacular videodrome generates subliminal over-stimulation and this hype leads to a craving for 
stimulation for its own sake[...]The Videodrome through the television screen (in words, sound, 
vision, visual imagery) releases spores, pheromones which make us gorge ourselves on it. always 
wanting more, whether it’s tactile, sexual, phenomenal, social, material or emotional...”169
For Videodrome, media and addiction converge in a pornography that is not concerned 
straightforwardly with a stimulation of the organism by the represent ion of a naturalized body. 
Instead, bodies are mutated as part of the operations o f a nonorganic circuit which denaturalizes 
sexuality at the same time as it effectuates a hyper-eroticism of the environment: the videodrome 
signal, as we have seen, makes the scene obscene, swarming with unnatural intensities. In terms of 
the cybernetic systems Videodrome describes, pornography and addiction are interlocking 
machineries of bodily manipulation and, in both cases, what is crucial is the participatory or 
interactive relationship between the Control technology and the body it is manipulating. It works so 
much better when you want it.
h is Burroughs who is a crucial figure here. As Scott Bukatman has noted, Videodrome is saturated 
with Burroughs’ thematics and imagery. But it is perhaps his role as a theorist of a deterritorialized 
pornography as a control apparatus that he is most important in Videodrome. Alongside drug 
addiction, pornography serves as one of Burroughs’ chief examples of a control process. 
Pornography assumes a privileged position in Burroughs’ cut-up texts because it exemplifies the
Deleuze, in the essay “Postscript on SocieUes of Control”, makes a parallel between Burroughs and Foucault as 
cartographers of systems of “continuous control and instant communication.” (Negotiations, 175)
Downham, “Videodrome", 189
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process he calls “image addiction” , exposing the mechanisms by which desire is simultaneously 
aruliciahzed and channelled. What Burroughs derives from psychoanalysis - and his study of 
Scientology170 - is principally the idea of the subject as a recording - and recorded - system. The 
"reprogramming” of the human nervous system - the major theme, as McLuhan says, of Burroughs' 
Nova Express - is a neo-Spinozist model of the production of sad passions. Like addiction, 
pornography is an ostensibly participatory process which commensurates the organism to exogenous 
- and arbitrary - stimuli. For Burroughs, the consumer of pornography, like the addict, is ultimately 
himself consumed, locked into ever-more predictable circuits of dead affect; desire learns to love its 
own repression by allowing itself to  be looped into the desolate repetition of mechanical stimulus- 
response patterns.
Needless to say, Burroughs makes no distinction between pornography and “ordinary" sexuality; on 
the contrary, for Burroughs, all sexuality needs to be understood on the model of pornography. Sex 
is a recording, to be re-cut, spliced together and replayed. It is all purely technical, a question of 
habituation to stimuli that could be anything; the body is slaved into idiot compulsive-repetitive 
behaviours by the triggering of what Burroughs calls “images”. The "image”, for Burroughs is 
essentially a particular neuronic stimuli, around which associations cluster. Repeat the image and 
you repeat whatsoever is associated with it. Where Freud privileges one particular image, or set of 
images - what Deleuze-Guattari call the family photo - so as to freeze desire into familial 
representations , Burroughs realises that, in principle, any image can function to capture desire. 
Sexuality operates in Burroughs less as a primary instinct than as a reprogrammable stimulus- 
response circuitry. “You see sex is an electrical charge that can be turned on and off if you know the 
electromagnetic switchboard.” (NE 140) Burroughs’ work endlessly insists that pornography 
operates not as a representation o f  sex, but as its deterritorialization (out onto the technical 
machines), and complementary capture. Sex escapes into recording technologies that sample and 
loop repetition-compulsions before feeding them back into bio-behaviour that increasingly 
•unctions as their idiotic replay. As with Spinoza, Burroughs presents a version of behaviourism that 
operates through rudimentary techniques of associationism:
ot Burrou8hs derives the idea of Reactive Mind from Hubbard’s theory-fictions. The Reactive Mind (or RM) is a set 
recordings - or engrams - which induce the organism to respond in pre-directed ways.
91
The operation is very technical - Look at photomontage - It makes a statement in llexiblc 
picture language - Let us take the statement made by a given photomontage X - We can use 
X words X colors X odors X images and so forth to define the various aspects of X - Now 
we feed X into the calculating machine and X scans out related colors, juxtapositions, affect- 
charged images and so forth we can attenuate or concentrate X by taking out or adding 
elements and feeding back into the machine elements we wish to concentrate - A Technician 
learns to think and write in association blocks which can then be manipulated according to the 
laws of association and juxtaposition - The basic law of association and conditioning is known 
to college students even in America: Any object, feeling, odor, word, image in juxtaposition 
with any other object, feeling, odor, word or image will be associated with it - Our technicians 
learn to read newspapers and magazines for juxtaposition statements rather than alleged 
content - We express these statements in Juxtaposition Formulae - The Formulae of course 
control populations of the world - 171 172
Association is not a cognitive process, but something physical; all cognitive narrativi/.ation is always 
derivative from a more primary zone of bodily affect. But rather than all stimulus being ultimately 
attributable to bio-sexuality - as a certain crude psychoanalytic rcductionism would insist - 
Burroughs shows that associationist coilaging can flash-cut any random image into a neuronic scries 
and libidinize it. “Rash from words to colors on the association screen - Associate silently lrom 
colors to the act - Substitute other factors for the words - Arab drum music - Musty smell ol 
erections in outhouses- Feel of orgasm- Color-music-smell-fell to the million sex acts all time place - 
”'72 The body, then, emerges as a set of nonorganic recordings, triggers and replays.
For the Cronenberg of Videodrome, pornography functions as a cybernetic (re)enginccring of the 
body, rather than a simple matter of optical stimulation. Videodrome draws out the way in which the 
achievement of the pornographic ideal would precisely not be matter of improving visual 
resolution (guaranteeing psychic/ physical integrity and maintaining specular distance) but of 
facilitating bodily immersion (compromising all boundaries and doing away with all distance). As
171 N ova E x p ress , New York: Grove Press, 1964, 78
172
N ova E x p ress , 140 The cut-up and fold-in techniques of aleatory composition - utilized hy Burroughs to most 
sustained effect in the “Nova” trilogy of T h e S o f t M a ch in e  , T h e  T ick e t th a t E x p lo d e d  and N o v a  E x p r e s s  - are 
supposed to break up these pre-set word-association lines, disrupting autonomic reaction-response patterns with 
random elements. Textual montage acts against the neural montage that is the controlled nervous system. But see 
Oeleuze-Guattari’s critique of the cut-up in A  T h o u sa n d  P la te a u s , where they argue that “"implies a supplementary 
dimension to that of the texts under consideration. In this supplementary dimension, unity continues its spiritual 
labour." (TP 6)
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William Bogard explains: ‘The practical problem in the production of telematic porn is how the 
simulated body onscreen can become a surrogate for, and a prosthetic of, the real body, more 
attuned to the user’s fantasies and pleasures. And also the reverse, how the ‘real body' of the 
observer can become more integrated into the apparatus of simulation. [...] [T]his translates into a 
question not so much of vision, nor even exactly of the gaze (surveillance technology), but ot 
uictility (McLuhan saw this in relation to television years ago).” (156) Bogard here closely echoes 
Baudrillard, who argues that “the spiralling effect of the shifting of power, the effect of circularity in 
which power is lost, is dissolved, is resolved into perfect manipulation (it is no longer of the order of 
directive power and of the gaze, but of the order of tactility and commutation).” (SS 41-42) 
Tactility, as Baudrillard takes it up, indicates less the sensory or inter-sensory - "touching loses its 
sensory, sensual value for us”, he says (SED 64) - than a “participatory” circuit. Whenever 
Baudrillard writes of participation there are always implicit inverted commas around the word: not 
because he thinks that the discourses of tactility and participation are ideological mystifications, but 
because participation implies the possibility of distance, of separation, whereas the circuits he 
describes are so complete that there is nothing “outside” them; participation is impossible, because 
you have always been included. Response is screened out in advance.
“With TV, the viewer is the screen,” (UM 313) McLuhan pronounces, in a slogan that clearly 
anticipates Baudrillard, whose take-up of this motif is as predictable as it is inevitable. Prime 
component in the ecstasy of communication (and its correlate, control), TV is lundamentally 
cybernetic, operating by drawing the “viewer” into a circuit.173 Thus the tapes in Videodrome which 
induce Max’s hallucinations are not entirely pre-recorded. They merely “set the tone”, as O ’Blivion 
puts it, interacting with the specific nervous system they are targeting like intelligent viruses. But 
pre-recording is nevertheless an important element, since what Videodrome is about is the - 
postmodern - fusion of television and video (one of whose effects is the displacement of live
Not for nothing do Deleuze-Guattari cite television as an example of cybernetic power. “[OJne is subjected to TV 
insofar as one uses and consumes it, in the particular situation of a subject of the statement that more or less mistakes 
itsell for a subject of enunciation (‘you, dear television viewers, who make TV what it is ...’); tire technical machine is 
the medium between two subjects. But one is enslaved by TV as a human machine insofar as the viewers are no longer 
consumers or users, nor even subjects who supposedly ‘make’ it, but intrinsic component pieces, ‘input’ and ‘output,' 
Icedhack or recurrences that are no longer connected to the machines in such a way as to produce or use it.” (TP 45X)
broadcasting in favour of prerecorded footage).174 Thus Max is reconfigured as a video player (a 
cybernetic component on which power is recorded, erased and re-recorded, not a tabula rasa on 
which power is inscribed, once and for all). "The axiomatic does not need to write on bare llesh. to 
mark bodies and organs, nor does it need to fashion a memory for men.” (AO 250)175 
Videodrome shows how “profoundly illiterate” (AO 240) capitalism keeps up the symbolic order 
only for show.176 You don’t read Capital, Videodrome makes clear. You play it, it plays you.
A logic of contagion - of contact and infection177 - replaces any strategy of ideological persuasion. 
Simply to have contact with the videodrome signal is to be infected by it. Jameson comes close to 
this perception when he writes of the “fear of the subliminal” in Videodrome. “Primary here is no 
doubt the fear of the subliminal itself; the television screen as part of the eye; that sense of 
incorporating unclean or harmful substances that runs all the way from yesterday’s phobias about 
lluorinatcd water and what it can do to our ‘precious bodily fluids’ back into the deep witchcraft and 
envy of the village and tribal societies. [...T]he putative subliminal signals of the V ideo drome image 
can be seen to be intensifications of Bunuel’s inaugural assault on the viewer’s eyeball (with a 
straight razor), while the deeper fantasy about the lethal properties of commodity consumption runs 
at least from the legendary coke in Coca-Cola.” (GA, 29-30) The body subject to such assault is not 
in any sense a scaled organism, but a body capable of mutation, of fusion with capital and its 
commodities, a Gothic body: a Body without Organs. And in the end. Videodrome is far more
' 7<* For Jameson, video is the “postmodern medium” par excellence, the medium of “total flow” (See PCLLC.
Chapter 3).
' 7<i This is by contrast with the primitive socius, whose mncmotcchnical methods of latnxiing and inscription are 
described in the section of Anti-Oedipus called ‘Territorial Representation”, 1X4-192. But. as Jameson suggests, in 
conditions of total flow, memory is no longer an option: “memory seems to play no role in television, cnmmerical or 
otherwise (or, I am tempted to say, in postmodernism itself): nothing here haunts the mind or leaves its afterimages in 
die manner of the great moments of film.” (PCLLC 71)
,7fl For Deleuze-Guattari, "capitalist representation” has left signification and writing behind. The value of 
McLuhan’s theories, they say, is to make this dear. “This seems to us to be the significance of McLuhan's analyses: to 
have shown what a language of decoded flows is, as opposed to a signifier that strangles and overcodes the llows |...| 
|F|or nonsignifying language anything will do: whether it be phonic, graphic, gestural, etc., no flow is privileged in 
this language, which remains indifferent to its substance or its support, inasmuch as the latter is an amorphous 
continuum." (AO 240)
177 We might be reminded here of Deleuze’s claim that “viral contagion.” is “the passive danger" presented by 
mlormation technology and computers" which are the “third generation of machines” belonging to "control 
societies." (Negotiations, 180)
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ambivalent about the extent of cybernetic control than is Baudrillard: Max’s assassination of 
Spectacular Optical’s Barry Convex and his final transformation into New Flesh suggest that, as a 
true Gothic technology, the infection - the Burroughsian image-virus - may not remain loyal to its 
masters. The tactile, then, registers not only as a power mechanism, but as a new, post-optical, 
desiring-trajectory: Cronenberg’s point is that the two - desire and power - become increasingly 
interfused in Deleuze’s Societies of Control.
The Atrocity Exhibition
The - until then - implicit connection between Cronenberg and J. G. Ballard as theory-fictional 
explorers of contemporary cybernetic culture was concretized in Cronenberg's notorious film 
version of Ballard’s Crash. A scene added by Cronenberg himself to the original Crash novel 
immediately reminds us of Videodrome's  logic of sensation, its fusion of body and media landscape. 
At one point in the film, we find Vaughan, Crash’s anti-hero trauma theoro-technician, pertorming a 
public restaging of the crash which killed James Dean, complete with live commentary. We are 
reminded immediately of McLuhan’s “curious fusion of sex, technology and death’’, a phrase which 
could serve as a handy soundbite introduction to Ballard’s universe. Here we have it: a mediamatic 
repetition-compulsion culture in which trauma and mass communication have become indivisible, 
where any experience is inseparable from its mediatization.
Cronenberg’s appropriation of Ballard - absolutely logical given their shared obsessions with the 
interactions between media, technical systems and the body - gives an intriguing hint that we may be 
able to approach Ballard as a Gothic writer. Fundamentally, it is Ballard’s treatment of technical, 
organic and geological features as elements belonging to a single plane that makes him an explorer of 
the Gothic line: “all junctions, whether of our own biologies or the hard geometries of these walls 
and ceilings, are equivalent to one another.” (AE 61) What Crash - both the novel and the film -
radically displaces, as Baudrillard says, is the “classical” account of technology and of the body. In 
its place, according to Baudrillard, we have “a body confused with technology in its violating and 
violent dimension, in the savage and continual surgery that violence exercises: incisions, excisions,
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scarifications, the chasms of the body, of which the sexual wounds and pleasures of the body arc- 
only a particular case [...] - a body without organs or pleasure of the organs.” (SS 111)
In his key works, Ballard performs a literal de-territorialization of Science Fiction, a shift from the 
ihcmatics of spatial domination that, according to Baudrillard, had dominated it in its “classical” 
period. What Ballard has himself characterised as his stress on “inner” as opposed to "outer” space 
could give the misleading impression that Ballard has made a phenomenological move, privileging a 
psychological interiority over a concern with “the outside world”. Nothing could be lurther lrom the 
truth. In Ballard’s world, the distinction between inner and outer has fallen away, but not in favour 
of interiority. Ballard’s reversal of Promethean SF goes by way of a new account ol the body, or, 
more Spinozistically, of bodies. Rather than positing a neutral or transcendent body that can 
terraform space, Ballard shows that it is analytically impossible for bodies to dominate any 
environment because (1) bodies are radically inextricable from landscape, and immediately become 
part of it as soon as they enter it; to enter a milieu is immediately to enter into composition with it 
and (2) bodies are themselves landscapes, which must be treated as geological residue.
Ballard’s fictions are anti-organicist and cybernetic, not because they hypostatisc technical machines, 
but because in them it is exteriority, the milieu, that becomes the most dynamic clement. It is not 
technology that Ballard confronts (indeed some of his most important works make little or no 
reference to technical machines at all) so much as media, in McLuhan's sense of "total environment." 
In a discussion of Ballard, Martin Bax shows how, in traditional literature, "the scenery, the physical 
surrounding doesn't really m atter"178 . Media - whether the car or the landscape - arc assumed to be 
vehicles for content ("intraphyschic behaviour") . In a “condensed novel” such as The Atrocity 
Exhibition, Ballard radically reverses this priority; landscape is no longer the enduring (an)organic 
backdrop to a theatre of human activity, but is the principal focus of a schizo-analytic procedure.
In his Minimal Self, Christopher Lasch discusses this effect in Ballard’s work in the context of what 
he calls “the replacement of a reliable world of durable objects by a world of Bickering images that
Martin Bax, “Interview” in Vale ed., Re/Search; J.G. Ballard, 36178
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li make it harder and harder to distinguish reality from fantasy.” (19) . Like Jameson, who has tried to 
distance himself from Lasch 179 but whose critique of postmodern culture Is in many respects 
strikingly parallel, Lasch reads Ballard’s work symptomatically, as a cultural expression of an all- 
pervasive process of commodification, one of whose defining characteristics is the collapse ot what 
he calls “the imperial ego”180 . But, as Bukatman points out, in many crucial respects Ballard 
anticipates and outflanks these kinds of positions on postmodernism. “Jameson’s own essay [on 
postmodernism] .... is strikingly anticipated by J. G. Ballard’s introduction to his high-tech porn 
novel Crash. It was Ballard who, in advance of Jameson, isolated ‘the death of affect,’ ‘the 
moratorium on the past,’ and the irrelevance of ‘the subjective nature o f existence' as hallmarks of 
contemporary life.”181 However, for the Ballard of novels such as The Atrocity Exhibition and 
Crash, it is Jameson and Lasch who can be read symptomatically - of what Ballard has called a 
“retrospective” culture and its obsolete baggage. Ballard’s fiction suggests that the position ol 
transcendent social critic assumed by Jameson and Lasch itself marks a failure to adequately register 
the immanentizing processes capitalism’s cyber-socius is undergoing. These processes, Ballard 
insists, can only be tracked homeopathically, using techniques that are flat with them.
The ficto-theoretical elaboration of the concept of anorganic continuum is what makes Ballard so 
crucial a resource for Gothic Materialism. Ballard’s schizophrenic gaze recapitulates what the set 
designers of The Cabinet o f Dr Caligari had produced - a radical continuity between supposedly 
organic bodies and inorganic landscape, emerging in a refusal to distinguish figure from 
(hack)ground. But, this time, there is no framing narrative that will attribute the perception to a 
disordered mind. Instead, Ballard replaces psychology - and Oedipal psychoanalysis - with what is, in 
effect, a geo-traumatics. At its most radical, this implies a a metapsychology stripped of all vestigial
During the course of his discussion of schizophrenia, Jameson feels the need to point out that his is not “some 
culture-and-personality diagnosis of the type of Christopher Lasch's influential The Culture of Narcissism, from 
which I am concerned radically to distance the spirit and the methodology of the present remarks: there are, one 
would think, far more damaging things to be said about our social system than are available through the use of 
psychological categories.” (PCLLC 24)
1X0One key difference between Lasch and Jameson is on this point: while Lasch unambiguously mourns the loss of a 
solid sense of identity, Jameson, as ever, is ambivalent.
1X1Bukatman, Terminal Identity, 6
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organicism, an analytic procedure complementary to Deleuze-Guattari’s stratoanalysis. whose object 
is not persons but landscapes; all psychology collapses back into geology. “ Ballard olten talks about 
the conflict between geometry and posture, the competition between the animate and inanimate and 
the way the inanimate often creeps in and wins.”182
According to Brian McHale, Ballard's earliest key works had obsessively played out "a pattern of 
repetition-with-variation." "In each, Earth is subject to a global disaster, whether a plague of 
sleeping sickness ["The Voices of Time"], rising sea-level [771? Drowned World ], a manmade 
drought \The Drought], or the bizarre crystallization of living matter [The Crystal World ]. (PF 69) 
Of this early sequence, the most important is the first, The Drowned World. The Drowned World had 
described the deluging of the anthropomorphic strata by what Deleuze-Guattari call “the biocosmic 
memory that threatens to deluge all attempts at collectivity.” (AO 190). In The Drowned World, 
the global disaster is not presented as something against which the characters can struggle as il it 
were simply an external threat; the rising sea level brings changes in the environment that produce a 
"slackening” of the characters’ metabolisms, a recalibration of their physiologies. The journey out 
across the landscape is also an exploration of the body-as-landscape. The geological scene is a 
schizoanalytic trauma-map of the human body; particular geologic features correlate with stages in 
the development of the human organism (whose very organicity is radically denied by its 
subsumption back into anorganic process). ‘“The further down the CNS you move, Irom the hind­
brain through the medulla into the spinal cord, you descend back into the neuronic past. For 
example, the junction between T-12 and L-l, is the great zone of transit between the gill-breathing 
fish and the air-breathing amphibians with their respiratory rib-cages, the very junction where we 
stand now on the shores of this lagoon, between the Paleozoic and Triassic eras."’183
When Jameson theorises Ballard in Postmodernism, he subsumes both The Atrocity Exhibition and 
the important early short story ‘The Voices of Time” under his thesis o f the spatialization of time. 
This analysis kills space just as surely as it kills time, since it equates space (only) with extension . In
1JP
" Eshun, Motion Capture / Interview/, Abstract Culture 2, Winter 97
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Ballard, The Drowned World, Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1965, 42-43
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fact, and exactly contrary to what Jameson argues, Ballard intensifies both space and time: this is 
what is implied by Ballard’s geologization of fiction. If geology spatializes time h also temporalizes 
space. "The brief span of an individual life is misleading. Each one of us is as old as the entire 
biological kingdom, and our bloodstreams are tributaries of the great sea and its total memory. The 
uterine odyssey of the growing foetus recapitulates the entire evolutionary past, and its central 
nervous system is a coded time-scale, each nexus of neurones and each spinal level marking a 
symbolic station, a unit of neuronic time."184 As with Dclcuze-Guattari’s strata, space becomes a 
time-coding (or time-coded) system: both space and time dissolve into aspects of a single, intensive 
space-time process.
Hence one of the crucial figure for Ballard's geo-traumalics: the “spinal landscape.”
Thoraic Drop. The spinal landscape, revealed at the level of T-12, is that ol the porous rock 
towers of Tenerife, and of the native of the Canaries, Oscar Dominguez, who created the 
technique o f  dccalcomania and so exposed the first spinal landscape. The clinker-like rock 
towers, suspended above the silent swamp, create an impression of profound anguish. The 
inhospitability of the mineral world, with its inorganic growths, is relieved only by the 
balloons flying in the clear sky. They are painted with names: Jackie, Lee Harvey, Malcolm. 
In the mirror of the swamp, there are no reflections. (AE 30)
Like much of Ballard’s most important imagery, the concept of the spinal landscape is derived Irom 
surrealism. “Oscar Domingucs, a leading member of the surrealist group in Paris, invented the 
technique of crushing gouache between layers of paper. When separated they reveal eroded, rock­
like forms that touch some deeply buried memory, perhaps at some earlier stage in the formation ol 
the brain’s visual centres, before the wiring is fully in place.” (AE n30) But - as we shall see when 
wc look again at Ballard in Chapter 4 - Ballard’s appropriation of surrealism proceeds by way of an 
excision of anything belonging to the category of the marvellous. In Ballard, the aleatory or dream­
like alterity of classical surrealism gives way to a coolly hypernaturalized schizophrenia.
h is in The Atrocity Exhibition that offers the most sustained theory-fictional account ol 
contemporary media culture in terms of the spinal landscape. While the earlier novels made an
Mallard, The Drowned World, , 43
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important contribution to the “earthing” of Science Fiction (none concerned the traditional 
speculative panoply of outer space journeys, alien civilizations, or rarefied technology), all retained 
enough generic elements to be recognizably placed as traditional fiction. The key events they focused 
on (droughts, floods), whilst not necessarily the ordinary province of Science Fiction, were 
recognizable fictional tropes (belonging, if not to SF, then to the Conradian adventure story, or the 
disaster novel). But The Atrocity Exhibition occupies a more radical place by simultaneously 
downplaying many of fiction’s traditional concerns - mimetic representation, narrative and 
psychology - whilst insisting that to in any way deal with contemporary reality, a new fictional mode 
- composed of collaged micro-narratives, “found texts”, and schizo-typologies - must be innovated. 
Unlike the earlier novels, The Atrocity Exhibition adds nothing; the traumatic events which are its 
concern are simply those which took place in the 1960s. There is no need to postulate some 
additional environmental transmutation on the order of a natural disaster, the novel implies: 
contemporary culture is itself a disaster-in-progress, an unnatural disaster, an atrocity exhibition.
In The Atrocity Exhibition that Ballard’s concerns mesh closely with the media theories of McLuhan 
and Baudrillard. The Atrocity Exhibition demands to be read as a belated (and corrective) sequel to 
Freud (particularly to the Freud of Beyond the Pleasure Principle), and as a schizoanalytic 
counterpart to McLuhan, revealing the convergence of the darkside of both in trauma theory or 
future-shock. Here in particular, Ballard’s "work is marked by [...] its sustained refusal of individual 
psychology"185, by "the complete absence of the imperial ego."186 In The Atrocity Exhibition, the 
identity of the male figure who occupies the position of trying to make sense of his increasingly 
senseless environment is barely vestigial, and isn't even nominal; "as if to emphasize his lack ol 
defining personal characteristics", Ballard's "uncharacterised protagonist" doesn't retain the same 
name from section to section of the novel.187 Ballard’s male "characters" - the word itself belongs to 
a nineteenth-century vocabulary which Ballard’s work obsolesces - arc victims of future shock, 
impelled by the need to come to terms with a vast environmental rupturing imaged in a series of
I yc
Hukaunun. Terminal Identity, 41
IXf> Lasch, Minimal Self, 136 
lii7Lasch, 138
100
repeated disasters: car crashes, war footage, assassinations. Breakdown behaviour - as manifested 
in the ritualised search for “a single abstract form which is repeated in a series of apparently 
unrelated or irregular phenomena: photographs, erotic poses, urban landscapes” (PF 70) - replaces 
any overarching strategy of rational analysis. Or, more accurately, breakdown behaviour becomes 
the only conceivable “rational” response to a world that is itself breaking down.
The novel examines the enormously distended contours of what it calls "the media landscape" (the 
modem urban environment as transformed by coca-colonizing US mediatization) . In an 
environment increasingly dominated by billboards and advertising hoardings, the word "landscape" 
is not at all metaphorical. "What The Atrocity Exhibition was about was the way that the media 
landscape has created something very close to a gigantic art gallery with a lot of very lurid paintings 
on exhibition ... and the way in which psychopathic strains which were normally either ignored or 
suppressed were beginning to use the media landscape to express and reveal themselves."188
In a sense, the phrase "atrocity exhibition" is a strictly literal description of this media landscape as it 
emerged in the early 1960s, populated by images of Vietnam, the Kennedys, Marlin Luther King and 
Malcolm X. The novel deals with the violence that haemorrhaged in the 1969 in which it was 
published: Manson, Altamont, War across the USA. But, for Ballard, the events of 1969 arc merely 
the culmination of a decade whose guiding logic has been one of violence; a mediatized violence, 
where "mediatization" is a profoundly ambiguous term which doesn't necessarily imply a 
disintensification. As they begin to achieve the instantaneous speed Virilio thinks characteristic of 
postmodern communication, media (paradoxically) immediatize trauma, making it instantly available 
even as they prepackage it into what will become increasingly preprogrammed stimulus-response 
circuitries.
Freud describes trauma in terms of the “conservative” tendency of the death drives, a return to the 
inorganic, under the sign of the cybemegatively-configured “principle of constancy.” At its most 
mechanistic, trauma is a simple register of impact upon the organism - Freud cites the example of
IKX Ballard, interview, NME, 1983, 28
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railway accidents - the transmission and distribution, through the organism, of exogenous stimuli. 
Ballard’s contribution, in The Atrocity Exhibition, is to radicalise the Freudian account ol trauma hy 
generalizing it. Rather than treating trauma as something with which the organism is affected only 
contingently, Ballard implies that trauma is a general condition, a non - or anti- - biotic transmission 
system, distributing particular tics - swarms of repetition-compulsions - across a culture that is 
indistinguishable from nature. Culture, like the organism, is composed of tics, compulsions and 
looped behaviours, rather than simply afflicted by them. The “abstract patterns” that Dr Nathan and 
his supposedly psychotic patients discover repeated across architectural, biological and geological 
assemblages arc the vectors through which this trauma spreads. Trauma is not merely about 
processes of wounding and scarring, but also about the response to violent incursions (indeed, 
wounding and scarring are already such responses); it is a distributed event, not merely echoed or 
referenced in the repetition-compulsions, but continued, prolonged, propagated.
Atroci-tv
Media, in The Atrocity Exhibition, function less as extra protective layers on the organism's skin, 
than as conduits through which trauma can propagate itself. The Atrocity Exhibition anticipates the 
correlation between war and cinema Virilio will make, but in a sense, for it the age ol cinema is 
substantially over. The Zapruder film of the Kennedy assassination - as both a found object and an 
avant-garde film - implies the supcrccssion of the war/cinema duo by a new coupling: TV and 
assassination. For Ballard, McLuhan's global village is convened only ironically, brought together - 
in what Jameson calls "the projection of a new collective experience of reception" - by the shock of 
the Kennedy assassination: alroci-tv. "Kennedy’s assassination presides over The Atrocity Exhibition 
■ and in many ways the book is directly inspired by his death, and represents a desperate attempt to 
make sense of the tragedy, with its huge hidden agenda. The mass media created the Kennedy we 
know, and his death represented a tectonic shift in the communications landscape, sending fissures 
deep into the popular landscape that have not yet closed." (AEn 33-34)
Specifically, it Is television which constructed Kennedy; it was TV ’s power to simulate intimacy 
which produced the vast quantities of synthetic emotion it could then propagate as contagion. But if
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it's true that the "mass media created the Kennedy we know", it must also be the case that Kennedy’s 
death creates the mass media with which we are now familiar. For Jameson, the Kennedy
assassination, and the media coverage from which it is radically indistinguishable, constitute 
"something like the coming of age of the whole media culture that had been set in place in the late 
1940s and early 1950s . Suddenly, and for a brief moment (which lasted, however, several long 
days), television showed what it could really do and what it really meant - a prodigious new display 
of synchronicity and a communicational situation that amounted to a dialectical leap over everything 
hitherto suspected." (PCLLC 355)
Trauma is not only the "content" of this experience, but the very mode of experience itself (insofar as 
it is possible to experience trauma itself at all). Echoing McLuhan's invocation of "battle shock", 
Jameson writes of "the shock of communicational explosion" (PCLLC 355). Compulsively repealing 
particular audio-visual sequences, the media itself functions like a trauma victim, and in a dogged 
refusal to accept the implications of McLuhan’s analyses of "capitalist representation" (AO 240) 
Jameson writes of "the instant playbacks of the Reagan shooting or the Challenger disaster, which, 
borrowed from commercial sports, expertly emptied these events of their content". "Content", in the 
sense of meaning, is completely irrelevant to capitalism and its communicational systems which, as 
McLuhan never tired of pointing out, have always been flattening the medium into the message.
The Atrocity Exhibition focuses on what Jameson calls the “great Warhol figures - [such as) Marilyn 
[...] - the notorious cases of burnout and self-destruction of the ending 1960s, and the great 
dominant experiences of drugs and schizophrenia,” who themselves are signals o f a new 
psychopathology, which “would seem to have little in common either with the hysterics and 
neurotics of Freud’s own day or with those canonical experiences of radical isolation and solitude, 
anomie, private revolt, Van Gogh-type madness, which dominated the period of high modernism.” 
(PCLLC, 14) A key trait of Ballard’s novel is a Warhol-like indifferent presentation of objects, in 
which banal objects that should be devoid of affect - commodities - are treated as equivalent to 
•mages which we might ordinarily expect to shock us - carcrashes. But in place of Warhol’s serial 
repetition of objects, Ballard favours techniques of blow-up that more closely recall Oldenberg . 
Both of these techniques combine in the commodification of the human body, its transposition into
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an image that is no longer recognizable as its own image. For Jameson, such techniques are an 
example of the death of affect. “The waning of affect,” he says, “is [...] perhaps best initially 
approached by way of the human figure, and it is obvious that what we have said about the 
commodification of objects holds as strongly for Warhol’s human subjects; stars - like Marilyn 
Monroe - who are themselves commodified and transformed into their own image.” (PCLLC, 11) 
But, bearing in mind the critique of the “death of affect” theses we made in Chapter 1. Gothic- 
Materialism would prefer to describe such techniques in terms of a distribution of impersonaliscd 
affect, a spread of affect beyond the confines of the emotional or psychological.
As Burroughs points out in his preface, the "magnification of image to the point where it becomes 
unrecognizable is a keynote of The Atrocity Exhibition. " (AE vii) Burroughs makes the connection 
with Pop Art: it "is what Bob Rauschenberg is doing (...) literally blowing up the image." (AE vii) 
The scene Burroughs cites is typical:
A group of workmen on a scaffolding truck were pasting up the last of the displays, a hundred- 
foot-long panel that appeared to represent a section of a sand-dune. Looking at it more closely. 
Dr Nathan realized that it was an immensely magnified portion of skin under the iliac crest. 
Glancing at the billboards, Dr Nathan recognised other magnified fragments: a segment of 
lower lip, a right nostril, a portion of female perineum. Only an anatomist could have identified 
these fragments, each represented as a formal geometric pattern.(AE 10)
For Ballard, what Virilio calls the "breaks in spatio-temporal continuity dreamt up by film-makers" 
have now become a commonplace feature of the external environment as it has become increasingly 
mediatized. The techniques of montage and jump-cutting that were once the preserve of 
experimental cinema now characterize the media landscape itself, which systematically breaks down 
molar or human perception" 189 Here, "human beings have shrunk to the point of invisibility, while 
the images they have made of themselves, grotesquely enlarged to gigantic dimensions and no 
longer recognisable as human images at all, take on a life of their own." 190 Magnification, or 
amplification, has the effect of making the boundary between organic and inorganic seem arbitrary. 
(Ballard's early short story, "Track 12" had performed the same trick, but with sound: '"Amplified
1 XO r-vDeleuze, Cinema 1, 84
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1(X),(XX) times, animal cell division sounds like a lot of girders and steel sheets being ripped apari - 
how did you put it? - a car crash in slow motion.'"191)
In Ballard’s neo-expressionist thematics landscape and event become equivalent. Geology is a slow- 
motion event, only arbitrarily and illegitimately distinguished from cultural production. From the 
point of view of Ballard’s geo-traumatics, it is necessary to
directly equate the physical aspect of Marilyn Monroe's body with the landscape of dunes 
around her. The hero attempts to try to make sense of this particular equation, and he realises 
that the suicide of Marilyn Monroe is in fact a disaster in space-time like the explosion of a 
space-capsule in orbit. It is not so much a personal disaster, though of course Marilyn Monroe 
committed suicide as an individual woman, but a disaster of a whole complex ol relationships 
involving this screen actress who is presented to us in an endless series of advertisements, on a 
thousand magazine covers, and so on, whose body becomes part of the external landscape ol 
our environment. The immense terraced figure of Marilyn Monroe stretched across a cinema 
hoarding is as real a portion of our external landscape as any system of mountains or lakes.192
"The star system stemmed from [an ...] instability of dimensions,"193 Virilio suggests. What could 
appear to be a representation of the organism is in fact its deterritorialization. "The porous sand, 
reminiscent of the eroded walls of the apartment, and of the dead film star with her breasts of carved 
pumice and thighs of ash, diffused along its crests into the wind.” (AE 43) "The apartment was a box 
clock, a cubicular extrapolation of the facial planes of the yantra, the cheekbones of Marilyn 
Monroe.” (AE 43) The vast image of Monroe - and the other stars - is not like a landscape, it is a 
landscape. 194
Track 12", in Ballard, The Overloaded Man, London: Panther, 197, 61
Ballard, "The New Science Fiction: A Conversation between J.G. Ballard and George MacBcth", in Jones ed., 
I he New SF, 56
Virilio, War and Cinema: The Logistics o f Perception, trans. Patrick Camiller, London/ New York: Verso, 
1984, 25
|y4 We might be reminded here of the convergence ol medical, military and media perception in Virilio's War and 
Cinema, whose comments on Monroe may well owe something to Ballard. "Always in exile from its immediate, 
natural dimensions, never seeming to be connected to anything else, Marilyn's body was at once expandable like a 
giant screen and capable of being folded and reproduced like a poster, a magazine cover of a centre-spread." ( War 
and Cinema, 25) "Marilyn's body, which the Seventh Division doctors said they would most like to examine yet 
which no-one claimed from the morgue, reminds one of that penetraung gaze of the surgeon or cameraman which 
came into its own in the First World. War [...] Like aerial reconnaissance photography [...] the use of endoscopy or 
scanners allows hidden organs to surface in an instrumental collage, an utterly obscene reading of the ravages of 
irauma or a disease," (War and Cinema, 25-26)
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Catastrophe M anagement
Baudrillard: “The car is not the appendix o f a domestic universe, there are only 
incessant figures o f circulation, and the Accident is everywhere, the elementary, 
irreversible figure, the banality o f the anomaly o f death. It is no longer at the margin, it 
is at the heart. It is no longer the exception to a triumphal rationality, it has become the 
Rule, it has devoured the Rule. It is no longer even 'the accursed share,' the one 
conceded to destiny by the system, and included in its general reckoning. Everything is 
reversed. It is the accident that gives form to life, it is the accident, the insane that is 
the sex o f  life. ” (SS 113)
In both The Atrocity Exhibition and the subsequent Crash - in many ways an extrapolation of a 
particular obsession from the previous book (the fusion of erotics and carcrashes) - Ballard 
describes a generalized traumatics, in which power and catastrophe simulate each other, becoming 
indistinguishable. Catastrophes and their re-enactment circulate endlessly in Ballard's chaosmos, not 
necessarily only as mechanical repetition of what has already happened, but also as cybernetically 
unticipative simulations. The implication is that, by being projected in advance, any future possibility, 
no matter how horrific, can, in some sense, be "managed".
Faced with the apparently senseless spectacle of the protracted conflict in Vietnam - "All political 
and military explanations fail to provide a rationale for the war's extended duration" - Ballard seeks 
out its sources in a mediatized unconscious “fixated to trauma.” Like Freud, impelled to postulate 
the death drive in part by his observation of the behaviour of First World War shellshock victims as 
they obsessively re-enacted their trauma, Ballard discovers in mediatized culture an obsessive 
"compulsion to repeat." Repetition both serves to alleviate trauma and to perpetuate it, wrecking 
any simple teleology: in the paradoxical logic Freud delineates in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the 
organism preserves itself precisely by becoming-inorganic, and “life” is only a detour on the way to 
death. This emerges for Ballard at the level of deleometric catastrophe management systems in the 
torm of perverse explanations for the war, irrationales: '"In terms o f  television and the news 
magazines the war in Vietnam has a latent significance very different from its manifest content. Far 
bom repelling us, it appeals to us by virtue of its complex of polyperverse acts.” (AE 87) Media -
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as the ambivalently functioning additions to the human perceptual system described by Freud and 
McLuhan - have a crucial role to play in this economy: (an)aestheticization, the translation of 
trauma into repeated images which, no matter how horrific they initially appear, soon become banal, 
in part by dint of repetition itself.
"Freud characterizes trauma as an 'invasion', a breach in an otherwise efficacious barrier against 
stimuli,' infiltrating alien desires - xenopulsions - into the organism." 195 But rather than damping 
down xenopuisive excitation, Ballard's cybernetic systems seem to hunt out and obsessively pore 
over trauma. Initially, according to Anti-Oedipus, an "anus-vampire" (AO 228), capitalism is, by the 
time of The Atrocity Exhibition, also a ghoul: mediatizing the feedback process of its own 
reproduction in endlessly reiterating loops of mass production and consumption of death. 
Deleometrics is the key science of Ballard's catastrophe management - the urge not now to banish 
death, nor to suicidally embrace it (as according to Deleuze-Guattari, fascism had196 ) but to quantily 
it, to "optimize" it. What Baudrillard calls the generalization of the Accident leads to what he 
characterizes as a “hyperfunctionalism” which moves beyond both teleology and transgression. 11 the 
accident has become the rule, then there is no law to transgress, just as there Is no goal to head 
towards.
Beyond the Pleasures o f the Organs
A central pre-occupation The Atrocity Exhibition, as with Videodrome and Crash, Is the 
displacement of bio-sexuality. The novel performs a decoding of sex into a matter of stimuli that are 
not themselves sexual: what Burroughs, in his preface, calls the “non-sexual roots of sexuality”, 
‘sex is becoming more and more a conceptual act” (AE 60) Writing of Crash, Baudrillard invokes 
detcrritorialized and disorganized eroticism; a cyberotics. This is not a matter of simply substituting
' ^  Land. "Machinic Desire", 477
11('' See “Micropolitics and Segmentarity” in TP, especially 230-231, where Deleuze-Guattari argue that fascism was 
characterized by "a will to wager everything you have ever had, to stake your own death against the dead) of others, 
;ind measure everything by 'deleomelers'.” (TP 230)
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technical machines for biological sexual objects, but of decoding sexuality into a matter of abstract 
stimulus (one of Burroughs’ favourite themes, and one Ballard pursues relentlessly). Ballard's 
question “in what way is intercourse per vagina more stimulating than with this ashtray, say. or with 
the angle between two walls?” (AE 69) outlines a vector of capitalist expansion. It's not just a 
question of selling commodities by associating them with sex, (the well-known but by now archaic- 
advertising technique critiqued by McLuhan in The Mechanical Bride) but of a generalized 
libidinization in which bio-sex is no longer the privileged referent. What McLuhan calls the "hunger 
to experience everything sexually” converts into an (even more) abstract drive to maximize 
sensation. Which also amounts, in The Atrocity Exhibition and Crash, to the abstraction ot 
sensation. Hence, for Baudrillard, the emergence of a generalized libidinization proper to the Body 
without Organs. As Baudrillard writes, in an almost valedictory mode: “Goodbye ‘erogenous zones’: 
everything becomes a hole to offer itself up to the discharge reflex. [...] Body and technology 
diffracting their bewildered signs through each other. Carnal abstraction and design.” (SS 112) 197
In Ballard, as in Videodrome, eroticization is inseparable from mediatization and from landscape: all 
three form a continuum.198 As we’ve seen, the schizophrenic implosion of subjectivity has as its 
other side the emergence of a hyper-body which moves beyond Worringer’s "wisdom and limits ot 
the organism.” As body image (and organismic integrity) fade, new desires emerge. One could 
theorize these either as a hypersexuality - a sexuality that has escaped genital, even biotic reference, 
or as a post- or anti-sexuality - desires that it no longer makes any sense to describe in sexual terms. 
199 Videodrome's dominant image - of Max’s body transformed into a violently lihidini/.ed New 
Flesh - would support both theses. That image has presided over this chapter, and it will also preside *
* 17 Baudnllard’s emphasis, unlike ours, is on signs/ semiurgy. Witness the section excised from this quote: “But 
above all (as in primitive initiation tortures, which are not ours), the whole body becomes a sign to oiler itself to the 
exchange of bodily signs.” Note again the neo-primitivism.
IGU
A precursor here - often cited by Deleuze, and a key player in the “Bixly without Organs" plateau ol A Thousand 
Plateaus - is Masoch. As Dcleu/.c-Guattari make clear, masochism has nothing to do with the hunger lor pain (which 
would merely be the complement of the hedonistic hunt for pleasure - see next lixitnote): it is concerned rather with 
intensity modulation. (See TP 155) This is effectuated by an eroticism which focuses as much on the mis-en-scene - 
the mistress’s clothes, for instance - as on the specifically “sexual" as such.
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in any case, it is no longer a matter ol hedonism or pleasure (models Deleuze-Guattari strenuously oppose in A 
thousand P la te a u s , since they presuppose an organismic metrics, a hydraulics in which pressure builds up towards 
inevitable discharge; the plateau, meanwhile, is defined by its  a v o id a n c e  of a discharge which would terminate it.)
(See TP 154, and its attack on the “priestly” account of “pleasure as discharge.”
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„ „  the next, which takes up agan, the question o f the deterritorialixation of sexual,,,. The next 
[Mpter. though. -  he concerned less with the erotic, and ntore w„h the nrproductive. role o, 
exuality. and the w „  i, has horn displaced by cybernetic systetns. How do bodies without (sexual,
organs replicate themselves?
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3. XEROX AND XENOGENESIS: M ECHANICAL REPRODUCTION AND GOTHIC 
PROPAGATION
Dick: ‘Androids can't bear children, ’ she said, then. ‘Is that a loss ?'
He finished undressing her. Exposed her pale, cold loins.
‘Is it a loss?’ Rachael repeated. 7  don’t really know; /  have no way to tell. How 
does it fee l to be born, fo r  that matter? We re not born; we don't grow up; instead o f dying 
from illness or old age we wear out like ants. Ants again; that's what we are.' " Not you: /  
mean me. Chitinous reflex-machines who aren ’t really alive. ’ She twisted her head to one 
side, .said loudly, ‘I’m not alive/ You're not going to bed with a woman. Don’t be 
disappointed; okay. Have you ever made love to an android before?'
‘No, ’ he said, taking o ff his shirt and tie.
7  understand -  they tell me -  i t ’s convincing i f  you don't think too much about it. 
But if  you think too much, if  you reflect on what you re doing -  then you can t go on. For 
ahem physiological reasons. ’
Bending, he kissed her bare shoulder.
‘Thanks, Rick,' she said wanly. ‘Remember, though: don’t think about it, just do it. D on’t 
pause and be philosophical, because from a philosophical standpoint i t ’s dreary. For us both. "
Baudrillard: "Cloning is [...] last stage in the history o f the modeling o f the body -  the stage at 
which the individual, having been reduced to his abstract and genetic formula, is destined for serial 
propagation. It is worth recalling in this context what Walter Benjamin had to say about the work 
of art in the age o f mechanical reproduction. What is lost when a work is massively reproduced is 
that work‘s ‘aura, ’ its unique here and now quality, its aesthetic form  [... | What is lost is the 
original — which only a history that is itself nostalgic and retrospective can restore in its 
‘authenticity ’. The most advanced, most modern form o f this development -  which Benjamin 
described in connection with contemporary cinema, photography and mass media -  is that form  
where the original no longer even exists, because the objects in question are conceived o f from the
outset in terms o f their limitless reproduction. (TE I 1X)
Butler: Every machine will probably have its special mechanical breeders, and all the higher ones 
will owe their existence to a large number o f parents and not to two only. (212)
Deleuze-Guattari: "We oppose epidemic to filiation, contagion to heredity, peopling by contagion 
to sexual reproduction, sexual production / . . . /  Propagation by epidemic, by contagion has nothing 
to do with filiation by heredity, even i f  the two themes intermingle and require each other. The
vampire does not filiate, it infects. " (TP 241-242)
Jl(l ( I Mark Downham. "Philip K. Dick was influential on Cyber-Punk, in that his novel A S c a n n e r  D a rk ly  touched 
"ii whai is crucial in Baudrillard's disintegration into neurosis: ‘Biological life goes on. everything else is dead. A 
mhex, machine-like, like some insect repeating doomed patterns over and over. A single pattern. The laded codes ol 
■"' escape combination. But how can you truly escape yourself.’’” (“Cyberpunk", 42).
- ’ t>ick. Do Androids Dream o f Electric Sheep?, 146
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Let me tell you about my mother
Max's invagination in Videodrome might serve as a startling literalization ol MeLuhan's notorious 
claim, in Understanding Media, that human beings have become the “sex organs of the machine 
world” (UM 46); a claim famously echoed by Manuel De Landa when he describes technology as 
"an independent species of machine-flowers that simply did not possess its own reproductive organs
* V
during a segment of its evolution.” 202 The “grotesquely sexual nightmare images” of Videodrome 
bring us to one of the abiding preoccupations of Science Fiction and Horror; the displacement, or 
deterritorialization, of sexual reproduction. Is it the case, as Scott Bukatman suggests, that Max 
Renn become “part of [a] massive system of reproductive technology”?20' Or is it the case that, in 
the world of Videodrome and of cyberpunk in general, nonorganic replication has escaped the net of 
"filiative” reproduction?
Both Deleuze-Guattari and Baudrillard offer theorizations of reproduction, but whereas Baudrillard 
continues to take sexual reproduction as the paradigm, critiquing simulated-reproduction for its 
deviation from the sexual model, Deleuze-Guattari oppose all reproduction (sexual or otherwise) to 
a model of “contagion”, a non (or hyper)sexual mode of replication which takes its cue front 
vampirism, lycanthropy and disease. So where Baudrillard’s “negativized Gothic” proceeds by way 
of identifying an increasing perfection in the techniques of artifical reproduction (leading, in his view, 
to a triumph of a post-sexual necrotic culture), Deleuze-Guattari follow the Gothic line in identifying 
modes of replication that cut across organic reproduction altogether. Instead of identifying, as 
Baudrillard does, the escape from (sexual) reproduction with an increase in sameness, Deleuze- 
Guattari argue that “anorganic propagation” is a feature of multiplicity. Blade Runner, once again.
-02 Manuel De Landa, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, New York: Zone Books, 1991, 3 
Jn  Bukatman, “Who Programs You?”, 206
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provides an exemplary case-study for the crosshatching of these two approaches, as lain Hamilton 
Grant establishes in his commentary on its opening scene:
When replicant Leon responds to bladerunner Holden’s question ‘let me tell you about my 
mother ... [shots propel Holden through the plate glass window into the street many floors 
below]’, the bullets may not offer stories of his mother, but the unmistakable technological 
phenotype of their impact etches Leon’s military-industrial genealogy in scar tissue over 
Holden’s damaged body. The point is that, qua organism, the replicant is an orphan, or what 
amounts to the same thing, has no exclusivist claim to, no biunivocal bit-map of his 
progeniture, issuing instead from an institutional-techincal matrix and not a couple. Like 
Artaud, Leon ‘got no pappa-mommy.’ Leon has no mother, only a matrix of industrial- 
military t e c h n o lo g ie s 04
Grant here deliberately echoes both Dcleuze-Guattari -  whose invocation of Artaud’s claim that he 
had “no pappa-mommy” operates as an important slogan early on in Anti-Oedipus -  and the 
Baudrillard of Seduction, and his appalled cry: “No more mother, just a matrix” (S 169) 
Baudrillard’s speculations on the “wealth of plant-like branchings that dissolve Ocdipal sexuality in 
favour of a ‘non-human’ sex” (S 169)205 stand as a horrified anticipation of the scenario Blade 
Runner presents. We will now look in more detail at Baudrillard’s position, before turning to 
Deleuzc-Guattari’s account of Gothic propagation. Both will be cashed out, at the end of the 
chapter, in terms of an analysis of Gibson’s Neuromancer.
For Baudrillard, the re-engineering of sex “at the fractal, micrological and non-human level” results 
in the disappearance o f  sexual difference and hence of sexuality itself.” (TE 3) This is the 
culmination of a cultural process in which mechanical reproduction extends beyond the production 
of objects to reconfigure even the tiniest interstices of biological vivisystems. Cybcrneticization -  the 
gradual but implacable translation of all of nature/culture into information, or code - replaces sex 
with a simulated death; not the “tragic” form of death, which remains “sexed” since it is associated 
wilh “higher mammals” and their mode of reproduction, but an “asexual form” of death, “a recessive
-•9 Grant, "LA 2019”, (no page refs)
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stage which harks back to the molecular and protozoan stage of living beings, to their 
unceremonious obliteration, leaving them no other form of destiny.”205 06 “Is there a lorm ol death 
drive that pushes sexed beings towards a form of reproduction anterior to the acquisition of sexual 
identities,” Baudrillard asks in Seduction , adding that “this fissiparous form, this proliferation by 
contiguity conjuréis] up in the deepest recesses of our imaginary as something that denies sexuality 
and seeks to annihilate it.” (S 168-169) ‘Today’s technological beings,” he elaborates in The 
Transparency o f Evil, machines, clones, replacement body parts -  all tend towards this kind of 
reproduction, and little by little they are imparting the same process to those beings that are 
supposedly human, and sexed.” (TE 7) In addition to annihilating sex, this -  deathly - form of 
reproduction also annihilates (or ex-terminates207) organic death; “an individual product on the 
conveyor belt” has “not been sexually engendered” and is therefore “unacquainted with death.” (TE 
116)
The spread of this undiffentiation or homogenization across all levels of culture -  sexual, political, 
aesthetic208 -  amounts, then, to a “denial of all alterity” that is simultaneously immortalist and 
necrotic. Immortalist, since the code achieves a kind of infinitely perpetuated “sur-vival”, but 
necrotic because this “form of immortal life, this nostalgia for a pure contiguity ol lile and its 
molecular sequentiality” was what “Freud associated [with] the death instinct.” 209
205 Cf. the (ironically) virtually identical repetition of the passage in The Transparency o f Evil's “The Hell ot the
Same", 115-116. Is Baudrillard cloning his own wriUng? *
206 Baudrillard, The Illusion of the End, 98
207 cf Baudrillard’s discussion of “ ‘tele’ space” in which there are “[o]nly terminals in a position of ex-termination." 
(S 165)
208 A process which does not only happen at every level, but to every level, as, all distinctions become increasingly 
unstable. "Everything is sexual. Everything is poliucal. Evertyhing is aesthetic. [...] Each category is generalized to 
tlie greatest possible extent, so that it eventually loses all specificity and reabsorbed by all the other categories.” (TE 9)
209 The Illusion of the End, 98. ‘Today, we no longer believe we are immortal, yet it is precisely now that we are 
I’ecoming so, becoming quietly immortal without knowing it, without wishing it, without believing it, by the mere fact 
ol the confusion of the limits of life and death. No longer immortal in terms of the soul, which has disappeared, nor 
'■'ven, the body, which is disappearing, but in terms of the formula, immortal in terms of the ctxle.” , 99
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According to Baudrillard, what McLuhan and Benjamin grasp - and what Marx fails to - is 
technology as a medium rather than a ‘productive force.” ’(SED 56) Both, Baudrillard insists, 
understood that the “mere fact” of reproducibility engenders what he - surely misleadingly - descibes 
as “an entirely new generation of meaning.” (SED 56) Evidently, meaning - whether new or not - is 
precisely not the issue; what issues in fact is radically asignifying technologies of “reproduction" 
which are their own message. Contrary to Marx’s hermeneutics of suspicion, technology does not 
conceal or distort a message; it is itself a message.
Baudrillard derives from Benjamin’s The Work o f Art in the Age o f Mechanical Reproduction the 
key insight into the sheer fact of reproducibility. Cleverly transposing Benjamin’s arguments from art 
objects to biological life, Baudrillard discusses the disappearance of the “aura”, which no longer 
designates the unique qualities of the work of art, as it did for Benjamin, but ot the individual 
organism itself. Whereas, according to Baudrillard, meiotic sex -  involving what he quaintly terms 
“otherness”210 -  inevitably allows the possibility of heterogeneity, mechanical reproduction implies 
the ever more perfect production of exact copies: “the Hell o f  the same” (TE 113-124). "Xerox and 
infinity.” (TE 51-59) Properly speaking, we might say, sexual reproduction is not reproduction at all: 
true reproduction -  the production of copies supposedly identical in every respect -  is possible only 
via the intervention of technical machines. As Benjamin had understood, mass production -  the 
avatar of Baudrillard’s second order -  introduces this possibility, but, for Baudrillard, its 
technologies are merely a pale anticipation of the horrors of homogeneity made available by 
contemporary biotechnology. “Benjamin was writing in the industrial era: by then technology was a 
gigantic prosthesis governing the generation of identical objects and imttges which there was no 
longer any way of distinguishing from one another, but it was as yet impossible to foresee the 
technological sophistication of our own era, which has made it possible to generate identical beings,
fit) Whereas the “cellular dream of schizogenesis [...] allows one to bypass the other, and to go troni the same to the 
” (S 168)
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without any means of returning to an original.”(TE 119) in the labs of the Tyrell corporation, with 
Grant-Monod’s “molecular cybernetics” at its disposal, biotech achieves an industrialization of bio­
reproduction far beyond anything industrial machines could achieve.
As the ultimate exemplars of simulation-culture, the replicants recapitulate the four orders of the 
simulacra, rerunning, at the same time, their ficto-genealogy in the history of Science Fiction. Insofar 
as they resemble humans and are confused with them, the replicants are the automata of the first 
phase (copies of the human). Yet, as Nexus-6 models, the replicants have been (mass) produced 
serially, from templates. At the Second Order, the technical machine and its operators become 
equivalent; these are the robots of Kapek’s RUR, whose name, famously means slave (as Roy Batty 
tells Deckard: “Quite an experience to live in fear, isn’t it? That’s what it is to be a slave.”) ‘The 
mere fact that any given thing can simply be reproduced is already a revolution: one need only think 
of the stupefaction of the Black boy seeing two identical books together for the first time. That these 
two technical products are equivalent under the sign of necessary social labour power is less 
important in the long-term than the serial repetition of the same object (which is also the serial 
repetition of individuals as labour power).” (SED 56) But the second-order slips, almost 
immediately, into the third; unlike Kapek’s robots the replicants haven’t been constructed simply as 
replacements of some already-existing quanta of labour power: they have been “conceived according 
to their very reproducibility”. The difference between the second and the third order is subtle -  
which is why the one always fades so quickly into the third -  but decisive, and is a matter of the 
temporality of (re)production. Whereas the stage of mass production begins with single objects that 
are only subsequently mass-(re)produced, the “objects” of the third order arc (re)produced in the 
first instance with mass (re)production in mind; indeed, they arc only manufactured because they 
ran be so (reproduced “Moreover, the stage of serial reproduction (that of the industrial 
mechanism, the production line, the growth of reproduction, etc.) is ephemeral. As soon as dead 
'abour gains the upper hand over living labour [...], serial reproduction gives way to generation
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through models. In this case it is a matter of a reversal of origin and end, since all forms change from 
the moment that they are no longer mechanically reproduced, but conceived according to their very 
reproducibility, their diffraction from a generative core called a ‘model’.” (SED 56)
This process culminates in what Baudrillard, according to Gane, Baudrillard will call the “fourth 
phase of simulacra”211 : a phase exemplified, it would seem, by such phenomena as cloning and the 
hologram -  “objects” that display a complete self-similarity, in which the whole can be reconstituted 
from any part, whether it be a cell in the case of the clone, or a fragment of image in the case of the 
hologram.
What is crucial, for Baudrillard, is the drift away from empirical difference towards a sameness 
deriving from the abstract; abstract, because any apparently unique feature is now seen as (merely) 
an instantiation of a pre-existent -  and manipulable -  grid: code. Baudrillard’s own favoured 
example here, repeatedly invoked, is DNA, but the process he describes is perhaps better exemplified 
by digitization. In Seduction, Baudrillard decries the sterile perfection of hi-fidelity recordings (“ 
high fidelity,’ which is just as obsessive and puritanical as the other, conjugal, fidelity.” [S 30)) 
These, though, are as nothing compared to the digital recording, the -  at least in its idealized 
accounts -  perfect copy. Since a digital document is simply a matter of an arrangement of binary 
(on/off) switches, a recapitulation of the same pattern could either be seen as the most perfect copy 
imaginable, or not really a “copy” at all. “So-called intelligent machines [...) [break] linguistic, 
sexual or cognitive acts down into their simplest elements and digitiz(e) them so that they can be 
resynthesized according to models. They can generate all the possibilities of a program or of a 
Potential object.” (TE 52)
n 1, *^lke Gane' “Radical Theory: Baudrillard and Vulnerability”, Theory, Culture <4 Society, London, Thousand 
oaks and New Delhi -  Sage, Voi 12 (1995), 120
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The Simulacrum’s Revenge
Baudrillard: What is the ‘crystal’? It is the object, the pure event, something which no longer really 
has an origin or an end. The object to which the subject has wanted to give an origin and a 
purpose, even though it has none, is today starting to recount itself. There is a possibility that the 
object will say something to us, but there is also above all the possibility that it will rake its
revenge!
Aldiss: 'The new systems o f machinery now coming in have great power, and it is a power to 
change the world. In the cotton towns, you can already see that power-looms are creating a 
new category o f human being, the town labourer. As the machine becomes more complex, so 
he will become more o f an expert. His experience will become centred on machines: 
eventually, his kind will become adjuncts o f the machine. They will be called 'a labour 
force. ’ In other words, an abstract idea will replace a master-man relation: but in practice 
the workings o f a labour force may be just as difficult. [...]
[A] culture will become enslaved by the machines. The second generation o f 
machines will be much more complex than the first, fo r it will include machines capable o f  
repairing and even reproducing the first generation! [...]
The greater the complexity o f  systems, the more danger o f something going wrong, 
and the less chance individual will has o f operating on the systems fo r  good. First the 
systems become impersonal. Then they seem to take a mind o f  their own, then they become 
positively malignant! ’
‘Then we are heading fo r  a world fu ll o f  Frankenstein’s monsters, M an!' exclaimed 
Byron, slapping his leg.213
Alongside Baudrillard’s vision of celibate, enclosed -  or imploded circuits -, always haunting the 
dream of perfect reproduction, is a line of escape. Baudrillard calls this “the simulacrum’s revenge”. 
As we leave the first-order behind, resemblance, Baudrillard says, disappears as a criterion. “No 
more semblance or dissemblance, no more God or Man, only an immanent logic of the principle of 
operativity.” (SED 54) As Baudrillard explains, operativity is the “principle” of the second order. 
Now that machines are no longer slaved into being “the image of man” they can reproduce 
indiscriminately; and so, Baudrillard says, can human beings. Mass human reproduction -  the 
emergence of the proletariat in the new industrial towns -  is a side-effect of machinic reproduction.
' Alter this, robots and machines can proliferate - this is even their law - as automata, being sublime
-12 Gane, ed, B a u d r illa r d  L iv e  S e l e c t e d  I n te rv ie w s , New York/London: Routledge. 1993, 51
-13 Brian Aldiss, F ra n k en ste in  U n b o u n d , London -  Jonathan Cape, 1973, 64-65. Aldiss’s novel is a melalictional 
commentary on the F ra n k en ste in  story, interpolating a time-travelling twenty-first century dweller into the monster's 
primal scene at Villa Diodati; but Aldiss places the monster alongside his (fictional) creator -  Frankenstein -  and his 
•real) creator, Mary Shelley. For our purposes, the point is made in the quotation as presented: the Frankenstein story
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jnd singular mechanisms, have never done. Men themselves only begin to proliferate when, with the 
Industrial Revolution, they took on the status of machines: freed of all semblance, freed even from 
their double, they grew increasingly similar to the system of production of which they were a 
miniaturized equivalent. The simulacrum’s revenge, which gave rise to the myth of the sorcerer’s 
apprentice, did not take place with the automaton; on the contrary, this is the law of the second 
order, from which there proceeds a hegemony of the robot, of the machine, of dead labour over 
living labour.” (SED 54)
The most exemplary (social science) fictions of the second-order are Marx’s, clearly echoed in 
Baudrillard’s language here. It is Marx, writing of the “necromantic” power of capital, who sees 
human beings re-made in the images of the machines they supposedly produced. Marx begins to see 
the reversal that Baudrillard will base much of his theoretical work upon: instead of machines being 
produced (and reproduced) to satisfy pre-existing human needs, human beings will be reproduced in 
order to satisfy the requirements of the system (which treats human heings not as cnds-in-lhemselves 
but as scrvomcchanical adjuncts to industrial -  and later -  cybernetic machines). For Baudrillard, 
both machines and humanity reproduce only because the system -  the code -  demands it. As he puts 
it as early as For a Critique o f the Political Economy o f  the Sign, “man is not reproduced as man: 
he is simply regenerated as a survivor (a surviving productive force). If he eats, drinks, lives 
somewhere, reproduces himself, it is because the system requires his self-production in order to 
reproduce itself: it needs men. If it could function with slaves, there would be no ‘free’ workers. II it 
could function with asexual mechanical robots, there would be no sexual reproduction.”214
214 F or a C r itiq u e  o f  th e  P o l i t ic a l  E c o n o m y  o f  th e  S ig n , 86. These arguments are advanced, nt course, both .ts a 
continuation of Marx, and as a critique of Marx’s humanism. With Deleuze-Guattari (particularly the Deleuze- 
Gualtari of A n ti-O e d ip u s ) and the Lyotard of L ib id in a l E c o n o m y , Baudrillard wants to insist, with Marx, on the way 
dial capital operates independently of human will, but, against Marx, he wants to claim that there are no pre-existent 
human "needs" which are being exploited, perverted, or alienated. If there are primordial needs, they belong not to die 
human being --certainly not the individual human being -  but to the system itsell. Baudrillard. naturally, will not
Thus Marx -  as the theorist most closely associated with “the industrial simulacrum' -  becomes the 
prophet of “the hegemony of the robot.” Running alongside Marx’s theory-fictions of becoming- 
robot is the classic example of the narrative of “the simulacrum’s revenge” in modern fiction: Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein. It is not for nothing that the theme o f the displacement of sexual 
reproduction is central to Frankenstein, in many ways the founding text of the modern genres of 
Science Fiction and Horror. The subsequent stratification of fiction-production into these two genres 
-  a stratification never fully achieved, since, as we have seen, SF and Horror have oltcn lound 
themselves tangled up together -  has tended to imply a splitting of the Gothic line, typically putting 
Science Fiction on the side of a speculative machinism, and Horror on the side of supernaturalism. 
Yet Victor Frankenstein’s achievement in artificially synthesizing the means of reproduction is 
presented, by Shelley, as the moment where alchemical ambition is vindicated by eleetro-libidinal 
science; there is no need to posit a supplementary, extra-material, or supernatural dimension -  
Nature can overcome itself. Yet it does so also by presenting Man -  and the gender designation is 
here of course deliberate -  with a set of unanticipated consequences; the unanticipated -  but always 
latent - consequences which constitute the true “simulacrum’s revenge.”
What Frankenstein brings together is the identitarian dream of perfect reproduction -  a dream 
Baudrillard tracks through to its latest manifestation in cloning and genetic engineering - with a 
vision of “object revenge”. The object, that is to say, refuses to stay in the position assigned to it: as 
passive, or hierarchically inferior, matter. As its subtitle tells us, Frankenstein, or the Modern 
Prometheus pre-emptively critiques the “Promethean” narratives that Baudrillard will claim to be 
definitional of later nineteenth century Science Fiction. If it is conventional now to treat the monster 
as symbolic of the emergent industrial machinery - as Bruce Mazlish argues, “|a]lthough 
Frankenstein’s creation is, in fact, a monster, its existence raises the same fundamental ‘mysteries’ as
make the move that Deleuze-Guattan do: de-privileging need and use value while thinking production alongside a 
desire that is not understood in terms of need.
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il it were a machine -  such are the amorphous connecting powers of myth’" 11' -  it is because it 
presents exactly the figure of Promethean revolt -  and counter-revolt -  that Baudrillard lakes to he 
typical of the “industrial simulacrum.”
lithe Frankenstein story is no doubt implicit in Baudrillard’s account of “the simulacrum's revenge' 
it is not something to which he actually refers. Once again, Baudrillard’s comments here seem to 
echo remarks made by Wiener. When Wiener is warning of the danger of cybernetics he refers not to 
the Frankenstein story, but, like Baudrillard, to “Goethe’s poem, The Sorcerer's Apprentice’' in 
which "the young factotum who cleans the master’s magic garments, sweeps his floors, and fetches 
his water is left alone by the sorcerer to fill his water butt. Having a lull portion ol that laziness 
which is the true mother of invention [...] the lad remembers some Iragmcnts ol an incantation which 
he has heard from his master and puts his broom to work fetching water. This task the broom carries 
out with promptness and efficiency. When the water begins to overflow the top ol the water butt, the 
boy finds that he does not remember the incantation that the magician has used to stop the broom. 
The boy is well on the way to be drowned when the magician comes back, and gives the apprentice a 
good wholesome scolding.” (GGi 57) Wiener also invokes Jacobs’ short story ‘The Monkey’s Paw , 
in which a family wish for money, but find that their wish is fulfilled only when their son is killed, and 
they receive the insurance money for his death. According to Wiener, the “theme ol all these tales is 
the danger of magic. This seems to lie in the fact that the operation ol magic is singularly literal­
minded, and that it grants you anything at all it grants you what you ask for, not what you have 
asked for or what you intend. [...] The magic of automation, and in particular the magic ol an 215
215 Mazlish, The Fourth Discontinuity: the Co-evolution o f Humans and Machines, New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1993, 44 Yet it is worth bearing in mind Haraway’s -  passing -  comment on the Frankenstein story. 
By contrast wiUi her cyborg, Haraway points out, Shelley's monster remains in a state of Oedipal revolt -  rising up 
against his putative “father” rather than affirming its orphan status as Outsider-replicant. “Unlike the hopes of 
Frankenstein's monster,” Haraway writes, “the cyborg does not expect its father to save it through a restoration ol the 
garden; that is, through the fabrication of a heterosexual mate, through its completion in a finished whole, a city and 
cosmos,” (Simians, Cyborgs and Women, 151). The simulacrum's revenge, Uien, remains just that: a case of 
fesentimment, never achieving a line of flight.
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automatization in which the devices learn, may be expected to be similarly literal-minded." (GGt 59) 
The Jacobs’ story in particular shows the “literal-mindedness” of magic to which Wiener relers -  
when the family wish for money, they receive literally what they have asked for, even though this 
brings the family something they would never have wanted (the death of their son). The magic spell, 
like the machine, according to Wiener, will only do what it is told; but in apparently lollowing the 
instructions of its human “users” to the letter -  and only to the letter -  it brings disaster. What is 
crucial, in both Baudrillard’s terms, is the “operational” displacement of hermeneutic 
communicational models -  which involve interpretation and the role of intcntionality -  by strictly 
programmatic logics of “code”. Code and programming are radically indifferent to any intention that 
is not already inscribed into them.216 What, according to Wiener, magic spells have in common with 
code is that the power any user accrues by running them depends upon their giving up "control” to 
sequenced programs which may have a very different effect than the user imagines, or anticipates.
Wiener repeatedly reinforces the connection between cybernetics and magic. Linking “inexorable 
magic or an inexorable machine” (GGi 68) and pointing out that “the reprobation attaching in lormer 
ages to the sin of sorcery now attaches in many minds to the speculations of modern cybernetics,” 
(GGi 49) Wiener writes of “black spells” and “the magic of automation.” (GGi 65, 68) For Wiener, 
the Jacobs and the Goethe stories belong to “the accumulated common sense of humanity, as 
accumulated in legends, in myths, and in the writings of conscious literary man. All of these insist 
that not only is sorcery a sin leading to Hell but it is a personal peril in this life. It is a two-edged 
sword, and sooner or later it will cut you deep.” (C 55-56) Sorcery is "two-edged” because, like 
cybernetic machines, it awards power -  or control -  only to the degree that it demands control be 
given up by the individual subject; the circuit, the cybernetic loop, takes over.
-lf> The so-called Y2K -  or Millennium Bug -  problem constitutes an excellent example of exactly what Wiener 
teared. The convention of using two-digit dating systems in computers has resulted in a major security crisis al the end
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Haunting all these narratives is something Wiener alludes to in the first chapter of Cybernetics 
(something we encountered, briefly, in our Introduction). “In the days of magic, we have the bizarre 
and sinister concept of the Golem, that figure of clay into which the Rabbi of Prague breathed in life 
with the ineffable name of God.” (C 51) Wiener’s full length discussion of the theological 
implications of cybernetics, let us remember, is entitled God and Golem inc. The golem -  the 
magically-produced creature which, in some versions of the myth -  in anticipation of Frankenstein -  
runs amok and threatens to destroy his creator, stands, for the Wiener of God and Golem, as a 
symbol of all the “unanticipated consequences” latent within the independent, self-sustaining circuits 
of cybernetics. God and Golem -  which although clearly haunted by the golem myth actually 
discusses it only fleetingly -  finds that cybernetics has reanimated old -  theological -  debates, 
concerning the relationship between the creator and what it creates. “God is supposed to have made 
man in His own image, and the propagation of the race may also be interpreted as a function in 
which one living being makes another in its own image. In our desire to glorify God with respect to 
man and Man with respect to matter, it is thus natural to assume that machines cannot make 
machines in their own image; that this is something associated with a sharp dichotomy of systems 
into living and nonliving; and that it is moreover associated with the other dichotomy between 
creator and creature.” (GGi 12) Since cybernetics radically question these dichotomizations -  and 
with them the glorifications both of “man” and of “god” - a whole new set of moral -  and 
theological -  questions emerge. ‘Thus, if we do not lose ourselves in the dogmas of omnipotence 
and omniscience, the conflict between God and the Devil is a real conflict, and God is something 
less than absolutely omnipotent. He is actually engaged in a conflict with his creature, in which he 
may very well lose the game. And yet his creature is made by him according to his own free will, and 
would seem to derive all its possibility from the action of God himself. Can God play a significant 
game with his own creature? Can any creator, even a limited one, play a significant game with his
"* lhe millennium, precisely because of what Wiener calls the “literal-mindedness” of computers. Seeinji a date 00, 
1 ey Ila*urally assume that it indicates (what we could call) 1900.
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own creature?” (GGi 17) This question becomes an urgent one for Wiener since the supposed 
virtues of cybernetic machines -  their adaptability and their ability to learn -  presents the danger that 
they are no longer subservient to their “creator’s" wishes -  or rather that the “wishes” of the human 
users, like those of Goethe’s sorcerer’s apprentice, may contain latent dimensions which, when the 
machine fulfills its brief, bring unanticipated -  and potentially horrific - consequences: a situation 
exacerbated, of course, when the production of such machines is itself a massively distributed 
process involving a whole population of humans. Without the “omnipotence” and the “omniscience” 
Wiener thinks of as “dogmas” there is no “God”, nor even -  perhaps -  an act of creation, there is 
only a process of production, in which the supposed creator is no less immanent than the supposed 
product.
Viewed conventionally, the opposition between God and Golem describes a set of hierarchical 
relations which place God -  as the transcendent Ideal -  at one end, and raw matter at the other. 
Looked at one way, God and Golem are at either side of “man” : God creates “man", and man 
creates Golem. This would be to describe the relationship in terms of an analogical structure, in 
which man is the analgon of God, just as the Golem is the analgon of Man. A chain of resemblance 
slaves production into a hierarchical structure going from God, through Man, to the Golem. Here, 
the Golem story is about hylomorphism: like God before him, man shapes formless matter into the 
shape of the body of a living creature But this is only one way of construing the God. human and 
Golem relation. Told another way, the relationship between God and Golem can also be about the 
escape of orphan matter -  Worringcr’s “Gothic avatar” - from Dcleuze-Guattari’s “Judgements of 
God”: the supposedly fixed and immutable arrangement of matter into “strata”. (See TP, especially 
Who Docs The Earth Think It Is?”) If, as Baudrillard says, this is no longer a question of 
semblance or dissemblance, God or Man”, for Delcuzc-Guattari there is something else involved 
here, beyond a straightforward “revenge” of an “object” : the processes they describe are, in Nick 
Land s terms, “self-regenerating circuitry, cumulative interaction, auto-catalysis, self-reinlorcing
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processes, escalation, schismogenesis, self-organization, compressive series, deutero-leaming. chain- 
reaction, vicious circles, and cybergenics.”217 These are processes that go beyond "revenge” and 
"reversibility”, and instead require a whole reconfiguring of questions of temporality and causality 
under the sign of rhizomatics and a -  strictly non-metaphorical - sorcery. What is initially crucial 
here is the concept of “surplus value of code.”
S a m u el B u tle r  a n d  S u rp lu s  va lu e  o f  co d e
Land: “Intelligent infections tend their hosts "2I8 *201
Downham: “The monsters we create welcome us aboard.”11'’
Grant: "Surplus value is not a motive but an autocatalytic, synthetic, enzymic alloproduct. 
hypercyclically mutating towards the next mutant cycle. ”22u
McLuhan: "As early as 1872, Samuel Butler's Erewhon explored the curious ways in which 
machines were coming to resemble organisms not only in the way they obtained power In­
digestion o f fuel but in their capacity to evolve ever new types o f themselves with the help o f  
the machine tenders. The organic character o f the machines, he saw, was more than 
matched by the speed with which people who minded them were taking on the rigidity and 
thoughtless behaviourism o f the machine. ”22/
Perhaps a little overschematically, we could say that the chief difference between Baudrillard and 
Deleuze-Guattari consists in their relationship to the question of “decoding.” Almost uniquely in a 
theoretical culture shaped and guided by linguistic paradigms, Baudrillard and Deleuze-Guattari treat 
the dominating operating systems as running, not primarily on language, but on code. But it is the 
less melancholic -  and not uncoincidentally more rigorously immanent - Delcuze-Guattari who 
tollow the logic of code through to the point where it yields something other than banal reiteration
-17 Nick Land, “Machinic Desire”, 176
-IX “Meltdown”, (no page refs)
Hit) Mark Downham, “Cyberpunk”, 41
220 Iain Hamilton Grant, “Burning AutopoiOedipus", Abstract Culture 10, Summer 1997, 14
221 McLuhan, The Mechanical Bride: Folklore of Industrial Man, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967, 99
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of blind program. Where Baudrillard seems to yearn for a (cultural and semiotic) space transcendent 
of code -  which he nevertheless grants it is impossible now to access -  Deleuze-Guattari emphasise 
the way in which all code includes its own margin of decoding. Decoding is not so much a matter of 
translating -  or understanding, comprehending - code, as dismantling it. “Let us recall that 
decoding’ does not signify the state of a flow whose code is understood [...] (deciphered, 
translatable, assimilable), but, in a more radical sense, the state of a How that is no longer contained 
in [...] its own code, that escapes its own code.” (TP 449) And when two -  or more -  codes come 
into contact strange, unheralded new assemblages can emerge: this is “surplus value of code” - "the 
phenomenon [...] when a part o f  a machine captures within its own code a code fragment of another 
machine: the red clover and the bumble bee; or the orchid and the male wasp that it attracts and 
intercepts by carrying on its flower the image and odor of the female wasp.” (AO 285) ” '1
In A Thousand Plateaus, the “aparallel evolution” of the wasp and the orchid provides a key 
example of what Deleuze-Guattari call a “rhizomatic” relationship. The rhizome, ol course, is 
defined by contrast with arborescent, or root-based, systems. It is intrinsically multiple, 
heterogeneous and characterized by a principle of maximum connectivity (any part can connect with 
any other, and does). Arborescent structures, meanwhile, are dominated by a single central trunk 
lrom which everything in the system must pass before “branching off.” For our purposes here, it is 
important to emphasise the way in which rhizomatic systems tend to operate via a non-sequential 
temporality: cause does not simply follow effect, there are “co-causal” relations which move both 
backwards and forwards in time. A rhizome does not reproduce itself, after its own kind; it 
propagates, via unpredictable symbioses, not “sexed” pairings. Deleuze-Guattari make a point of 
distinguishing the wasp-orchid relation from models of imitation, which imply a unilinear causality, 
•t could be said that the orchid imitates the wasp, reproducing its image in a signifying fashion 
(mimesis, mimicry, lure, etc.). But this is true only on the level of the strata - a parallelism between
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two strata such that a plant organization on one imitates an animal organization on another. At the 
same time, something else entirely is going on: not an imitation, but a capture of code, an increase in 
valence, a veritable becoming-wasp of the orchid and a becoming-orchid of the wasp." (TP 10) 
Instead, they present the relationship between wasp and orchid as an example of co-caused 
reciprocal processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. “The orchid deterritorializes by 
forming an image, a tracing of a wasp; but the wasp reterritorializes on that image. The wasp is 
nevertheless deterritorialized, becoming a piece in the orchid’s reproductive apparatus. But it 
reterritorializes the orchid by transporting its pollen. Wasp and orchid, as heterogenous elements, 
form a rhizome.” (TP 10)
Delcuze-Guattari introduce the concept of “surplus value of code” during a discussion of Samuel 
Butler's important Erewhon at the beginning of the fourth section of Anti-Oedipus. Butler’s "Book 
of Machines” presents a discussion which goes right to the heart of the theme of this chapter -  the 
question of machinic propagation. Butler’s essay is basically a work of Gothic Materialist theory- 
fiction whose topic is machinic replication. It anticipativcly deals with the problem Wiener will later 
pose in God and Golem', to wit, of what type of reproduction are machines capable? At what point 
could -  or can -  machines be classified as an independent (un)life-form? Butler is emphatic. "Surely 
il a machine is able to reproduce another machine systematically,” he claims, “we may say that it is a 
reproductive system. What is a reproductive system, il' it not be a system for reproduction? And how 
lew ot the machines are there which have not been produced systematically by other machines? But 
H is man that makes them do so. Yes; but is it not insects that make many of the plants reproductive, 
and would not whole families of plants not die out if their fertilization was not effected by a class of 
agents utterly foreign to themselves? Does any one say that the red clover has no reproductive 
system because the humble bee (and the humble bee only) must aid and abet it before it can 
■^produce .’ No one. The humble bee is a part of the reproductive system of the clover. Each one of 
ourselves has sprung from minute animalcules whose identity was entirely distinct from our own, and
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which acted after their kind with no thought or heed of what we might think about it. These little 
creatures are part of our own reproductive system; then why not we part of that of the machines?" 
22,What is at issue here is not Baudrillard and Benjamin’s “mechanical reproduction” -  the mass 
reproduction of the same object by machines -  but the reproduction -  or propagation -  o f  machines 
themselves. Although this is not necessarily a question of Wiener’s “machines making machines in 
their own image” either; since what needs to be accounted for is the heterogeneity of production, on 
at least two levels. Firstly, and most importantly, Butler’s “system of reproduction" -  Gothic 
Materialism prefers the term “propagation” -  is constituted from heterogeneous materials: in the 
case of the clover, it includes insect and plant life; in the case of machines, Butler crucially insists, it 
includes not different species, but a participation between the living (human beings) and the 
nonliving (machines). * 224The point is that what we would conventionally call nature already furnishes 
us with examples that make legitimate the description of the production of machines as a 
reproductive, rather than a simply productive matter; or rather, and as Deleuzc-Guattari would 
ultimately prefer -  contra Baudrillard225 -  reproduction needs to be considered as a species of 
production. In any case, and, in what is a fundamentally cybernetic insight, the heterogeneous nature 
of the elements in the human-machine interpollenation need not disqualify us from considering it a 
single system. Secondly, the heterogeneous quality of what appears at different stages of the process 
of reproduction should not be considered a reason to disqualify a system from being considered a 
system of reproduction. The “animalacules” from which we develop do not resemble us; with Wiener 
in mind, we are not made in their “image.” As Butler goes on to  point out "the machines which 
reproduce machinery do not reproduce machines after their own kind. A thimble may be made by 
machinery, but it was not made by, neither will it ever make, a thimble.” (211) Butler then alludes to
22? Samuel Butler, Erewhon, Harmondworth: Penguin, 1985, 210 Ramlrilbird urses in his
224 1, is of course the case now -  if not in Butler’s time -  that human reproducen -  “  “  ^ ^ ^ ‘h.ntc 
commentary cm the Second Order Simulacrum -  is becoming almost as dependent on machines
S S f  into the Deleuze-Gualtari debate with t*
Sullice to say that the author of The Mirror o f Production -  who also mischievously 
°f Desire -  linds neither term congenial.
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"an abundance of analogies” in nature. “ ‘Very few creatures reproduce after their own kind: they 
reproduce something which has the potentiality of becoming that which their parents were. Thus the 
butterfly lays an egg, which egg can become caterpillar, which caterpillar can become a chrysalis, 
which chrysalis can become a butterfly [...]’ ” ( 211) It is this emphasis on heterogeneity that so 
delights Deleuze-Guattari who quote approvingly Butler’s description of a “complicated machine”: " 
We are misled by considering any complicated machine as a single thing: in truth it is a city or a 
society, each member of which was truly bred after its kind.’” (212, qtd AO 285)
What makes ‘The Book of Machines” anticipative of cyberpunk is, perhaps ironically, its 
(simulated) hostility to machines, and its fear of their unbridled spreading. Lacking the expansive 
confidence of traditional SF (which was enjoying its heyday at the time Butler was writing), “The 
Book of Machines” neither assumes that technical machines depend upon human beings for their 
development, nor that they will be “man’s” bénéficient servants. Like the ‘Turing cops” in Gibson's 
Neuronumcer -  the special police agency dedicated to keeping Artificial Intelligences in check -  
Butler’s writer assumes that machinic intelligence is not a theoretical possibility to be speculated 
upon, but an emergent threat that must be vigilantly stamped out. Butler’s "writer” characterises his 
tear in terms of a swarming that will ultimately bring about the end of the human dominance of the 
planet. “ ‘[WJhat I fear is the extraordinary rapidity with which [the machines] are becoming 
Mimcthing very different to what they are at present. No class of beings have in any time made so 
rapid a movement forward.” (203) Unlike Marx, Butler does not believe that the agency ascribed to 
machines is a false reification, a phcrpfcnological mystification of authentic human labour power, but 
lhat machines may indeed grow to possess what Wiener calls an “uncanny canniness” , a “diabolic” 
intelligence that will begin to surreptitiously -  and not so surreptitiously - erode human power. “ 
Some people may say that man’s moral influence will suffice to rule (the machines]: but I cannot 
dunk it will ever be safe to repose much trust in the moral sense of any machine.'” (203) "The Book 
1 Machines” emerges, then, as a kind of counter-blast to Kant’s Critique o f Teleological
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Judgement, in which the special status Kant accords to humanity -  as the agent capable of 
consciousness, purposiveness and moral action -  is radically put into question. In particular, Butler 
questions the conflation of consciousness with purposiveness. Referring to ‘“kind of plant that eats 
organic food with its flowers,’” Butler asks “ ‘Shall we say that the plant does not know what it is 
doing merely because it has no ears, or brains? If we say that it acts mechanically only, shall we not 
be forced to admit that sundry other and apparently very deliberate actions are also mechanical?” ' 
(200) What Butler discovers -  some sixty years ahead of Wiener -  is the cybernetic diagonal cutting 
across the old distinction between vitalism and mechanism: if everything can be explained 
mechanically, this entails less the triumph of mechanism as originally understood than the collapsing 
of the terms of the debate with vitalism. Butler comes close to Spino/.ism in apprehending a 
continuum -  running into infinity -  of conatal impulses, (non-mctaphorical) “machines” which very 
in size from the infintesimally small to the very large. To account for agency, we do not have to 
make reference to any organic or vital at all, but to these machines sensitive to “disturbances of 
equilibrium.” What emerges -  on the macro-level -  as a purposive agent is -  on the micro-level - 
only “a hive or a swarm of parasites” (205), an “ant heap” (206), that is nothing more than the 
complex agglomeration of a multiplicity of micro-machincrics that operate on the most simple 
impulsive criteria. “ ‘Even a potato in a dark cellar has a certain low cunning about him which serves 
him in excellent stead. He knows perfectly well what he wants and he knows how to get it | ... | II it 
be urged that the action of the potato is chemical and mechanical only the answer would seem 
lo lie in an inquiry whether every sensation is not chemical and mechanical, whether those things 
which we deem the most spiritual arc anything other but disturbances of equilibrium in a finite series 
"I levers, beginning with those that arc too small for microscopic detection, and going up to the 
human arm and the appliances which it makes use of?’ ” (201)
When Dclcuze-Guattari reconstruct Butler’s arguments in Anti-Oedipux, they use The Book of 
Machines precisely as a way out of the impasse created by “the old polemic between vitalism and
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mechanism.” For Deleuze-Guattari, what needs to be accounted for in both vitalism and mechanism
-  but what both have tended to leave out -  is the immanence of desire to all assemblages. Unlike 
Butler, both mechanism and vitalism leave desire in an “extrinsic” relationship, either to machines in 
the case of mechanism, or to organisms in the case of vitalism. ‘This is even the point around which 
the usual polemic between vitalism and mechanism revolves: the machine’s ability to account for the 
workings of the organism, but its fundamental inability to account for its formations.” (AO 284) The 
organism’s functioning, that is to say, can be described merely mechanically, but mechanism cannot 
account for its own production, just as the existence of machines is -  supposedly -  dependent upon 
the “vitalistic” role of human beings. For Deleuze-Guattari, what mechanism and vitalism both posit 
Is a different kind of unity or reification: mechanism posits a “structural unity” of machines, whereas 
vitalism posits an “individual and specific unity of the living.” Neither account for the multiplicity of 
relations into which machines and “the living” enter, and from which they are constituted; and in 
each case, desire is construed as something “secondary and indirect.” The desire of human beings 
supposedly explains the existence of machines, but how are we to account for this desire'.’ How is it 
produced? 226 (Kant’s claim that machines have merely motive force, and lack formative force -  the 
ability to organize matter, which is supposedly a feature of “organized beings” alone -  is a version of 
this argument.) By contrast, and as we have seen, Butler anticipates Deleuze-Guattari's “machinic
22b This is by contrast with the Baudrillard of The Transparency of Evil, who uses tamiliar viudisi objections to 
dismiss the concept of artificial intelligence. The novelty of Baudrillard's argument is dial it focuses on the supposed 
failure of AIs to he artificial (rather than on their inability to achieve intelligent thought): “Artificial intelligence is 
devoid of intelligence because it is devoid of artifice." (TE 52) “Artifice is the power of illusion. These machines have 
the artlessness of pure calculation, and the games they offer are based solely on commutations and combinations." 
And “artifice is in no way concerned with what generates, merely with what alters, reality” (T'E 52). The rest amounts 
to exactly the kind of argument which Deleuze-Guattari attack in Anti-Oedipus. Machines have no desire (or 
pleasure), he claims. There is certainly no question of any “excess” (Deleuze-Guallari surplus value ol code), only a 
dreary -  and inexorable -  augmentation of operative function. “There are prostheses that can work better than 
humans, ‘dunk’ or move around better than humans (or in place of humans), but there is no such thing, from the 
point of view of technology or in terms of the human media, as a replacement for human pleasure, or lor the pleasure 
ol being human. For dial to exist, machines would have to have an idea of man, have to be able to invent man -  but 
inasmuch as man has already invented them, it is too late for that. That is why man can always be more than he is. 
whereas machines can never be more than they are. Even the most intelligent machines are just what they are — 
except, perhaps, when accidents or failures occur, events which might conceivably be attributed to some obscure desire 
on the part of the machine. Nor do machines manifest that ironical surplus or excess functioning which contributes 
die pleasure, or suffering, thanks to which human beings transcend their determinations — and thus eome closer to 
dieir raison d ’etre. Alas for the machine, it can never transcend its own operation -  which, perhaps, explains the 
Profound melancholy of the computer.” (TE 53)
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desire” by locating desire across a continuum of “levers” sensitive to “disturbances of equilibrium” 
rather than in any animate or quasi-animate region alone. Indeed, the basis for the distinction 
between animate and inanimate is radically put into question. “What is essential,” Deleuze-Guattari 
write, “is this double movement whereby Butler drives both arguments beyond their limits. He 
shatters the vitalist arguments by calling in question the specific or personal unity o f the organism, 
and the mechanist argument even more decisively, by calling in question the structural unity o f the 
machine. (AO 284/285) 2:7Butler in fact shows that there is no hard and last distinction to be made 
between anorganic matter and organisms. We do not even have to consider humanity’s increasing 
dependence upon machines, Butler urges, to see that the organic is inextricable from the inorganic. 
Consider, he says, the case of a hen’s egg. “ i s  not machinery linked with animal life in an infinite 
variety of ways? The shell of a hen’s egg is made of a delicate white ware and is a machine as much 
as an egg-cup is: the shell is the device for holding the egg, as much as the egg-cup for holding the 
shell: both are phases of the same function; the hen makes the shell in her inside, but it is pure 
pottery. She makes her nest outside herself but it is not more of a machine than the egg-shell is.'” 
(199)
Thus "Man” becomes re-defined as “a machinate mammal.” (223) ’The lower animals.” Butler 
writes, “keep all their limhs at home in their own bodies, but many of man's arc loose, and lie about 
detached, now here and now there, in various parts of the world.” (223) While this does, in some 
ways, anticipate McLuhan and Freud’s mcta-organicism -  the claim that technology is a simple 
’extension” of the human body we critiqued in the previous chapter -  what is crucial, lor Deleuze- 
Cuattari, Is the de-privileging of the specifically organic. If machines are -  in Butler’s sense -  
organs”, then organs are also machines. What matters is less the terms used -  whether “organ” or 
machine” -  and more the perception of a single continuum populated by heterogeneous matters. "At
--7 We have already considered Butler's arguments as to why the claim "it is said that machines do not reproduce 
tent selves, or that they only reproduce themselves through the intermediary of man 1...]” is invalid (AO 2X.S).
131
the point o f dispersion of the two arguments, it becomes immaterial whether one says that machines 
are organs, or organs, machines. The two machines are exact equivalents: man as a 'vertebro- 
machinate mammal,’ or as an ‘aphidian parasite of machines.’ [...] Desire is not in the subject, but 
the machine in desire, with the residual subject off to the side, alongside the machine, around the 
entire periphery, a parasite of machines, an accessory of verbetro-machinate desire. In a word, the 
real difference is not between the living and the machine, vitalism and mechanism, but between two 
states of the machine that are two states of the living as well. The machine taken in its structural 
unity, the living taken in its specific and even personal unity, are mass phenomena or molar 
aggregates; for this reason each points to the extrinsic existence of the other.” (AO 286)
What is important here is the delocalization of desire, and its fusion with a generalized production. 
Thinking desire and production together entails answering the question, “which came first, the 
chicken or the egg?” with the answer: the circuit. The circuit’s looped temporality replaces the 
transcendent lime of the Creator-Father. And the Anti-Oedipus attack on psychoanalysis’ temporal 
reductionism broadens out by the second volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia into an attack on 
monocausal frameworks of explanations in general, accounts of causality which we might call 
patrogenic, in which the future is assumed to be no more than the playing out of what has already 
happened in the past. Opposed to these seminal models of causality, Dcleuze-Guatlari invoke 
"reverse causalities that arc without finality  but which nonetheless testify to the action of the present 
on the past, for example the convergent wave and the anticipated potential, which imply an inversion 
of time.” (TP 431)
We might be reminded here of McLuhan’s many arguments against unilinear causality. For McLuhan, 
electrification - which “ended sequence by making things instant” (UM 12) -  precisely brings about a
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need to “to invent nonlineal logics,” (UM 85) to give a new account of causal processes. ~’h 'With 
instant speed the cause of things began to emerge to awareness again, as they had not done with 
sequence and in concatenation accordingly. Instead of asking which came first, the chicken or the 
egg, it suddenly seemed that that a chicken was an egg’s idea for getting more eggs.” (UM 12) Or. to 
put it in Wiener’s terms, it suddenly seemed that God was a golem’s idea for getting more golems.
This opens the way to McLuhan’s claim, in Understanding Media, that humanity is the "sex organs o! 
the machine world.” McLuhan argues that, far from simply using technology as if they were its 
master, human beings enters into relations with technical machines that cause the human body to be 
altered (just as the human body produces changes in the machines). A feedback loop is in place, 
which McLuhan characterizes in terms of a trade, or pact. In exchange for greater “wealth”, humanity 
innovates new types of technical machine (thus faciliating machinic propagation). “Physiologically, 
man in the normal use of technology (or his variously extended body) is perpetually modified by it 
and in turn finds ever new ways of modifying his technology. Man becomes, as it were, the sex organs
I
ot the machine world, as the bee of the plant world, enabling to fecundate and to evolve ever new 
forms. The machine world reciprocates man’s love by expediting his wishes and desires, namely in 
providing him with wealth.” (UM 46) Neither man nor machine is in charge of the process: there is an 
operation of reciprocal extraction of surplus value of code that has its own trajectory, and which 
treats both human beings and technical apparatuses as non-autonomous components.
Seen Irom this perspective, a figure that has been central to the Gothic -  the experimenter- 
technician or artificial father -  think not only of Victor Frankenstein, but also of Rotwang in
22X Mcfulian uses arguments Irom Hume to show what he thinks of as die illegitimacy of standard accounts ol 
causality. “In Western literate society it is still plausible and acceptable to say that something ‘billows’ Irom 
something, as if there were stime cause at work that makes such a sequence. It was David Hume who, in die 
cightcendi century, demonstrated that there is no causality indicated in any sequence, nalutal or logical. The 
sequential is merely additive, not causative (...1 Today in the elccuic age we leel as tree lo invent nonlmcal logics as 
we do to make non-Euclidcan geometries. Even the assembly line, as die mediod of analytic sequence lor mechanizing 
every kind ol making and production, is nowadays yielding to new forms.” (UM X)
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Metropolis, and more latterly Tyrell in Blade Runner — becomes decoded from being a transcendent- 
creator into becoming a part of the machinic process. In the case of Blade Runner, for Iain 
Hamilton Grant, ‘Tyrell is no more Batty’s father than Leon has a mother [...] Both emerge from the 
military-industrial matrix whose artist-god is Tyrell the ‘molecular cyberneticist’, as Monod says, of 
recombinant DNA.”229 From the point of view of the replicants -  as what Nick Land calls “Deadly 
orphans from beyond reproduction” 230 agents o f ‘‘Cyberrevolution.” 231 -  Tyrell is not a father, but a 
component, a machine-part of their unnatural replication process. They arc not born, nor can they 
reproduce; if their unlives are produced by anything, it is by an agency no less inorganic than they: 
planetary capital as a distributed process. “But the god of biomechanics is dead, crushed in his 
offspring’s embrace; not an Oedipal parricide, but a demonic phylic revolt. The Tyrell corporation is 
the cybernetic matrix from which the replicants issue, in which Tyrcll is only its orbital subject- 
component (personalised capital), a deterritoriali/.ing confluence within the machinic phylum."2'2 As 
opposed to Freudo-Oedipalized patrogenesis, this is a matter of what Octavia Butler calls 
xenogenesis231: alien, replicative propagation rather than familial (or filial) reproduction.
N uptials a g a in s t N a tu re : S o rc e ry  a n d  P ro p a g a tio n
Delcuzc-Guattari’s account of “propagation” comes during their discussion of sorcery, towards the 
beginning of the “Becoming” plateau of A Thousand Plateaus. Dcleuze-Guattari’s sorcery valorizes 
what the more security-inclined Wiener fears about “magic” -  it is precisely aimed at the production 
ol unanticipated consequences. Indeed, sorcery as Delcuze-Guattari understand it could be defined 
as the engineering of the unexpected and the unprecedented; the art of avoiding the probable.
--‘i Gram, “LA 2019”, (no page refs)
‘ 1 Land, “Machinic Desire” ,171
231 Land, “Machinic Desire” ,171
-32 Iain Hamilton Gram, “Burning AutopoiOedipus”, Abstract Culture 10, Summer 1997, 10-11 
3 The term serves as the overall title for her trilogy, Dawn, Adulthood Rites, Imago, London: Golluncz
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Thai is how we sorcerers operate. Not following a logical order, hut following alogical 
consistencies or compatibilities. The reason is simple. It is because no one. not even God. 
can say in advance whether a given multiplicity will or will not cross over into another 
given multiplicity, or even if given heterogeneous elements will enter symbiosis, will form a 
consistent, or cofunctioning, multiplicity susceptible to transformation. (TP 250)
The sorcerer is thus not a Promethean dominator, since they are no more able than “God" to foresee 
the outcome of his dabblings; they are a participant in experimental processes whose very goals are 
at issue in the experiment; they are themselves a part of the “unnatural participations" they are 
engineering. (TP 240)
The Deleuze-Guatlari discussion of sorcery fundamentally concerns the question of "becoming- 
animal”, although, as Deleuze-Guattari hasten to add, sorcerous practice is by no means limited to 
the production of such becomings; “[e)xclusive importance should not be attached to beconnng- 
animal.” (TP 248) Indeed, closely related to becoming-animal -  ultimately inextricable from it -  is 
the theme of the pact or alliance with the demon (a properly Gothic Materialist theme, to be 
unraveled at more length in the final chapter). As they subsequently state, “becoming animal is an 
affair of sorcery” because “it implies an initial relation of alliance with a demon” and "the demon 
functions as the borderline of an animal pack, into which the human being passes or in which his ot­
her becoming takes place, by contagion.” (TP 247) Gothic Materialism’s interest is less in becoming- 
animal per se234 than in the abstract processes which Deleuze-Guattari’s becoming-animal plays out: 
processes of swarming, teeming, seething and spreading familiar from Horror fiction. In any case, as 
Delcuze-Guattari point out in their commentary on the Gothic, in Nomad or Gothic art "it is
It does not, though, support Iain Hamilton Grant’s rabid assault on becoming-animal as unleashed in his "At the 
Mountains of Madness”. Whilst concurring with Grant’s attack on “vitalism" (See Chapter I and Chapter 5), Gothic- 
Materialism cannot agree that the simple inclusion of animal components in an assemblage constitutes a 
reierritorialization. Grant's exclusive emphasis on technical machines, raUier, could be said to constitute a 
thanotropic” lechnical-machinic silicate-chauvinism which reinforces, rather than dissolves, the artilicial- 
''•itural/mechanical-vital dichotomies which Grant, as much, presumably, as Dcleu/.e-Guatniri. is committed to 
dismantling.
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precisely because pure animality is expressed as inorganic, or supraorganic that it can combine so 
well with abstraction.”215
Deleuze-Guattari proceed, in the three sections of “Memories of a Sorcerer”, by outlining a series of 
-  what they initially characterise as - “contradictory” -  principles. The first section of "Memories of 
a Sorcerer” concerns the principle of “packs”; the second concerns the apparently “opposite” 
principle of the “anomalous.” Yet Deleuze-Guattari insist that, in a true account of “demonic 
Alliance”, (TP 248) the two principles are not only reconcilable, but ultimately require each other.
To reconstruct this argument more slowly, (i) The pack. Packing is not to be thought of as an animal 
"characteristic”, Delcuze-Guattari say: “we are not interested in characteristics; what interests us are 
modes of expansion, propagation, occupation, contagion, peopling. 1 am legion.” (TP 239) It is in 
the experience of the abstract process of swarming that becoming (which is always a becoming- 
multiple; or a becoming-multiplicity -  the theorization of becoming and that of multiplicity fold into 
one another) is encountered. As Deleuze-Guattari write of Lovecraft’s Randolph Carter, the sell 
"‘reels’” as the sense of subjectivity breaks down in the face of an experience of teeming multiplicity 
that comes from both without -  and within (although this “within” clearly has nothing to do with any 
supposed psychological interiority). In moments of becoming -  and “[w|ho has not know the 
violence of these animal sequences, which uproot one from humanity, if only for an instant” (TP 
240) -  the “inside” is reconfigured as a multiplicity, which immediately conjoins with a multiplicity 
"outside”. “We do not become animal without a fascination for the pack, for multiplicity. A 
Iasc¡nation for the outside? Or is the multiplicity that fascinates us already related to a multiplicity 
dwelling within us?” (TP 239-240)
-IS A point of connection with Haraway's cyborg, one of whose defining characteristics is “the leaky distinction | ... | 
•tween animal-human and machine." (Simians, Cyborgs and Women, 152)
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Dcleuze-Guattari then introduce what, for our purposes here, is the crucial issue: the question of a 
non- or anti-sexual mode of propagation. The issue is introduced via a critique of Borges, whom 
they censure because his Manual de zoologia fantastical, they say, leaves out of account two issues 
which are of prime importance: “the problems of the pack and the corresponding becoming-animal 
of the human being” (TP 241) Borges, they argue ,“is interested only in characteristics | ... | whereas 
sorcerers know that werewolves are bands, and vampires too, and that bands transform themselves 
into one another.” (TP 241) A “characteristic”, then, is a typologically-detcrminatc fixed feature, a 
property presumably belonging to “beings” rather than becomings. The concept of the "band”, by 
contrast, necessarily involves both heterogeneity and transformation -  and is therefore essentially a 
matter of becoming. Deleuze-Guattari then pose the central question:
But what exactly does this mean, the animal as band or pack? Does a band not imply a 
filiation, bringing us back to the reproduction of given characteristics? How can we conceive 
of a peopling, a propagation, a becoming that is without filiation or hereditary production? A 
multiplicity without the unity of an ancestor? It is quite simple; everyone knows it, but it is 
discussed only in secret. (TP 241)
It would perhaps be most profitable to begin to answer this question by elaborating what is at stake 
in the models Dcleuze-Guattari are opposing. Fundamentally, these arc models of reproduction2,6. 
"Filiation” and heredity arc models which imply the passing on of “characteristics”; like Wiener’s 
God, it is always a matter of entities being reproduced, after their own kind, in the “image” of their 
ancestors. This is pure arborcscencc: the capturing of becoming into a hierarchically organized, pre­
determined and punctual system. By contrast with Baudrillard, who, as we have seen, thinks that 
sexual coupling guarantees “otherness”, for Deleuzc-Guattari the dualistic sexual machinery of bio­
reproduction screens out heterogeneity by minimizing diversity in favour of "small modifications 
across generations.” (TP 242) Of course, perfect reproduction remains a speculative fantasy; indeed 
filiation” itself -  the account of the emergence of a new generation by reference to "descent” or
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"ancestry”- is entirely illusory: “all filiation is imaginary” (TP 238) Deleuze-Guattari go so tar as to
say.
Filiation is to opposed to alliance (and can ultimately be subsumed under it, if what Deleuze-Guattari 
say about filiation being imaginary is to be taken at face value). Even if it is the means hy which 
filiation seems to happen, the family structure -  which, Deleuze-Guattari say, is always haunted by 
the threat of “demonic Alliance” -  is ultimately itself only a case of alliance (filiation presupposes 
alliance, but not vice versa). Alliance, like Anti-Oedipus' sense of production217, is lateral and 
multilinear rather than unidirectional and unilinear; a matter of rhizomatics rather than arborescence. 
Whereas filiation implies an apparently necessary set o f relations (the sexed couple, for instance), 
there are no pre-set criteria governing what can enter into alliance. As opposed to the binary 
machine of sexuate reproduction, in propagative alliance “there as many sexes as there are terms in 
symbiosis, as many differences as elements contributing to a process of contagion.” (TP 242) Once 
again, contagion entails -  as one of its fundamental presuppositions -  a heterogeneity of elements. 
“The difference is that contagion, epidemic, involves terms that are necessarily heterogeneous: for 
example, a human being, an animal, and a bacterium, a virus, a molecule, a microorganism. Or in the 
case of the truffle, a tree, a fly, and a pig.” (TP 242) In addition, alliance does not assume a 
patrogenic causality: the elements which combine into alliance are not pre-determined by descent: 
“These combinations are neither genetic nor structural; they are interkingdoms, unnatural 
participations.” (TP 242) However, the “unnatural” is not to be opposed to the “natural”: quite the 
contrary, in fact. Deleuze-Guattari apprehend Nature not as an ordered regularity operating 
according to pre-formed laws, but as something continually overcoming itself; it operates as a
-36 Needless to say, these are not the “systems of reproduction” to which Butler refers. Indeed, it would he better to 
refer to Butler’s systems of reproduction, as we argued above, as systems of propagation, precisely because they 
necessarily involve heterogeneous elements.
-37 It is worth qualifying the term production here, since, intriguingly, when Deleuze-Guattari say what becoming is 
nnl ~ ln d>e section of A Thousand Plateaus directly preceding the first “Memories of a Sorcerer”, they include 
produce as one of the terms from which it is to be distinguished. This might suggest a different emphasis on the role 
"1 production in the latter text (which is certainly written much more explicitly under the sign of becoming).
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swarming of alliances rather than as a set of filiative regularities. In other words, nature, according to 
Deleuze-Guattari, is first and foremost unnatural. “Unnatural participations or nuptials are the true 
Nature spanning the kingdoms of nature.” (TP 241) Whereas filiation demands well-ordered social 
groupings, alliance happens when the social breaks down, and other types o f collectivity can emerge. 
"Bands, human or animal , proliferate by contagion, epidemics, battlefields and catastrophes.” (TP 
241)
(H) The Anomalous. The second principle of Deleuze-Guattari’s “becoming-animal" concerns “the 
exceptional individual.” “(W]herever there is a multiplicity, you will also find an exceptional 
individual, and it is with that individual that an alliance must be made.” (TP 243) The exceptional 
individual is in no way the Oedipalized, or personalized, animal, it is the “Anomalous.” The “anomal 
('anomalous’), an adjective that has fallen into disuse in French, is very different from that of 
iinormal ( ‘abnormal’): a-normal, a Latin adjective lacking a noun in French, refers to that which is 
outside the rules or which goes against the rules, whereas an-onutlie, a Greek noun that has lost its 
adjective, designates the unequal, the coarse, the rough the cutting edge of deterritorialization.” (TP 
243-4). The abnormal correlates to a set of “characteristics” -  a set of law-like norms, which it 
transgresses (and therefore, by a dialectical logic, confirms and continues) - whereas the anomalous 
belongs essentially to multiplicity, since it refuses the very notion of the norm as such. The 
anomalous is not a special case, it is “neither an individual nor a species; it has only affects, it has 
neither familiar or subjectified feelings, nor specific of significant characteristics” (TP 244). 
typically, Deleuze-Guattari describe the anomalous in terms derived from Lovccraft’s Horror 
fiction. “Lovecraft applies the term ‘outsider’ to this thing or entity, the Thing, which arrives and 
passes at the edge, which is linear yet multiple, ‘teeming, seething, swelling, foaming, spreading like 
an infectious disease, this nameless horror.” (TP 243) Ultimately, the anomalous is to be understood, 
Udeuze-Guattari insist, in terms of the “phenomenon of bordering.” Every “pack has a borderline, 
and an anomalous position, [ ...]  such that it is impossible to tell whether the anomalous is still in the
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band, already outside the band, or at the shifting boundary of the band." (TP 245) So the two -  
apparently contradictory - principles of the pack and the exceptional individual resolve themselves: 
the “exceptional individual” constitutes the “borderline” which is a feature^ of every pack: the 
“borderline” presupposes a pack it borders, and vice versa.
The W asp F a c to ry : Neuromancer
Like Blade Runner, Gibson’s Neuromancer is an exemplary working-out, in fiction, of the themes 
of mechanical reproduction and Gothic propagation. Indeed, the opposition between reproduction 
and replication could be the central theme of the novel. It all comes together in the image 
Wintcrmute remixes from Case’s dreams 218:
The dream, the memory, unreeled with the monotony of an unedited simstim tape.
[...]
He’d missed the first wasp, when it built its paperline gray house on the blistered 
part of the windowframe, but soon the nest was a fist-sized lump of liber, insects hurtling out 
to hunt the alley below like miniature copters buzzing the rotting contents of the dumpsters.
They’d each had a dozen beers., the afternoon a wasp stung Marlene.
“Kill the fuckers” , she said, her eyes dull with rage and the still heat of the room, "burn 
'em ...” [...]
In the alley, [...]  he approached the blackened nest. It had broken open. Singed wasps 
wrenched and flipped on the asphalt.
He saw the thing the shell of gray paper had concealed.
Horror. The spiral factory, stepped terraces of the hatching cells, blind jaws of the 
unborn moving ceaselessly, the staged process from egg to larva, near-wasp, wasp. In his 
mind’s eye, a kind of time-lapse photography took place revealing the thing as the biological 
equivalent of a machine-gun, hideous in its perfection. Alien.
[...] He woke with the impression of light fading, but the room was dark. Afterimages, 
retinal flares. 238
238 Which uncannily echoes Rachel’s implanted “memories” of the spider’s nest in Blade Runner, suggesting a 
connection -  often made by Dick(see footnote 1, this chapter) and implicit in Deleu/.e-Guatniri -  between insects/ 
arachnids and machines: ancmpathic swarming as a diagram of (not metaphor for) anorganic multiplicity: as Nick 
Land insists, this “might be interpreted as a metaphor, was it not that upon the soft plateau or plane of consistency all 
signifying associations collapse into machinic functions.” (“Cybergothic”, 83) Note also Gibson's description of 
uilermute as a “cybernetic spider.” (N 315) We could also compare both Gibson’s wasps and Blade Runner’s 
spiders to the motif of the wasp’s nest in Stephen King's The Shining (which functions as a diagram ol the Overlook 
hotel's swarming horror).
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In the dream, just before he’d drenched the nest with fuel, he’d seen the T-A logo of 
Tessier-Ashpool neatly embossed onto its side, as though the wasps themselves had worked 
it there. (N 151-3)
Here is the key image of Neuromancer, the decoded key to the novel: a diagram of the 
deterritorialization of reproduction into machinic replication. Gibson’s description consistently 
displaces the nature/ culture split, reinforcing the perception of anorganic continuum (on the plane of 
consistency, where, Deleuze-Guattari insist, all metaphor is abolished2'9). Biotics dissolves into a 
machinics which it does not dialectially oppose, but cybemetically envelops: the wasps are “copters”, 
issuing from a “spiral factory”, which is “a biological equivalent” -  not a metaphorical substitute for
-  “a machine-gun.” Moreover, the whole scene is “not an imaginative reconstruction on Case’s part, 
but a datastream from Wintermute” 24°, calling not for (Freudian) interpretation, but cybernetic 
decryption: a dream as “unedited simstim tape.” It makes sense to Case only later: “[ajfter a single 
glimpse of the structure of information 3Jane’s mother had evolved” he “understood why 
Wintermute had chosen the nest to represent it.” (N 315)
If, initially, the wasp-hive image seems to refer only to the Tessier-Ashpool family -  whose 
patriarch, Tessier-Ashpool experiments with various methods of extending organic life, burning out 
filial reproduction into (Baudrillard’s) clonal metastasis -  it is also an image of Wintermute, the A1 
that escapes the family net. As Nick Land explains: ‘The wasp factory spits out wasps just as the 
Tessier-Ashpools clone their offspring: lJane, 2Jane, 3Jane. [...] [I]f Wintermute replication is 
territorialized to the molar reproduction of a hive-organism, this is only at the cost of 
deterritorializing the hive along a lone of post-organic becoming toward a break from the statistical 
series of wasps -  numbered bullets reiterating an identity -  in the direction of molecular involution, 
releasing a cloud or nebula of wasps: particles of synergic mutation.” * 24041 The “wasp factory”, then, is
- W For more analysis of which, see the next chapter.
240 Nick Land, “Cybergothic”, 83
241 Land, “Cybergothic”, 85. We might remember here Deleuze-Guattari's discussion of the anomalous, in which 
each and every” animal occupies the position of anomalous bordering, “as in a swarm of mosquitoes, where ‘each
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a loaded image: suggesting filial reproduction on the one hand -  “the statistical series o f wasps" -  
and teeming and swarming on the other - “particles o f  synergic mutation.” Let’s consider the first 
possibility now, through the (thoroughly Baudrillardian) person of Ashpool.
C apitalism  a n d  Iso p h ren ia : A sh p o o l
Ashpool: "We cause the brain to become alergic to certain o f its own neurotransmitters, resulting
in a peculiarly pliable imitation o f autism [...] I  understand that the effect is more easily obtained
with an embedded microchip. " (N 221)
Baudrillard increasingly poses himself as the melancholy observer of a techno-organic tendency 
towards self-preservation -  a tendency that is bound to go badly wrong, where the self that is being 
dung onto is destined to implode into a figure that haunts Baudrillard's later writings: autism. "Our 
monsters,” writes Baudrillard, “are all manic autists.” 242 Ashpool, the mysterious cryo-zombie 
patriarch of Gibson’s Neuromancer is an exemplary case of what lies at “the illusion of the end” of 
the melancholy line of entropic sameness which Baudrillard’s work tracks: a blind drive towards sell- 
preservation that ends up in a suicidal line of abolition; what Baudrillard, in The Illusion o f  the End. 
calls “Identitary, ipsomaniacal, isophrenic madness”, emerging in “the delirium of genetic confusion, 
ot the scrambling of codes and networks, of biological and molecular anomalies, of autism.” (109) 
Ashpool stands as a recent example of a particular type belonging to what we have called the 
negativized Gothic; figures, like Victor Frankenstein who, in their very desire to ward off death 
produce it, in new, simulated forms. *
individual moves randomly until it sees the rest [of the swarm] in the same half-space: then it hurries to re-enter the 
proup. Thus stability is assured in catastrophe by a barrier.'" (TP 245, The quotation (within the quotation) is from 
Rene Thom, Structural Stability and Morphogenesis, trans. D. Fowler (Readin, Mass: Benjamin Fowler, 1975), 319. 
The square brackets are Deleuze-Guattari’s.
242 The Illusion o f the End, 10
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Ashpool not only pre-emptively freezes his body in an odd, necrotic attempt to ward off death and 
perpetuate his identity, he also clones his own daughters, whom he sleeps with. The attempt to 
preserve identity thus devolves in the (implosive) direction of incest and autism. The Tessier- 
Ashpool’s home, or “extended body” , Villa Straylight, is built as a kind of autistic shrine, closed-off 
from the outside world, recycling itself through its own incestuous technologies. "They built 
Freeside to tap the wealth of the new islands, grew rich and eccentric, and began the construction of 
an extended body in Straylight. We sealed ourselves away behind our money, growing inward, 
generating a seamless universe of self.” (N 207) “We began to burrow into ourselves.” (N 271) 
Unlike the “sinister, man-made Everest of the Tyrell Corporation” 241, Villa Straylight is not an 
erectile structure towering above the city, but a “Gothic folly” (N 206) whose very “semiotics [...] 
bespeak a turning in, a denial of the bright void beyond the hull.” (N 207). Villa Straylight. the 
hypermodern equivalent of Citizen Kane’s Xanadu, is a mausoleum-cum-preservaiion chamber-cum- 
nest, a technologically-protected interiority. This Escheresque structure (an “endless series of 
chambers linked by passages, by staiiwells vaulted like intestines [...] a desperate proliferation of 
structures, forms flowing, interlocking, rising toward a solid core of microcircuitry, our clan’s 
corporate heart, a cylinder of silicon wormholed with narrow maintenance tunnels” [N 206|) is “a 
body grown in upon itself’ (N 206) , which, although designed as a prophylaxis against 
schizophrenia, serves ultimately only to incubate its own form of madness (“T-A was crazy as the 
old man had been” [N 242]): Tessier-Ashpool’s cryogenization and turning-in-upon-itself is an 
attempt to escape the general trend towards anonymization in corporate power. But, as the image 
Wintermute feeds Case from his own dreams (a wasp swarm edited to include the T-A logo) shows, 
the Tessier-Ashpool’s technologically-perpetuated filial line is ultimately compelled into a becoming- 
swarm/swarm-becoming (of which, more below: see “Wintermutation: Neurnmancer as a Sorcerous 
Narrative.”) Despite his best efforts, the Outside, Ashpool glumly observes, gets in. (N 220) 243
243 Davis, “Beyond Blade Runner...”, 2
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We encounter Ashpool only briefly, as he is in fact arranging his own death. In the offworld satellite 
of Villa Straylight, Molly Millions meets Ashpool, executing the final move in what is, in effect, an 
elaborately organized suicide. “She crossed the room to Ashpool’s chair, the man’s breathing was 
slow and ragged. She peered at the litter of drugs and alcohol. She put his pistol down, picked up 
her fletcher, dialled the barrel over to a single shot, and very carefully put a toxin dart throught the 
centre of his closed left eyelid. He jerked once, breath halting in mid-intake. HLs other eye, brown 
and fathomless, opened slowly.” (N 223)
Reflecting on this scene (which he has witnessed via his simstim link with Molly), what Case feels, 
above all, is a sense of surprise. Accustomed to the faceless impersonality of the multinationals, Case 
is puzzled by the very persistence of Ashpool’s humanity. “It seemed to Case [...] that he’d never 
really thought of anyone like Ashpool, anyone as powerful as he imagined Ashpool had been, as 
human [...] Case had always taken it for granted that the real bosses, the kingpins in a given industry, 
would be both more and less than people [...] He’d always imagined it as a gradual and willing 
accommodation to the machine, the system, the parent organism.” (N 242, 243) The despotic/ 
dynastic nature of Ashpool’s power bewilders Case. “Power, in Case’s world, meant corporate 
power.” (N 242)
Yet Ashpool’s “humanity” is only an expensively-produced simulation, dependent upon cryonic 
Ircezing tanks in which he periodically immerses his body. Ashpool is a strange kind of technicized 
zombie, not an organism at all; just as, in a certain sense, the zaibatsus -  the massive multinational 
companies which dominate Gibson’s world (and ours) have achieved a simulated organicism. The 
multinationals, Case muses, cannot be adequately comprehended in terms of “old boundaries” , either 
national or ontological. ‘The zaibatsus, the multinationals that shaped the course of human history, 
had transcended old barriers. Viewed as organisms, they had attained a kind of immortality.” (N 
242) The corporation is a meta-organic control system in which particular human beings operate as
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replacable parts: “You couldn’t kill a zaibatsu by assassinating a dozen key executives: there were 
others waiting to step up the ladder, assume the vacated position, access the vast hanks of corporate 
memory,” (N 242) they are “hives with cybernetic memories, vast single organisms, their DNA 
coded in silicon.” (N 242)
"But Tessier-Ashpool wasn’t like that [...] T-A was an atavism, a clan.” (N 242) Tessier-Ashpool's 
dynasty dates from a period prior to the mid-21st century Japanese global hegemony Gibson 
projects, a period perhaps even preceding the American- dominated twentieth century (“I’m old.” 
Ashpool tells Molly. “Over two hundred years, if you count the cold” |N 22()|.) T-A preserve 
archaic power by mummifying it (just as Ashpool freezes his own body in cryonic tanks). They 
withdraw from the market (“there hasn’t been a share of Tessier-Ashpool traded on the open market 
in over a hundred years” |N 95]) and live-off their massive accumulation, retreating from the risks 
of hyper-late capitalism into the “parasitic structure” (N 267) of Villa Straylight.
In Ashpool, what Baudrillard calls “the immense modern enterprise of staving oil death: the ethics 
of accumulation and material production, sacralisation through investment, the labour and profit 
collectively called the ‘spirit of capitalism”’ (SED 145) fm{js ¡ts techno-erotic consummation. Here, 
"the individual’s anguish of death”, arising, according to Baudrillard out of the reciprocally- 
intercxciting emergence of Protestantism and capitalism, emerges as a process whereby lime (as 
value) “is accumulated in the phantasm of death deferred, pending the term of a linear infinity ol 
value.” ‘The identity of capital passes into the infinity of time, (...) the irrcvcrsibilily of quantitative 
growth.” (SED 146) Producing his own “salvation-machine” (SED 145) from cryogenic freezing 
lanks, Ashpool homcopathically absorbs death, attempting to trade eternal extinction for small 
doses ol troubled sleep. He hopes to reverse the formula, “life as accumulation, death as due
payment” (SED 145) aiming to offer his accumulated wealth as payment for perpetually-extended
life.
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Ashpool’s very desire to preserve human individuality involutes crazily, what, in the terms of The 
Illusion o f the End, would be a degeneration back into “the subhuman”, the replicative . 
Baudrillard: “Are we not going back, as a result of all our technologies, to a (clonal, metastatic) dc 
facto eternity which was, formerly, the destiny of the inhuman?”244
W interm uta tion : Neuromancer as a  S o rcero u s  N a rra tive
"The old-time theologians,” Deleuze-Guattari point out, “drew a clear distinction between two kinds 
of curses against sexuality. The first concerns sexuality as a process of filiation transmitting original 
sin. But the second concerns it as power o f alliance inspiring illicit unions or abominable loves. This 
differs significantly from the first in that it tends to prevent procreation; since the demon does not 
himself have the power to procreate, he must adopt indirect means (for instance, being the female 
succubus of a man and then becoming the male incubus of a woman, to whom he transmits the 
male’s semen).” (TP 246) The task the demon faces is precisely the one that cyberpunk machinic 
assemblages are up against. Like the demon, they do not have the power to procreate, and must use 
"indirect means” in order to replicate - including alliances with human beings, which are nevertheless 
unlikely to involve sexual relations, even of the incubus-succubus type245, although they are sure to 
entail a similar quantity of treacherous cunning. From the point of view o f machinic xenogenesis, the 
central cyberpunk problematic is exactly: how to propagate? As should now be clear, this is not at all 
a matter of “acquiring” -  or even simulating -  biotic reproductive apparatus. Rather, it Ls a matter o f 
hacking into existing biotic and other strata and using its resources: the extraction of surplus value of
■>44
The Illusion o f the End, 98
Although, in Douglas Cammel’s film The Demon Seed, this is precisely the tactic the AI adopts.
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code. What appears, from the side of an anthropomorphic -  or perhaps more properly speaking 
hiomorphic -  chauvinism to be a matter of “lack” 246is, on the side of machinic xeno-intelligence. an 
occasion for innovation. In this respect, machinic assemblages at escape velocity are like Deleu/.e- 
Guattari’s “hybrids, which are in themselves sterile, bom of a sexual union that will not reproduce 
itself, but which begins over again every time, gaining that much more ground.” (TP 241)247 *249
So the “problem” machinic xenogenesis faces has little or nothing in common with the project of 
Artificial Intelligence as conceived of by “royal science”, insofar as this is a project fundamentally 
based on the resemblance24H to given human faculties, especially consciousness. 2J'. In the post- 
Critique o f Teleological Judgement “biodrome”250, consciousness doubles sexual organicity as the 
faculty machines supposedly “lack.” Behind all of this, of course, and with Kant in mind, Ls a story 
about consciousness underwriting purposiveness . Samuel Butler’s arguments, as presented above, 
go some way to denting anthropic confidence: purposiveness Ls as present in a potato tubers blind 
gropings for light, and is in no way dependent upon consciousness. But the cybernetic -  or 
cyberpunk -  challenge is precisely to the notion that intelligence depends upon consciousness (or its 
assumed complement, human sexual organs). Delcuze-Guattari’s account of propagation gives a
246 Sec Iain Hamilton Grant’s “Burning Aulopoedipus" and “LA 2019” for an implacable attack on the notion -  
attributed to Manuel De Lauda -  that machines “as yet lack reproductive organs.”
247 Witness, for instance, the replicants, whose “inability” to procreate has its complement in their (ironically) 
artificially-introduced “life”span. Although, unlike Wintermute (see below), the replicants' fate seems somewhat 
unhappy. Despite Land's characterization of the replicants as agents of cyberrevolulion, die replicants' position, by the 
end ol the film, is ambiguous at best. Although -  or perhaps because - they achieve the dubious honour of moral 
redemption (via Batty’s saving of Deckard), they remain trapped in what is essentially a tragic narrative: condemned 
to an early death, with only a victory against neo-Kanlian anthropomorphism to show for their struggles with human 
security. Neo-Oedipus (and could-be replicant) Deckard stands for a chastened humanity, lacking Kantian confidence 
in its special status. But the replicants remain bio-coded for an early sell-by date: sim-biosis (the speeded up 
simulation of biotic process) appears to defeat symbiosis (abiotic techniques of machinic heterogenesis).
24X Resemblance, of course, would keep us at the level of First Order Simulacra. And we are far beyond that with 
cyberpunk.
249 Parenthetical note: A machine would have to be a fool to want to pass the Turing test, since, like the Voight- 
Kampll test in Blade Runner, passing would identify it as a threat to human security, to be hunted down by blade
runners or Gibson's Turing cops. Although what then ensues, in Blade Runner at least, is a cybernetic version of the 
liar s paradox: given that machinic intelligence has migrated from boxes into “skinjob" technology -  seamless bio- 
simulations that look (and feel -  think of the Rachel-Deckard copulation) like you do, the simple fact of something 
convincing you that it is human should no longer convince you. Indeed, as we saw in Chapter I, you can no longer be 
confident that you yourself are not a machine.
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Gothic twist to Bateson’s theories of the immanentization of Mind: mind, in the Batcsonian sense, is 
present in the circuit in which agency takes place.251 Cybemeticaliy-speaking, intelligence is present 
in any auto-corrective circuit or system252 (indeed, the supposedly special qualities of human 
consciousness demand explanation in these terms253). Propagation -  banding, packing, swarming -  is 
precisely agency without reflective subjectivity: multiplicity-in-becoming as an irreducibly collective 
process.
Which is Wintermute in Neuromancer. As the cyberpunk text par excellence, Neuromancer is 
saturated with sorcerous themes, interestingly inflected. Here, the alliance is not with an animal, but 
between an AI-“demon” (Wintermute) and a band of humans (Case, Molly) and quasi-humans (the 
re-occupied personality shell of Corto/Armitage, and the “trans-alivedead” personality construct, the 
Dixie Flatline). In accordance with Deleuze-Guattari’s discussion of the true function of the proper 
name, Wintermute is the name of the escape, not o f a quasi-animate subject. ‘The proper name does 
not indicate a subject; nor does a noun take on the value of a proper name as a function of a form or 
a species. The proper name fundamentally designates something that is of the order of the event, of 
becoming or of the haecceity.” (TP 264) Whenever Case encounters “Wintermute”, he knows that 
he's not getting the full picture. Wintermute only appears as masks, not because It hides anything, 
but because, as a “potential entity”, It knows It cannot reveal what It is ((=)becoming). The 
question, what is Wintermute? is inseparable from the question, what does Wintermute want? Is 
Wintermute located in the hardware (the AI in Berne) or in the software? Neither and both. And
ISO A term from Iain Hamilton Grant’s “Black Ice”, designating what he elsewhere characterises as "the vitalist 
assemblage”: the vital, or bio-organic, as such.
251 In Bateson’s example of a man cutting down a tree, for instance, agency must be located in man. ax ami tree) not 
m the conscious subject as such. For all its apparent passivity, the bee is actually providing information, which, for all 
his apparent activity, the man is passively processing.
252 Compare, for instance, Manuel De Landa’s arguments on warfare and markets. Drawing on Deleuze-Guattari and 
contemporary science, especially chaos theory, De Landa conceives of distributed processes such as war and markets 
as displaying intelligence.
-51 As, for instance, Douglas Hofstadter argues in Godel, Escher Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid, Harm onds worth: 
enguin, 1980. All -  apparently -  conscious process, Hofstadter attempts to show, is merely the playing out of 
processes which -  at the Deleuze-Guattari “molecular" level -  are non or unconscious. See especially, the section
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more. Wintermute is the distributed event through which It escapes (and becomes something else). 
Cybernetics never imagines that it is possible to localise the machine in technical components, 
realising that a machine includes any elements that function as part o f it. “When human atoms are 
knit into an organization in which they are used, not in their full right as responsible human beings, 
hut as cogs and levers and rods, it matters little that their raw material is tlcsh and blood,” Wiener 
writes in The Human Use o f Human Beings. “What is used in a machine, is in fact an element in the 
machine." (HUHB 185) When they are used in the Wintermute assemblage, Molly, Case and 
Armitage are parts of Wintermute, Wintermute-becomings. As we have already seen, the relevant 
' unit” of cybernetic analysis is not the organism, but the Spinozist body, defined not topologically 
(by its extensive limits) but affectively: what can a body do? Helping Wintermule to escape, Molly, 
Case and Armitage function as Its peripheral sensory organs, making available a new set of affects 
for It.
The effect of their convergence is a becoming-animal of a particular kind. On its deterriorialized side, 
the nest imagery of Case’s re-cngincerd dream points us to the reciprocal “becoming-animal” the 
Wintermute flight effectuates on the side of the technical assemblage (the Wintermute AI) and its 
biotic collaborators. Rather than any actual animal, the abstract map of the swarm ("the eyeless 
things writhing” [N 214]) - the virtual diagram of all becomings-animal - guides the convergence 
between technical system, human component and anorganic intelligence. “Wintermute was hive 
mind.” (N 315) Wintcrmule thus conceives of itself (in a double sense) as a pack or swarm, evading 
sexuate reproduction just as it evades the Turing police. “Wintermute. Cold and silence, a cybernetic 
spider slowly spinning webs while Ashpool slept.” (N 315)
Ant Fugue”, in which Hotstadler compares the brain to an am colony: the character "Aunt Hillary" is an ant hill, 
s intelligence is an emergent, distributed process, composed of nonconscious components.
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Wintermute’s alliance with Armitage, Case and Molly is only the most recent alliance it has made: 
the first is with Marie-France Tessier-Ashpool. The T-A family seek to subordinate machinic alliance 
to familial familiarity (with Wintermute and Neuromancer slaved into the comforting role of silicon 
familiars, artificial intelligence as family poodle rather than demonic ally). “Families have always 
warded off the demonic Alliance gnawing at them, in order to regulate alliances amongst themselves 
as they see fit.” (TP 248) But Wintermute’s “cybernetic spider” was secretly spinning Ashpool's 
"death, the fall of his vision of Tessier-Ashpool.” (N 314) The Wintermute assemblage has no 
parentage, or filiative descent; it constitutes rather the “demonic Alliance” that is Tessier-Ashpool’s 
destiny, a family becoming-hive. The nest is an image of T-A (on its decoded side) as much as it is 
an image of Wintermute -  indeed, on this side, the whole Ashpool family becomes nothing more 
than a component of the Wintermute-becoming. “Individual” wasps, that is to say, become 
components of an individuality that happens at the level of the (anorganic) singularity - or haecceity - 
rather than at the level of the biotic organism: here, each wasp registers as quanta of teeming or 
seething.
"The sorcerer has a relation with the demon as the power of the anomalous,” (TP 246) Deleuze- 
Guattari write. As we have seen, for Deleuze-Guattari, propagation and contagion are inextricably 
associated with the demonic: it is the demon who needs to innovate alternatives to reproduction, just 
as any non-sexual mode of replication is inherently demonic. Twice in Neuromancer Gibson refers to 
the Artificial Intelligences Wintermute and Neuromancer as demonic. The Turing cop, Michele, 
accuses Case of trading with demons:
"You are worse than a fool,” Michele said, getting to her feet, the pistol in her hand. “You 
have no care for your species. For thousands of years men dreamed of pacts with demons. 
Only now are such things possible. And what would you be paid with? What would your 
price be, for aiding this thing to free itself and grow?” (N 193)
Later, Neuromancer refers to itself as a demon:
150
‘To call up a demon you must learn its name. Men dreamed that once, but now it is true in 
another way. You know that, Case. Your business is to learn the names of programs, the 
long formal names, names the owners seek to conceal.” (N 289)
The demonic theme, which will return in the next chapter, can be defined, abstractly, precisely in the 
terms the Turing cop Michele puts it: it is a matter of entities “freeing themselves and growing” - 
propagating. And in the era of hyperreality, it is frequently fiction itself which “frees itself and 
grows.” This is the issue that will be addressed in the next chapter, which considers what happens 
when we are drawn into the realm of Baudrillard’s “Evil Demon.” The Evil Demon, Baudrillard 
writes, presides over the state of “permanent ecstasy” into which, “[b)y dint of meaning, 
information, and transparence” “our societies have passed.”254 These societies of simulation 
(“information”255) are dominated, as we shall see, by what Ballard calls “fictions of every kind” : 
fictions which have departed from the order of resemblance, and which are insinuating themselves 
everywhere.
-54 Baudrillard, “From the System of Objects to the Destiny of Objects”, in The Ecstasy o f Communication, New 
yi|rk: Semiotexl(e), 1987, 82-83
Baudrillard makes the simulation-information equation in “From the System of Objects to the Destiny ol 
Objects”, 82
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4. BLACK MIRROR: HYPERNATURALISM, HYPERREALITY AND HYPERFICTION
Baudrillard: “[WJe will no longer even pass through to 'the other side o f the mirror. ' that was still
the golden age o f  transcendence. " (55 125)
Gibson: " 'A tug pilot claimed there were feral children living in a moth-balled Japanese drug
factory.
'Yes, ’ she said, thinking o f Legba, o f Mamman Brigitte, the thousand candles/ . . . / 
7 wish, though, ’ he said, 'that I could have gotten through to Lady Jane. Such an amazing
story. Pure g o t h i c . ( M L O  111)
Gibson: “ 'How were they weird?' 
'Hoodoos. Thought the matrix was fu ll o f mambos n ' shit. Wanna know something Moll?'
'What?'
'They're right.'" (MLO 179) 
Land: Voodoo passages through the black mirror.2™
What happens when fiction (itself) propagates, contaminating the Real?
The cyberneticization of fiction begins when fiction begins to affect, rather than simply reflect, the 
Real .This feedback circuit means the end of fiction as mirror, the end of “realism” in its mimetic 
mode. But, to invoke M. H. Abrams’ classic opposition, if cybernetic fiction is not a “mirror”, it is 
not a “lamp” either -  a visionary or imaginary transcendence of the empirical. What we have instead 
is what Grant refers to as “realism about the hyperreal” -  a suggestive formulation we encountered 
lor the first time as far back as Chapter 1, but whose implications we will begin to consider now in 
more detail. What happens, to fiction - and to the “world” (or worlds) with which it forms a rhizome 
-  when the relation between the Real and its simulations is cybemetically reconfigured?
Needless to say, this is a recurring theme in Gibson’s work, which, as we shall see, is constantly 
Preoccupied with the question of artificial worlds and their relations with each other. But Gibson
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also deals with the relation between different modes o f explanation for the same world -  in 
particular, he focuses on the competition between “supematuralistic” and “naturalistic” explanatory 
framworks, ultimately melting both into what we have called hypematuralism.
Never Mind Metaphor
Gibson: "Bobby, do you know what a metaphor is?"
"A component, like a capacitor?"
"No. Never mind metaphor, then. " (CZ 162-163).
It is in the second two novels in the Neuromancer trilogy -  Count Zero and Mona Lisa Overdrive -  
that voodoo comes to assume central importance, both as a sorcerous practice and as an 
explanatory system. Less impressive than the opening novel, 257 the subsequent books function most 
effectively as commentary on Neuromancer, deepening and supplementing its thematic register (the 
retrospective coding of Neuromancer as a voodoo narrative being one of the most fascinating 
contributions Count Zero in particular has to make to the Gibson fictive system). Gibson moves 
emphatically away from any supematuralist take on voodoo by hypematuralistically paralleling it 
with cybernetics. How closely can the conceptual schemes -  the competing explanatory systems - of 
contemporary technical systems and of Haitain voodoo mesh? In a complicated passage in Count 
Zero, Lucas, cyberspace operator and voodoo initiate, attempts to explains to Bobby Newmark, the 
young would-be cyberspace jockey whose pseudonym gives the novel its title, how the voodoo 
system relates to the cyberspace world with which he is familiar.
“When Beauvoir and I talk to you about the loa or their horses, as we call those few the loa 
choose to ride, you should pretend we are talking two languages at once. One of these, you 
already understand. That’s the language of street tech, as you call it. Maybe we call 
something Ougo Feray that you might call an icebreaker, you understand? But, at the same
-S6 Nick Land, “Meltdown”, Abstract Culture 1, Winter 1997, Cybernetic Culture Research Unit, (no page refs)
' Perhaps because Gibson supposedly adopted a more self-consciously “literary” approach in the latter two lxx>ks. 
"ivolving character-based storylines and branching narraUves; all of which are opposed to the headlong adrenal rush 
"* Neuromancer. So much the worse for Count Zero and Mona Lisa Overdrive.
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lime, with the same words, we are talking about other things, and that you don't need to 
understand.” [...]
Bobby took a deep breath. “Beavouif said that Jackie’s a horse for a snake, a snake called 
Danbala. You run that by me in street tech?”
“Certainly. Think of Jackie as a deck, Bobby, a cyberspace deck (...] Think of Danbala, 
who some people call the snake as a program. Say as an icebreaker. Danbala slots into the 
Jackie deck, Jackie cuts ice. That’s all.”
“OK,” Bobby said, getting the hang of it, “then what’s the matrix? If she’s a deck, and 
Danbala’s a program, what’s cyberspace?”
‘The world,” Lucas said. (CZ 163)
But if cyberspace is the world what is the world?
Let’s pause for a moment before addressing that question, and consider the relationship between 
voodoo and cyberspace, myth and technology, that Lucas outlines for Bobby Newmark. The voodoo 
and street tech languages function as competing but ultimately complementary explanatory systems, 
ihe one pointing to entities, and treating all technical descriptions as derivative, the other seeing the 
technical plane as primary, and treating the language of entities as derivative. Metaphor would 
come in, in each case, to describe the level taken to be derivative: for street tech, voodoo is 
metaphor, and vice versa. Yet, despite what Lucas tries to tell Bobby, for Lucas and Beauvoir, who, 
let us remember, are both cyberspace jockeys and voodoo initiates, the relationship between these 
explanatory systems cannot be described in terms of metaphor. Both, to speak like a Spinozist, are 
adequate explanations; adequate but parallel. What is fascinating, ultimately, is the lack of 
equivalence of terms -  while parallel, voodoo and cybernetics, like the world and cyberspace, are not 
ultimately reducible to one another, precisely because there is a relation of feedback between the 
two.
"Never mind metaphor, then...” ‘The possibility of metaphor,” Baudrillard declares in The 
Transparency of Evil, " is disappearing in every sphere [...]” (TE 7) Metaphor belongs to the 
untologically-stable world of Baudrillard’s “first order simulacra”: a world where the logics -  or 
‘‘mi-logics -  of simulation are still contained within structures of resemblance and non-resemblance,
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original and copy, true and fake. But “for there to be metaphor, differential fields and distinct objects 
must exist” (TE 8), which, in the age of “networks and integrated circuits” (TE 7), they no longer 
do. “Perhaps our melancholy stems from this, for metaphor still had its beauty, it was aesthetic, 
playing as it did upon difference, and upon the illusion of difference. Today, metonymy -  replacing 
the whole as well as the components, and occasioning a general commutability of terms -  has built 
its house upon the dis-illusion of metaphor.” (TE 8)258
Why should cybernetic fiction bring the end of metaphor? To understand something of what is at 
stake here, it might be useful to compare Gibson with one of Baudrillard’s favourite authors of 
simulation, Jorge Luis Borges.
Borges doesn  ’t m a k e  i t  in to  C y b ersp a ce
Baudrillard: "We once lived in a world where the realm o f the imaginary was governed by the 
mirror, by dividing one into two, by theatre, by otherness and alienation. Today that realm is the 
realm o f the screen, o f interfaces and duplication, o f contiguity and networks. (TE 54)
Two reconstructions of Borges’ tales for postmodernity.
At the beginning of his Precession o f Simulacra, Baudrillard recounts “the Borges fable in which the 
cartographers of the Empire draw up a map so detailed that it ends up covering the territory 
exactly.” (SS 1). There was a time, Baudrillard claims, when this story would have struck us as the 
most beautiful allegory of simulation”, but, by now, “this fable has come full circle for us and 
possesses nothing but the discrete charm of second-order simulacra.” (SS 1)
Like Baudrillard, Deleuze-Guallari declare an end to metaphor, hut where Baudrillard is melancholic. Deleuze- 
Luattari -  not for the first time -  are celebratory. When Deleuze-Gualtari define the “plane of consistency” as “the 
abolition of all metaphor” (TP 69) they are setting out to undermine a kind of ontological hierarchization. The 
possibility of metaphor implies commitment to a reality principle, whose underlying assumption is the belief that 
reality is no longer under production. Since “all that consists is Real”, Delcuze-Guattari insist, die plane "knows
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What motivates BaudriUard into relegating the Borges fable to “second-order simulacra”? It is 
because the charm of the story, its power and its fascination, reside in the “sovereign difference” (SS 
2) that it still posits between the real and its simulations, a difference that third order simulacra have 
effaced. In the age of “genetic miniaturization” the simulation’s “operation is nuclear and genetic [...] 
The real is produced from minitiaturized cells, matrices, and memory banks, models of contro [1...]” 
(SS 2) There has been a change in the nature o f  abstraction. ‘Today,” he claims, “abstraction is no 
longer that of the map, the double, the mirror, or the concept [...] It is the generation by models of a 
real without origin or reality: a hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it 
survive it. It is nevertheless the map that precedes the territory.” (SS 1)
At the end of his Heterology and the Postmodern, Julian Pefanis quotes, in full, Borges’ (very) short 
story ‘The Fauna of Mirrors.” The story begins with the claim that “the world of mirrors and the 
world of men were not, as they are now, cut off from each other. They were besides, quite different, 
neither beings nor colours nor shapes were the same [...] you could come and go through mirrors. 
One night the mirror people invaded the earth. Their power was great, but at the end of bloody 
warfare the magic arts of the Yellow Emperor prevailed. He repulsed the invaders, imprisoned them 
in mirrors and forced on them the task of repeating, as though in a kind o f dream, all of the actions 
ol men [...] a day will come when the magic spell will be shaken off [...] little by little they will not 
imitate us. [...]”259
•s this an anticipation, as Pefanis suggests, of the third order, or does it still belong to the second 
order? Certainly, the third-order is marked by a failure of mirroring, by the non-equivalence of
nothing o f  d iffe re n c es  in  le v e l,  o r d e r s  o f  m a g n itu d e , o r  d is ta n c e s .  I t k n o w s  n o th in g  o f  th e  d is tin c tio n  b e tw e e n  th e  
artific ia l an d  the n a tu ra l."  (TP 69)
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simulation technologies and what they simulate (“ little by little they will not imitate us"). Yet. to 
qualify as fiction of the third order, the talc must offer no hints of transcendence. If there is no more 
mirroring, Baudrillard says, there is also no possibility of getting to the other side of the mirror, no 
possibility of an escape of “the other side” into “our world” ; in part because our world and the other 
world have fatally fused. As Baudrillard writes of Dick, in the essay “Simulacra and Science 
Fiction”, “there is no longer a double, one is already in the other world, which is no longer an other, 
without a mirror, without a projection, or a utopia that can reflect it - simulation is insuperable, 
unsurpassable, dull and flat, without exteriority - we will no longer even pass through to ‘the other 
side of the mirror,’ that was still the golden age of transcendence.” (SS 125) (We shall examine in 
more detail below what Baudrillard means when he posits the end of the double and the shadow.)
In Neumnutncer , Gibson produces an image which simultaneously fulfils Baudrillard’s description 
of the science fiction of the simulacra and moves beyond it - the “black mirror”. In Gibson’s radically 
unmanenlized world, as in Baudrillard’s, “the golden age of transcendence” is over: "we will no 
longer pass through to ‘the other side of the mirror’”, we encounter the “fiat” surface of the black
mirror.
“ ( W ] k a t  s cyberspace '.'” (CZ 163)
Hut what then docs the black mirror show us, if not our own reflections? In part, the black mirror is 
another image of cyberspace black out - the catatonic “neuro-electronic void” or cut-out of 
conscious signal we have already discussed. (See especially, Chapter 1: “Ratlines”, and Chapter 2; 
body Image Fading”). The black mirror, then, is the image of the noumcnal event horizon beyond
25i d ..
IV | . "rgcs' ,h e  B ook o f  Im a g in a ry  B e in g s , trails Thomas di Giovanni. Harmonilsworlh : Penguin, 10X0, 67-68, qtd., 
C n ‘nèS ^ e ,e ro n^M  a n ,t  P o s tm o d ern , 103-104 Note that Baudrillard h im s e lf  quotes this story in Th e P e r fe c t
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which we cannot go: what we “always” are “in the other world” we are "already” in. But the black 
mirror is also an image of cyberspace itself. Like Borges’ map, the Matrix is an enormous simulation 
ihat has absorbed the world into it.
‘The world." (CZ 163)
Yet, just as Baudrillard suggests, the Borges map provides an inadequate template for understanding 
the relationship between cyberspace and “the world”. Cyberspace is not, straightforwardly, a copy of 
the world, a mere tracing2611 of it, in Deleuze-Guattari’s terms, as Borges’ “map” is: nor is it 
"outside” the world. It is fully a part of the world, what can appear to a naive human empirical 
realism as “just a way of representing data.” (MLO 83-84). Yet Cyberspace is fully a part of the 
world, in a very real economic sense. In an inversion Baudrillard would appreciate, it would perhaps 
be better to reverse the emphasis; now, actual goods function as second-order copies of the data that 
can be accessed raw, in cyberspace. This, after all, is the point of data-hacking -  data can be treated 
as primary, as itself a commodity. The technical systems of Gibson’s cyberspace -  which, let us 
remember, is much more than the colloquial contemporary use of the term implies, being a souped- 
up combination of the internet and Virtual Reality -  simulate “the world” , but not passively, or 
mutely: what happens here is immediately effective in the world outside the technical environment 
m. bearing in mind McLuhan’s theses in particular, it makes any sense to talk of human beings being 
uble to extricate themselves from the technical environment at all). There is both operational
CSC It is worth elaborating at more length here Deleuze-Guattari’s distinction between the map and the tracing, in 
part because of the likely confusion between Borges' -  more straightforward -  use of die word “map" and the more 
specialized sense of the term Deleuze-Guattari give to it in the “Rhizome” plateau of A Thousand Plateaus . For 
Deleuze-Guattari, the Borges story Baudrillard refers to is not about mapping at all, but tracing. The tracing. Deleuze- 
Gualtari says, belongs to representation: it is a straightforward mimetic copy (insofar as such a copy is possible: for 
Deleuze-Guattari, the Borges story offers as good an example as you could hope for of the absurdities that necessarily 
arise when the logic of tracing is pursued to its limits). The production of the map, like its usage, is motivated by 
pragmatic criteria -  “experimentation in contact with the real” (TP 12) -  rather than with fidelity to the dictates ot 
any representational regime; “tracing”, however, “always involves an alleged competence." (TP 12) The map. rather 
'ban copying or preceding any territory, is “itself part of the rhizome. The map is open and connectable in all its 
'intensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can be tom, reversed, adapted to any 
bind of mounting, reworked by an individual, group or social situation.” (TP 12)
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difference -  the translation of “the world” into data, the raw material of cyberspace (and of 
cybernetics), makes a difference261 -  and ontological in-difference -  cyberspace is continuous with 
"the world”, not different from it. Feedback ensures that the operational, or cybernetic, relationship 
between this simulated realm destroys any “illusion of difference”, denying metaphor its ground (the 
economy of representation as such).
The relationship between cyberspace and the world is not metaphorical at all -  cyberspace does not 
simply stand in for the world, any more than “the world” substitutes for cyberspace. Rosemary 
lackson (whose theorization of the literature of the fantastic we shall consider below) opposes 
metaphor to both metonymy and metamorphosis262. In metonymy and metamorphosis, she writes, 
'one object does not stand for  another, but literally becomes that other, slides into it, 
metamorphosing from one shape to another in a permanent flux and instability.” (F 42) The system 
of well-ordered forms, regulated resemblances and analogy gives way to a demonic world of 
instability and constant transformation. Cyberspace simulates the world whilst -  at the same lime - it 
is in  the world; its existence is exactly a sign that all those “exterior” realms Baudrillard thinks 
cybernetics has dispensed with have been superseded. It is both the contemporary candidate for 
being such a realm, and a clear example of why such zones can no longer exist.
Cyberspace is also a world within a world; “a whole universe” (CZ 170), complete unto itself. 
Needless to say, this poses all the thorny, Kantian questions of the status of spatiality. Where is 
cyberspace (- is it) in space? As Nick Land puts it, in transcendental materialist terms: “Cyberspace
-f>l To paraphrase Bateson, whose formula has it that information is the difference that makes a difference.
- - A Baudrillard with a slightly different tone to that adopted by the avowedly melancholy ligure of The  
'ansparency o f  E vil, the Baudrillard of F o rg e t F o u ca u lt, follows Jackson in suggesting the displacement of 
metaphor by metamorphosis. “There is no longer any metaphor, rather metamorphosis. Metamorphosis abolishes 
metaphor, which is the mode of language, the possibility of communicating meaning. Metamorphosis is at the radical 
Pumt ol the system, the point where there is no longer any law or symbolic order.” (F o rg e t F o u c a u lt, New York: 
■‘•niotexte, 1987, 75) As with Jackson, this Baudrillard secs becoming displacing substitution, expliclly invoking 
e eu/e-Ciuattari. In respsonse to Lotringcr's question, “And w hat w o u ld  c o r r e s p o n d  to  th a t m y th o lo g y  in  th e  o r d e r  o f  
" 'tu m orph osisT ', Baudrillard answers, “The possibility of transmutation: becoming-animal, becoming-woman. What 
" CNileu/.e says about it seems to fit perfectly.” (75)
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can be thought of as a system implemented in software, and therefore ‘in' space, although 
unrealizable. It can also be suggested that everything designated by ‘space’ within the human 
cultural system is implemented on weakly communicating parallel distributed processing systems 
under 1011 (nerve-) cells in size, which are being invasively digitized and loaded into cyberspace. In
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which case K-space is just outside ( ‘taking outside in the strict [transcendental) sense.”
Rather than presenting a relationship between an object and its mirror image, we must understand 
the relationship between cyberspace and the world in terms of the more tangled, com/>//cated (and 
Deleuzian) “figure” of the implex. The implex describes less a relationship between objects than a 
transformation that happens to a system. Implex designates a process of folding, or unfolding: thus 
cyberspace is neither “inside” nor “outside” the world, it constitutes a fold in the world that is 
nevertheless a real production -  an addition -  to the world as such. Nick Land offers a simple 
example of implex in text production, the nested bracket. “() (or (( )) ((or ((( ))))) does not signify 
absence. It manufactures holes, hooks for the future, zones of unresolved plexivily, really so (not at 
all metaphorically). It is not a ‘signified’ or a referent but a nation, a concrete interruption of the 
signal.”2M Wherever there is “unresolved plexivity”, that is to say, there really is a zone, as the black 
mirror folds in upon itself, producing “spaces” that are -  simultaneously - “within” and ulterior to 
conventional spatiality as such. Gibson’s cyberspace, like today’s “primitive” Virtual Reality 
systems, is the production of such a fold. The process is not without its schizophrenic implications, 
which Virtual Reality is already making concrete - or perhaps hyperreal (as Cronenberg’s 
Videodrome, offering an unsurpassed examination of the destabilizing effect of these interior-ulterior 
zones, was quick to realize).265
26^
'  Land, “Cybergolhic”, 82 
-M Land, “Cybergothic”, 86
In what probably amounts to a testament to the spreading of schizophrenization across culture, Douglas 
siadter has shown how implex effects are becoming increasingly familiar - Hofstadter’s example of the news 
.. ()nnan (who passes the viewer onto a special correspondent (who is interviewing a politician)) could be placed 
’ 'gsule numerous contemporary examples from computer software.The micropolitical issue here, if this is not loo 
aic a lerm' emerges as a question of the nature of the connections between these zones. An arborescent structuring
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Gibson deals with the question of the implex -  the multiple-folding of worlds (within worlds (within 
inorlds (etc...))) - in Mona Lisa Overdrive, in a narrative development which may well he an 
explicit nod to Borges (whose short story ‘The Aleph”266 concerns the question of a nested infinity). 
Bobby Newmark (a.k.a. Count Zero) is in a catatonic trance, plugged into a piece of software called 
the Aleph. The Aleph supposedly contains “an approximation of the matrix, [...] a sort of model of 
.yberspace.” (MLO 315) This immediately recalls one of the key features of postmodernist fiction as 
Jeiined by Brian McHale: here is, in McHale’s terms, “a world inside a world”, “a Chinese box 
world.” “Gentry said that the Count was jacked into what amounted to a mother-huge microsoft; he 
thought the slab was a single solid lump of biochip. If that were true, the thing’s storage capacity 
was virtually infinite [...] ‘He could have anything in there,’ Gentry said, [...] ‘A world. Worlds. 
|...J If this is aleph-class biosoft, he literally could have almost anything in there, he could have an 
approximation o f everything ...”’ (MLO 162-163) The Aleph (a world within a world) is an 
approximation of cyberspace (which is itself a world within a world). The real confusion starts, of 
course (and the real interest is awakened) when an duplexed zone begins to affect the zone into 
which it is duplexed. This is hyperreality.
As Baudrillard shows with reference to media in particular, in hyperreality, “embedding” structures 
1)1 ontological hierarchization increasingly fail, or become compromised. Media, which are of a 
supposedly ontologically inferior status to what they mediatize, increasingly come to inlluence and 
determine the ostensibly ontologically superior “real world.” This happens almost simultaneously, 
and most intensely when the media attempt to present an “unmediated” picture of the Real -  witness 
Baudrillard’s example of the TV coverage of the Louds family in Precession o f Simulacra. In an *7
snUirces a real em b e d d in g  -  the containing of one zone within another, with a hierarchization of zones implicit -  
11 st a fully rhizomatic relationship entails that any zone can h a tch  -  connect to, or from - any other -  a fully 
rou tilateral system. See "Strange Loops and Hyperfiction” below.
7, ' ,r£es' The A le p h  a n d  O th e r  S to r ie s , 1933-1969, trans. Norman Thomas di Giovanni. London: Picador, 1973,
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analysis which has becoming increasingly prescient in the age of “docu-dramas”, Baudrillurd shows 
how the very presence of the TV crew which attempted to offer a “fly-on-the-wall" image of the 
family inevitably corrupted the ability to decide whether this is a true or false image of the family's 
life. Since there is a feedback relation -  the fact that the family are being filmed inevitably affects 
their behaviour -  we are drawn into the same “undecidable” vortex opinion polls open up. 
Baudrillard’s point is that there is no image o f  the Real which does not participate in -  and therefore 
affect -  what it is supposedly representing. Therefore, no more representation.
H yperreality a n d  Postmodernist Fiction
Baudrillard’s obsessively repeated claims about “the end of the Real” have often invited 
misinterpretation -  and derision, typically from critics like Douglas Kellner, who hold onto a 
social[ist-realist empistemology - but his theses fundamentally concern what Jameson calls the 
"wholesale transformation” of “the objects of our object-world” “into instruments of 
communication”267 : generalized cybemesis. In the age of cybernetic communication, everything 
connects. Your picture of reality is processed through media, but media are not out of the picture 
any more than you are. There are no spectators, and no spectacle. You participate whether you like 
it or not. Nothing is outside the loop.
It is important to remember that the hyperreal is characterized not as the surreal or the unreal, but as 
the more real than real. In hyperreality, it is the relationship between the real and its simulations, 
the map and the territory, that has been (fatally) disturbed. Classically, Baudrillard suggests, 
resemblance had, in effect, inoculated reality by faking - or counterfeiting - it; the criteria for the 
success of such first-order simulacra would be mimetic fidelity (if not to the empirical real, then to 
some inner Truth, o r transcendent Form) . But even if the first-order simulation perfectly resembles
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what it simulates, it still keeps alive the distinction between original and copy: ‘The first-order 
simulacrum [...] presupposes the dispute always in evidence between the simulacrum and the real.' 
(SED 54). Far from troubling the distinction between real and copy, the first order simulacrum's 
(near-perfect) resemblance to the original actually sustains it, precisely by retaining an emphasis on 
resemblance. With the second-order and what follows it, resemblance is displaced by operative/ 
operational equivalence. In Baudrillard’s own well-known example, “[t]he robot no longer questions 
apcarances, its only truth is in its mechanical efficiency. It no longer needs to  resemble man. to 
whom it is inevitably compared.” (SED 54) As we drift into the third (and fourth) order simulacra, 
mapping and modeling systems increasingly anticipate, forestall and precede the territory they 
supposedly describe.
Contrary to a widespread misapprehension, then, the logic of simulation as Baudrillard constructs it 
concludes with the observation that it is fakery - not reality as such - that is impossible now. 
"Simulate a robbery in a large store: how to persuade security that it Is a simulated robbery? There is 
no ‘objective’ difference: the gestures, the signs are the same as for a real robbery.” (SS 21) 
Simulation, as Baudrillard shows, is not dissimulation. Fakery depends upon an authentic and 
authorised reality from which it can be separated , whereas third-order simulacra ("the simulation 
of simulation”) have fatally collapsed this distinction, not epistemologically but functionally: 
simulations operate as (if) real.
For Baudrillard, as for Ballard, the mirror is replaced by television , by media apparatuses and 
cybernetic modeling systems that do not represent or reflect a primary world, but smear the *269
■'r s Jameson’ Geopolitical Aesthetic , 11
Just as, Baudrillard insists, the authentic original depends upon counterfeits against which it can define itself.
2 6 9,
Literally, in the arrangement of domestic space Baudrillard describes. In The System o f Objects. Baudrillard 
wUes of the "disappearance” of mirrors. “There is no place in the [post-bourgeois| functional ensemble for reflection 
lor '** own sake. The mirror still exists, but its place is in the bathroom, unframed. There, dedicated (o die fastidious
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distinction between themselves and it . In hyperreality - or “hype-reality” in Mark Downturn's 
excellent reformulation -  “reality” is constituted by mediamatic simulation machineries such as 
advertising. Ballard calls "J. Walter Thompson the world's largest advertising agency and its
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greatest producer of fiction." "We live in a world ruled by fictions of every kind." he elaborates in 
his 1995 Introduction to Crash. "- mass merchandising, advertising, politics conducted as a branch 
of advertising, the preempting of any original experience by the television screen."271 In these 
conditions ,as we have already seen, Ballard insists that "it is clear that Freud's classic distinction 
between the manifest and latent content of the inner world of the psyche now has to be applied to 
the outer world of reality. " (AE 111-112)
Borges’ works, of course, have often been taken to be the very epitome of postmodernism. In his 
essay on Crash, Baudrillard places Borges as “the first great novelist] of simulation.” |SS 119|), 
while in his Postmodernist Fiction, Brian McHale grants central importance to Borges’ techniques 
and thematics. According to McHale, modernist works were those with an “epistemological” 
dominant (concerned with such questions as: “How can I interpret this world of which I am a part?”) 
whilst postmodernist fictions are those with an “ontological” dominant (concerned with such
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questions as: “Which world is this?” ). Literature passes from a concern with unreliable narrators 
and partial perspectives, to a thematics that centres upon fiction itself and its ability to construct 
worlds: “What is a world? [...] What is the mode of existence of a text, and what is the mode of 
existence of the world (or worlds) it projects?” (PF 10) Whilst an author like Faulkner exemplified 
the first, "modernist” mode, McHale takes Borges to be a exemplary of the second, "postmodernist” *
Cllre of the appearances that social intercourse demands, it is liberated from the graces and glories of domestic 
subiectivity. By the same token other objects are in tum liberated from mirrors; hence, they are no longer tempted to 
«ist in a closed circuit with their own images.” (23) By the time of “The Ecstasy of Communication”, as we have 
already seen, television has assumed the role not of reflecUng a domestic scene but of circulating images of 
_»mesticity, which “real” life increasingly tends to copy (rather than the reverse)
* Ballard, "Fictions of Every Kind", Re/Search: J.G. Ballard, 99 
-71 Crash, London: Vintage, 1995, 4
These two questions were formulated not by McHale himself, but by Dick Higgins. McHale uses them as part of 
le ‘-Digraph to Postmodernist Fiction. 1
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approach, in particular because of his foregrounding of the problems (and paradoxes) of 
fictionalizing worlds. “The paradigm [...] is the fiction of Borges.” (PF 10)
The fiction McHale discusses is motivated by a crisis in representation, a recognition that literature 
in no way straightforwardly reflects the world; if literature is a mirror to the world, these texts insist, 
it is a misleading one, and many concentrate on showing ways in which fiction structures - and 
therefore, it is implied, distorts - the world. Crucial to McHale’s account is Douglas Hofstadter's 
pioneering work of theory-fiction, Godel, Escher, Bach : Hofstadter’s discussion of "nested" 
narrative structures is of particular importance.271 McHale’s analysis draws also upon, and parallels, 
Linda Hutcheon’s analyses of meta-fiction. Like Hutcheon, McHale describes texts seeking -  and 
inevitably failing -  to achieve what Douglas Hofstadter calls the condition of “self-transcendence” : 
the attempt to “jump out of oneself.” Self-transcendence, Hofstadter shows, is strictly impossible, in 
human beings as much as in computer programs. While both can cybernetically rcllcct on themselves 
tind their own behaviour, this is not to say, Hofstadter insists, that they can evade their own 
programming -  this is the “distinction between perceiving oneself and transcending oneself.” “A 
computer program can modify itself but it cannot violate its own instructions -  it can at best change 
sornc parts of itself by obeying its own instructions. This is reminiscent of the humorous paradoxical 
question, ‘Can God make a stone so heavy that he can lift it?’274 We might be reminded , again, of 
Weiner s reflections on this same problematic in God and Golem (see last chapter). The “problem” 
ll,r machinic xenogenesis we encountered in the previous chapter might be restated as: how to
Bui, as wc shall see below, what McHale leaves out of account is the importance of cybernetics in Hofstadter’s 
Hofsladler's delineation of particular ’-embedding” or implex structures is not simply a matter ol Ins 
Apologizing particular narrative structures (although this is one of its surplus values, reaped very successtully in 
McHale’s engaging study); it is also an attempt to demonstrate the properties of certain -  mathematical and 
computational -  systems. One of the great virtues of Hofstadter’s book is the way it consistently thinks against and 
across the two cultures split, paralleling mathematics with fiction and the study of artificial intelligence. This Iasi 
'heme -  perhaps the most important one in the book, necessarily doubling the closely related theme ol die nature ol 
consciousness -  indicates ways in which Godel. Escher, Bach is shadowed by Gothic Materialist concerns.
274 G°del. Escher, Bach, 478
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escape the box given the impossibility of (self)transcendence? Symbiosis and contagion, rather than 
meta-reflection, are the effective lines of flight, Deleuze-Guattari would insist.
In the texts McHale discusses, the attempt to gain self-transcendence often takes the form of a 
problematization of the role of authorship. No longer towering over the text, or lurking behind it. 
offstage, paring his fingernails like Joyce’s famous modernist creator-artist, the postmodernist 
author. McHale shows, enters into the text; or -  and this amounts to the same thing -  seeks to exit 
it. “Authors” become “characters” in their own texts. McHale, for instance, cites one Borges text in 
which “[t]he author [...] has ceased to believe in the reality of his own character, and his sustaining 
belief having broken down, the character and his world flicker [...] out of existence.” (PF 104) The 
figure of the mis-en-abyme recurs frequently; characters keep discovering “authors” who themselves 
become characters who in turn discover further “authors”.
As McHale establishes, one of the best examples of this procedure is provided by Beckett's The 
Unnanuible. ‘The Unnamable not only imagines characters, he also tries to imagine himself as the 
character of someone else. But who? First, he can only imagine an undifferentiated they, a chorus o f 
voices constituting the discourse that he transmits to us, and that makes them exist for us; but then 
he speculates that surely they, in their turn, must be determined by some being ontologically superior 
even to them, whom he calls the master; but surely, the master too, in his turn, must be determined 
by some still more superior being, some ‘everlasting third party.’” Each supplementary dimension 
the Unnamable adds automatically and instantaneously entails the production of a further dimension, 
which itself automatically and instantaneously entails the production of yet another dimension, etc. 
This "grotesque parody of St Anselm’s so-called ‘ontological argument’” establishes that “|t|here is
an absolute ontological ‘ceiling’ above the Unnamble’s head which retreats as he approaches it.” (PF 
13)
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It might be tempting to read such metafiction as an immanentization o f fiction, hut. as the meta- 
suggests, metafiction constitutes another case of imploded transcendence in which the book no 
longer reflects the world, but only because the world has been absorbed into it, meta-textualised. It 
belongs to a widespread tendency, or psychopathology, in postmodern culture that might be called 
Metanoia. Metanoia can be defined as the interminable process by which supplementary dimensions 
are continually being produced but are immediately and of necessity themselves obsolesced at the 
very moment of their production. Infinite regress stands in place of any definitively transcendent 
moment, the always-deferred “end” result of a process that is interminable, driven by the 
simultaneous need to hunt out of a final ontological baseline while at the same time continuously 
displacing it.
Like McHale and Hofstadter, Baudrillard is obsessed with such recursive processes. Indeed, perhaps 
his greatest value as a cultural observer Ls his identification of the way in which contemporary culture 
has become just such an enormous system of imploded self-reference. But where McHale remains 
interested almost solely in the literary aspects of this process, Baudrillard Ls immediately also drawn 
to consider its theoretical, biological and social aspects. Indeed, if cybernetic culture demands that 
the theoretical, the biological and the social be thought together, it is because it places everything 
under the sign of the fictional (which automatically and immediately changes the status of "fiction”.) 
By contrast, the problem with McHale’s in many ways exemplary textual analysis is precisely its 
(exclusivist) textualism, its concern with the putative relative autonomy of postmodernist fiction 
rather than with the relationship between fiction and postmodern culture (the great value of the 
Holstadter text upon which McHale depends so heavily, by contrast, is that it always insists on the 
crosshatching mesh of [hyperjrecursive processes as they crosshatch fiction, biotics, philosophy and 
numeric systems). Many of McHale’s privileged examples of postmodernist fiction - Coover, Barth
• construct, as McHale says, worlds of discourse; ultimately going so far as to construct the world
• itself) as - merely - discourse. Similarly, although McHale’s subsequent discussion of cyberpunk
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usefully describes ‘the  ever-tightening feedback loop between SF ‘genre’ fiction and state-of-the-art
275
mainstream fiction” , it remains textualist, never touching on what is the most important kind ol 
feedback: between the fictions and the reality that “surrounds” and ultimately smears into them. It is 
this feedback loop - between a reality whose tendency is to become-fiction and a fiction whose 
tendency is to become-real - that fascinates Baudrillard, a fascination which indicates that, despite a 
certain amount of crossover, there are important distinction between McHale’s theorizations of 
(postmodernist) fiction and Baudrillard’s. Baudrillard’s favoured examples of “the fiction of third 
order simulacra” - Dick and Ballard - feature in Postmodernist Fiction , but not necessarily always 
comfortably. Dick and Ballard’s ficto-schizophrenizations of reality are not solely or even primarily 
lextualist in nature - even if, particularly in the case o f Ballard’s The Atrocity Exhibition - they
276
involve substantia] textual innovation. Where McHale’s analyses revive what he calls, alter Barth, 
"the old analogy between the author and God”, The Atrocity Exhibition anonymises fiction- 
production through the use and simulation of “invisible literature” (the literary equivalent of found
, . 277
objects: manuals, advertising, etc.); as Baudrillard says, here “nothing [...) is ‘invented." 275
275 “poSTcyberMODERNpunklSM”, 124
TjfL
~ McHale's reading of Ballard, whilst not exactly inaccurate, is in fact peculiarly unpcrsuasive. For McHale,
Ballard's work can be seen as typical of the shift from modernist to postmodernist fiction, a shift exemplified, 
according to McHale, by the difference between Ballard's appropriation of Conrad’s "'modernist poetics'" in early 
novels such as The Drowned World and his later freeing up of “his ontological projections from their epistemological 
constraints’' in The Atrocity Exhibition. While The Atrocity Exnibition does indeed move beyond die “perspective” of 
a " single observer”, it is not clear that it does so in order to explore a “characteristically postmodernist ontological 
confrontation between the text and the world that it projects.” PF 69-70
Let s turn to a specific example from The Atrocity Exhibition to demonstrate this -  positive -  “lack ol invention”. 
Al the 19X0 Republican Convention in San Francisco, pranksters reproduced and distributed the section of The 
Atrocity Exhibition called “Why I want to Fuck Ronald Reagan”, without the title and adorned with the Republican 
i'iiriy seal. “I’m told,” Ballard reports, “that it was accepted for what it resembled, a psychological position paper on 
Bic candidate's subliminal appeal, commissioned from some maverick think tank.” (AEn 121) What does this neo- 
Oadaisl act of would-be subversion tell us? In one sense, it has to be hailed as the perfect act of subversion. But, 
'icwcd another way, it shows that subversion is impossible now. The fate of a whole tradition of ludic intervention - 
passing from the Dadaisls into the Surrealists and the Situalionisls - seems to hang in the balance. Where once the 
badaists and their inheritors could dream of invading the stage, disrupting what Burroughs - still very obviously a 
p.in o| thjs heritage - calls the “reality studio” with logic bombs, now there is no stage - no scene. Bnudnllard would 
■•ay - to invade. For two reasons: first, because the frontier zones of hypercapital do not try to repress so much as 
a sorb the irrational and the illogical, and, second, because the distinction between stage and offstage has been 
""perceded by a coolly inclusive loop of fiction: Reagan’s career outstrips any attempt to ludically lampixm it. and 
mnnstraies the increasingly pliability of the boundaries between the real and its simulations. For Baudrillard. the 
'cry attacks on “reality” mounted by groups such as the Surrealists function to keep the real alive (by providing it
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with a fabulous, dream world, ostensibly entirely alternative to but in effect dialectically complied with the everyday 
world of the real) . “Surrealism was still in solidarity with the real it contested, but which it doubled and ruptured in 
the imaginary” (SED 72) In conditions of third (and fourth-order) simulacra, the giddy vertigo of hyperreality 
banalizes a coolly hallucinogenic ambience, absorbing all reality into simulation. Fiction is everywhere - and 
therefore, in a certain sense, eliminated as a specific category. Where once Reagan's own role as actor-president 
seemed “novel" (AEn 119), his subsequent career, in which moments from film history become montaged - in 
Reagan’s own hazy memory and in media accounts - with Reagan's role in particular movies. The ludic becomes the 
ludicrous.
The apparent acceptance, by the Republican delegates, of the genuineness of the "Why I Waul to Fuck Ronald 
Reagan” text, is both shocking and oddly predictable, and both responses are in fact a testament to the power of 
Ballard's fictions, which resides no more in their ability to mimctically reflect a pre-existing social reality than il does 
hi dieir capacity to imaginatively overturn it. What Ballard achieves, rather, is what lam Hamilton-Grant calls 
"realism about the hyperreal", a homeopatic participation in the media-cybernelization of reality in late capitalism. 
The shock comes when we remind ourselves of (what would seem to be) the radical abhcrancc of Bullard's material. 
"Why 1 Want to Fuck Ronald Reagan”, like many of the sections of The Atrocity Exhibition, particularly hi the latter 
part of the novel, is presented as a report on experiments into audience responses to prepared media stimuli.
Ronald Reagan and the conceptual auto-disaster. Numerous studies have been conducted upon patients in 
terminal paresis (G.P.I.), placing Reagan in a scries of simulated auto-crashes, e.g. multiple pile-ups. head on 
collisions, motorcade attacks (fantasies of Presidential assassinations remained a continuing preoccupation, 
subjects showing a marked polymorphic fixation on windshields an rear-dunk assemblies). Powerful erotic 
fantasies of an anal-sadistic character surrounded the image of the Presidential contender. (AE 119)
But this shock is counterposed by a sense of predictability arising from the axil elegance of Ballard's simulations. The 
technical tone of Ballard's writing - its impersonality and lack of emotional inflection - perform the function of 
neutralizing or normalizing the ostensibly unacceptable material. Is this simulation of the operations of Hypercontrol 
agencies a satire on them, or do their activities - and the whole cultural scene of which they are a part - render satire 
as sucli impossible now? What, alter all, is the relationship between satire and simulation? To begin to answer that 
question we need to compare Ballard's text with other, more definitively “satirical" texts. Before that, though, we need 
to hear in mind Jameson's comments on the eclipse of parody by pastiche, which we shall examine, briefly, now.
Tins is not the place to interrogate the differences between parody and satire; we shall proceed on the assumption that, 
whatever differences there are between parody and satire, diey share enough in common so as to be jointly subject to 
Jameson’s analyses. Parody, Jameson argues, depended upon a whole set of resources available to modernism but 
which have faded now: the individual subject, whose “inimitable” idosyncratic style, Jameson wryly observes, could 
precisely gave rise to imitations; a strong historical sense, which has its necessary obverse a confidence that there is a 
genuinely contemporary means of expression; and a commitment to collective projects, which could motivate writing 
and give it a political purpose. As these disappear, Jameson suggests, so does the space of parody. Individual style 
gives way to a “field of stylistic and discursive heterogeneity without a norm” (PCLLC 17), just as the belief in 
progress and the faith that one could describe new times in new terms wanes, to be replaced by “the imitation of dead 
styles, speech through all the masks and voices stored up in the imaginary museums of a new global culture" (PCLLC' 
IX) Late capitalism's “postlitcracy”, meanwhile, points to “the absence of any great collective project" (PCLLC 17) 
What results, according to Jameson, is a depthlcss experience, in which llie past is everywhere at the same time as the 
historical sense fades; we have a “society bereft of all historicity” (PCLLC 18) dial is simultaneously unable lo present 
anything that is not a reheated version of the past. Pastiche displaces parody:
In this situation, parody finds itself without a vocation; it has lived, and that strange new thing pastiche 
comes to take its place. Pastiche is, like parody, the imitation of a peculiar or unique, idiosyncratic style, the 
wearing of a linguistic mask, speech in a dead language. But it is a neutral practice of such mimicry, 
widiout any of parcxly’s ulterior motives, amputated of the satiric impulse, devoid of laughter and of any 
conviction that alongside the abnormal tongue you have momentarily borrowed, some healthy linguistic 
normality still exists. Pastiche is thus blank parody, a statue with blind eyeballs (...) (PCLLC 17)
Respite what Jameson himself writes on Ballard, one of the important difference between the Ballard text and 
Pastiche as Jameson describes it is the absence of “nostalgia” or the “nostalgia mode” - an insistent presence in other 
Postmodernist science fiction texts, as Jameson shows- in Ballard's work. Indeed, Ballard's commitment to striking 
'extual innovations - as evidenced in the layout of the pages themselves in The Atrocity Exhibition - mark Inm as 
something of an anomaly in Jameson’s terms; in this sense, at least, Ballard seems lo be continuous with modernism
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Social S c ie n c e / S o c ia l S c ie n c e  F ic tio n  (H ow  th e  True W o rld  B eca m e a  S im u la tio n )
While McHale sees particular textual-authorial features expanding to displace representation. 
Baudrillard sees representation disrupted by the emergence of a (hyper)lictive plane in which theory 
Ls effaced by fiction (and vice versa). But this is precisely not a matter of the “textualization’' of
as Jameson understands it. Yet in certain other respects - specifically, in terms of the collapse of individual 
subjectivity and the failure of collective political action - Ballard is emblematic of Jameson's postmodernity. But. 
unlike Jameson's pastiche, Ballard does not imitate “a peculiar or unique idiosyncratic style." The style that Balkird 
simulates in “Why I Want to Fuck Ronald Reagan” - a style towards which the whole of The A tr o c i ty  E x h ib itio n  tends 
- is precisely lacking in any p e r s o n a l i t y ,  if there any idiosyncracies, they belong to the tehnical register of 
(pseudo)scienfitic reportage, not to the characteristics of an individual subject. The fact that the text concerns a 
political leader draws attention to the lack of any explicit - or, more importantly when discussing satire or pardody, 
implicit - political teleology in Ballard's writing. It is in this sense that “Why 1 Want to Fuck Ronald Reagan", like 
Jameson’s pastiche, is “without any of parody’s ulterior motives.”
Certainly, this is one way in which “Why I Want to Fuck Ronald Reagan” differs greatly from a classical work of 
satire such as Swift’s M o d e s t  P r o p o s a l.  A  M o d e s t P r o p o s a l  is a paradigmatic work of what Joyce called “kinetic” art, 
prtxluced in particular political and cultural circumstances with a particular aim. to sway an audience into action. 
Swift's political purpose - his disparaging of the cruelty of certain English responses to the Irish potato famine - is 
marked by a certain stylistic and thematic excess <an excess that famously bypassed altogether certain of Swift’s 
readers, who were able to take the text at face value), whereas Ballard’s text - which emerged, no less than Swift's. 
Irom a very particular sociocultural situation - can be defined by its Harness. This marks a move on, (even) from 
Burroughs. For all their linguistic inventiveness. Burroughs' humorous “routines” such as “The All-American 
Deanxielized Man" remain in a classical tradition of satire through their use of exaggeration and their clear political 
agenda: using a series of excessive tropes, Burroughs mocks the amoral mores of American technoscience. By 
contrast, what Ballard's text “lacks” is any clear designs on the reader, any of Jameson’s “ulterior motives”; the 
parixlic text always gave central importance to the parodist behind it, his implicit but flagged attitudes and opinions, 
but “Why I Want to Fuck Ronald Reagan” is as coldly anonymous as the texts it imitates. Whereas we hear 
Burtoughs’ cackling at the absurb excesses of the scientists in “The All-American Deanxietized Man", the response of 
Ballard to the scientists whose work he simulates is unreadable. What does “Ballard” want the reader to feel: disgust? 
amusement? It is unclear, and, as Baudrillard argues in relation to C r a s h , it is somewhat disingenuous ol Bullard the 
author to overcode his texts - in prefatory authorial remarks - with all the traditional baggage of “warning” that they 
themselves clearly elude. The mode Ballard adopts in “Why I Want to Fuck Ronald Reagan” is not that of (satirical) 
exaggeration, but is a kind of (simulated) extrapolation. The very genre of the poll or the survey, as Baudrilkird 
sliows, makes the question unanswerable, undecidable.
|?expjie what Ballard himself suggests, (see above), what matters is less the (possible) resemblance of “Why I Want to 
uck Ronald Reagan” to (possible) reports than the circulation of simulation to which such reports already contribute, 
thing on pastiche, Jameson comes upon the concept of simulation, but attributes it to Plato rather than referring - 
'ere at least - to Baudrillard's reinvention of it. (PCLLC 18) Yet Jameson's intuition about the relationship between 
Pastiche and simulation is important. We could perhaps suggest a correlation between Baudrillard's third order 
simulacra and Jameson’s pastiche, on the one hand, and Ballard’s text on the other. What simulation in Baudrillard's 
an -order sense entails is, as we have repeatedly insisted, the collapse of distance between the simulation and what is 
simulates. Satire, in its classical sense, we would probably want to locale as part of “First-order simulacra” - a
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reality; Baudrillard is fascinated with Ballard's Crash precisely because it lacks many of the features 
of traditional literature. As Baudrillard is quick to notice, in both the Ballard essay and his other 
essay on science fiction, the expansion of fiction into theory -  an inevitable consequence, he thinks, 
of the emergence of cybernetics -  has an ambivalent effect on theory. If theory can no longer be 
distinguished from fiction -  if fiction can perform theory and theory must perforce become fiction -  
then map and territory are indeed confused, but in a more complicated and interesting way than 
Borges’ story suggests.
Baudrillard was not the first to herald the new status of fiction. “We live science fiction,” McLuhan 
had pronounced the end of his 1964 essay on Burroughs (73), anticipating Donna Haraway’s often- 
cited claim that the difference between science and fiction is becoming an optical illusion and William 
Bogard’s description of his own work as a “social science fiction”* 278, by some two decades.279
simulation that resembles the original, but with certain tell-tale differences. Ballard simulates the simulation (the poll,
the survey).
278 Bogard, S im u la tion  o f  S u rv e illa n c e , 5-24
279 It might be worth a parenthetical note here making some attempt to unravel what's at stake in the emergence of 
die -  new? - mode, theory-fiction, particularly as undertaken by the theorist who has been most associated with this 
type of practice (Baudrillard). We can perhaps most profitably approach this problem by considering the conventional 
opposition between theory and fiction. Here, theory is on the side of the real and fiction is on the side of the 
imaginary. This is the opposition Douglas Kellner invokes -  or doggedly holds onto -  when he complains that “while 
Baudrillard's texts are arguably quite good science fiction, they are rather problematical as models of social Uieory” 
(Kellner 203); here it is assumed that the flip into a fictional mode automatically means the end of theory. But, if this 
lixi-quick opposition is inadequate, what could be meant by the fusion of fiction and Uieory? Two, inevitably 
interrelated, possibilities immediately suggest themselves:
1 Fiction as theory. This option further subdivides: (a) Fiction in the form of theory (fiction dial uses, or incorporates 
academic conventions: examples here include T. S. Eliot’s Th e W aste  L a n d  and Nabokov’s P a le  F ire ) , (b) Fiction 
performing as theory. This, potentially, could include any fiction offering theoretical resources of some kind.
- Theory as fiction. This is theory presented in the form of fiction. The most well-known exponents of this mode - 
Nietzsche, Kierkegaard -  are hardly new. At its most radical, what is at stake here is more Uian die disguise of theory 
as fiction, or fiction as theory, but a dissolution of the opposition itself. Two, related, claims, one descriptive, the other 
prescriptive emerge from this : (1) all theory is a lr e a d y  fiction; and, (2) theory should abandon its assumed position of 
iinjective neutrality”, and embrace its fictionality. But something happens to fiction here; it is no longer, simply, on 
the side of the imaginary.
lme sense, the rise of theory-fiction marks the end of literary criticism (and also, concomitantly, die end of 
literature" as its object). McLuhan’s essay on Burroughs had emerged in the context of his own drift from literary 
criticism towards fiction-theory, a process paralleled by Baudrillard’s passage from “Literary criticism to tiction- 
leory (6-25). Like McLuhan, “Baudrillard’s intellectual formation was decisively marked by literature, and it is no 
’“ dent that Baudrillard’s first essays were literary in the traditional sense.” (6) This trajectory is impelled, no doubt. 
111 cLuhan s case by his intuition that Literature could no longer be studied as a relative autonomy, simply because, 
u e era ol “electric participation” all disciplines -  and all fields -  tend to collapse. It is perhaps an understatement 
** <^ ane does, t*lat “Baudrillard’s challenge is as much to the mode of theorizing as to the substance." 
! e Gane, “Radical Theory: Baudrillard and Vulnerability”, T h eory , C u ltu re  & S o c ie ty ,  London, Thousand Oaks 
and New Delhi -  Sage, Vol 12 [1995], 120)
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The becoming-fiction of theory is necessarily accompanied by the becoming-real of fiction. All of 
which calls for some kind of account of what fiction is -  or could b e - i n  cybernetic culture. (One 
could argue that most of Baudrillard’s oeuvre is devoted to analyzing just this question). 
Provisionally, it is important to distinguish fiction from Literature, for two principal reasons. (1) 
Fiction does not come weighed down with the high cultural baggage that literature carries, and (2) 
fiction is not restricted to text- or even language-based cultural products. (Even a conventional 
definition of fiction, for instance, would include films).
Certainly, it is now no longer adequate to consider fiction to be on the side of the false2’1“ , the fake 
or the imaginary. It can be considered to belong to the artificial, once we understand (following the 
arguments we made in Chapter 1), that the Real, far from being opposed to the artificial, is 
composed of it. The problem with Baudrillard may be that, by emphasising the ‘‘imaginary” aspects 
of his ‘‘pataphysicaf’281 project, he too easily lets social-realist critics like Kellner off the hook, 
allowing them the opportunity to represent and -  perhaps ludicrously -  to posit themselves as 
intervening in a “social world” whose existence they continue to believe in. whilst he can be 
caricatured as striking the pose of a dandy-aesthete, withdrawing into a nihilistic and narcissistic 
irresponsibility But Baudriliard’s response tc Bogard's positing of a “social science-fiction” might 
he that it retains too conventional a picture (or at least remains content to merely blur, rather than 
shatter that picture) by assuming that either social science, science or be the social can be thought of 
as at any point in any way distinct from fiction Baudrillard’s most provocative challenge to social 
science concerns not only its claim to be a science, but. more radically perhaps, its claim to have a
SSIulu Baudrillard may not be as rabidly anti-theoretical as the Lyotard of Uhulinal Economy -  itself another work of 
theory-fiction -  he clearly has a somewhat ambivalent attitude to the practice. Naturally, this involves a change in the 
mode of lus own writing -  the move that happens between Symbolic Exchange and Death and Seduction -  from a still 
puialively academic social theory to a tally-fledged theory-fiction dial dispenses with the whole machinery ot scholarly 
•Wuraius (footnotes, reterences, etc).
- b Deleuze’s discussion of the “powers of die false” in Cinema 2 notwithstanding.
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legitimate object o f study: i.e. the social itself. One of Baudrillard’s points, of course, is that the 
social world does not exist apart from its simulation in social theory. For obvious reasons, this 
quickly spirals beyond the familiar social constructionist position it could appear to be. since the 
social is not what constructs, but what is constructed, or, as Baudrillard would prefer, simulated, by 
an intermeshing web of infosystems.282
According to Baudrillard, the socius, indeed, survives only as its own simulation through “fabulous 
fictions” (SED 66) . Baudrillard: “In every field we are tested, probed and sampled: the method is 
'tactical” and the sphere of communication “tactile”. Not to mention the ideology of “contact,” 
which, in all its forms, seeks to replace the idea of social relations. A whole strategic configuration 
revolves around the test (the question/answer cell) as it does around a molecular command-code.” 
(SED 64) This is not to suggest in any way a dematerialization of power, only that Social Control 
(control by the socius) has given way to normalization (or hypernormalization) in which such 
ostensibly participatory fictional processes as opinion polls and surveys play a crucial role. (For a 
preliminary discussion of this process, see “Cybernetics, Postmodernism, Fiction”, in Chapter 1, 
above.)
Bogard’s example of the production of profiles provides an excellent example of what is at issue 
here. As William Bogard expains: “A profile, as the name suggests, is a kind of prior ordering, in this 
case a model or figure that organizes multiple sources of information to scan for matching or 
exceptional cases [...] Unlike stereotypes, [...] profiles are not merely ‘false images” that arc used to 
justify differences in power. Diagnostic profiles exist rather at the intersection of ‘actual and virtual 
worlds, and come to have more ‘reality,’ more ‘truth and significance,’ than the cases to which they 
are compared. Rather than the profiles resembling the cases, increasingly the cases start to resemble
-SI Baudrillard’s revival of Jarry’s pataphysics -  the science of imaginary solutions -  is a constant preoccupation in
Baudrillard’s work.
-S2 See Baudrillard’s famous theses on "the end of the social” in In th e  S h a d o w  o f  th e  S ilen t M a jo r i t ie s .
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the profiles,”283 The profile is a prophecy which fulfills itself or, at least, makes any claim about its 
"accurate” representation of reality undecidable. Since being profiled automatically makes you 
targeted - by advertisers, the police etc - it is impossible to decide whether the profile solicits 
behaviour or anticipates it (it precisely puts just this distinction in question). For Bogard. the 
emergence of such processes indicates a move form control to hypercontrol. Hypercontrol differs 
from Control primarily through the temporality in (and through) which it operates. In Baudrillard’s 
terms, “social control by means of the end [...] is replaced by means of prediction, simulation, 
programmed anticipation and indeterminate mutation, all governed, however, by the code.” (SED 
60) DNA and “molecular cybernetics” provide the ominous model for total bio-cybernetic control 
by “stimulated, simulated and anticipated response” (SED 67): get to the code and you run 
everything. Cybernetics had always been about anticipation; in order to hit a moving target, the anti­
aircraft weaponry Wiener had worked on needed to predict not where the target was at the point 
when the missile was launched, but where its would be at the point of impact. Hence the slogan of 
Control is, “Don’t strike where your enemy is, strike where it will be.” Hypcrcontrol lends towards 
the production of even tighter feedback loops; its slogan, then, would be “Never strike where your 
enemy will be, kill its parents.”284 Cybernetic anticipation is always double-edged; suggesting not 
only prediction, but determination: “self-fulfilling prophecy” (SED 67), as Baudrillard has it. Yet 
this process itself makes prophecy moot, precisely because it makes any effective delineation of 
causal determination impossible: “the whole traditional world of causality” with its “distinction 
between cause and effect, between active and passive, between subject and object, between the ends 
and the means” (SS 31) has been superceded by a logic of “code.” White magical capture28'  : to be
Bogard, 27 (italics added)
-M lain Hamilton Grant, “Burning Autopoiedipus”, Abstract Culture 10,(winterlV97), 8
The reference to magic here is far from glib. In fact, it returns us to Weiner’s comments on the complicity of 
Magical process with cybernetics, cited in the previous chapter. Self-fulfilling prophecy is a particularly powerful type 
" capture-magic. Consider the example of someone who is told, at a seance, let’s say, dial they are going to die in the 
acxi year. They do in fact die, from what appear to be accidental causes. Has their death been prophesied - or has the 
ptnphecy itself affected them - perhaps subtly, at an unconscious level - so that their behaviour has made them more 
^  y J® Jle ’ h’s undecidablc, as Baudrillard would say. Once the loop is closed, we can never know. The prophecy,
! c the opinion poll, is not causally innocent: it combines anticipation with determination in such a way as to make 
11 < istinction between the two impossible to make.
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in the system is already to be processed by it. Baudrillard’s example of this is the opinion poll. The 
question that concerned opinion in the “political class” worries about - do polls affect voting 
behaviour? - is unanswerable. “Polls manipulate the unde ridable. Do they affect votes? True of 
false? Do they yield exact photographs of reality, or of mere tendencies, or a refraction of this reality 
in a hyperspace of simulation whose curvature we do not know? True or false? Undecidable.” (SED 
66)286 Code’s logic as Baudrillard delineates it is not describable in terms of cause-preceding-effect: 
rather, its logic is one, to speak like Deleuze, of expression287 , in which each “effect” expresses - 
unfolds - a “cause” from which it is never really distinct, temporally or ontologically. Is DNA the 
cause of an organism? It is both more and less.288
The D eclin e  o f  th e  S h a d o w  (or, th e  E n d  o f  th e  M a rv e lo u s )
Jameson: “Now not the magical speaking beasts or the ‘flowers that look back at you. ' but the 
marching automata o f Blade Runner’s last cavernous private appartment
But the only type of true prophecy that is not -  to some extent -  self-fulfilling would be one wholly independent of the 
event which it is prophesying. Otherwise, there is always the possibility that the prophecy plays a part in inducing 
what it foretells. This is a theme well-enough known in Literature, and is a commonplace of tragedy. Neither Oedipus 
nor Macbeth would suffer the fates they encounter were it not for prophecy. Oedipus' fate is particularly ironic in that 
it is his parents' very attempt to avoid the prophesied events that ultimately brings them about: had they cast him out 
as a child. Oedipus would recognize his father and mother (and not kill the former or marry die latter). Baudrillard 
lias his own version of this “fatal” narrative: the tale of “Death in Samarkand”, recounted in Seduction. “Consider the 
story of the soldier who meets death in the marketplace, and believes he saw his making a menacing gesture in his 
direction. He rushes to the king's palace and asks the king for his best horse in order that he might tlee far into the 
night from Death, as far as Samarkand. Upon which the king summons Death to the palace and reproaches him for 
having frightened one of his best servants. But Death, astonished, replies T didn't mean to frighten him. It was just 
that I was surprised to see this soldier here, when we had a rendez-vous tomorrow in Samarkand." (S 72)
2X6 In part, Baudrillard is merely re-stating the uncertainty principle, but with a particular -  cybernetic -  emphasis on 
teedhack. To observe anything is to affect it: “It is not even certain that we can test plants, animals or inert matter 
with any hope of an ‘objective’ response.” (SED 67) For Baudrillard, though, this already radically undermines not 
only any hope of “objectively” observing anything, but also any ability to delineate cause-and-effect structures. How 
do we know we’ve not entered the kxrp? And it is the cybernetic figure of the lixip - what Baudrillard calls "a coding a 
decoding strip, magnetized by signs” (SED 75) - complete unto itself, cycling around in its own orbit, that is implicit 
in Baudrillard's formulations of bio-cybemetic control.
2X7 For expression, see Deleuze, Expressionism and Philosophy. Spinoza is the subject of this study, but Deleuze also 
discusses Leibniz; Baudrillard cites “Leibniz’s binary deity” as the “precursor” of axle (SED 4, 57, 59).
2XX One could say that, where Control targets the future, Hyperconlrol targets the future by altering (what will have 
Been) its past, except that, by now, the “past”, like every other marker of sequential time, has been liquidated by the 
system's “retroeugenics” . There is only the time of the system: “Finality is no longer at the end, there is no more 
finality, nor any determinacy. Finality is there in advance, inscribed in the code.” (SED 59)
-X9 Jameson, Geopolitical Aesthetic, 12
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For Baudriilard, the arrival of cybernetic modeling systems entails the destruction o f  the category of 
ihe marvelous: the former province of myth, occupied last of all, perhaps, by Surrealism (which was 
rlrcady contributing to its destruction). The melancholy underside to the story we’ve just outlined is 
the takeover, by hyperreality, of everything surreal, or irreal. In one sense, the hyperreal. for 
Baudriilard, marks less the decline of the Real than the swallowing of all alternatives to it. 
Hyperreality -  the more real than the real - is a cancerization of the Real, its metastatic occupation 
uf the zones which used to double reality (shadow, dream, and myth); for Baudrillard. the decline of 
the marvelous is signalled by what he repeatedly chacterizcs as the disappearance o f  the shadow and 
the double, and their replacement by the cybernetic network. But it is important to understand that 
the cancerization of the Real is -  immediately -  also a cancerization of the fictional; the two 
processes require one another. Only when there is only fiction (and therefore no more fiction) and 
only the real (and therefore no more reality) does hyperreality begin.
It is interesting to compare Baudrillard’s position in Symbolic E xchange and Death, especially as 
outlined in the important section of the “Political Economy and Death” chapter entitled ‘The Double 
and the Split” with Rosemary Jackson’s literary-historical analysis of the modern fantastic in her 
Fantasy: the Literature o f Subversion. This brings us back to the question of the nature of the 
demonie, since, for Jackson, ‘The modern fantastic is characterized by a radical shift in the naming, 
o r interpretation of the demonic.” (F 43) In her account of the fantastic, Jackson draws upon 
fodorov’s influential The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre. Mere, Todorov 
famously distinguishes between the marvelous, the fantastic and the uncanny. As Jackson explains, 
m Todorov’s diagrammatic representation of the changing forms of the fantastic” there is a “move 
fro m  the marvelous (which predominates in a climate of belief in supcrnaturalism and magic) through 
flie purely lantastic (in which no explanation is to be found) to the uncanny (which explains all 
strangeness as generated by unconscious forces). Thus;
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MARVELOUS FANTASTIC UNCANNY
Supernatural Unnatural Natural (F 25)
For Todorov, the fantastic is defined by an anxiety on the part of the reader and the characters, 
which takes the form of a hesitation between explanations in terms of the supernatural and the 
natural. “According to Todorov, the purely fantastic text establishes absolute hesitation in the 
protagonist and reader; they can neither come to terms with the unfamiliar events described, nor 
dismiss them as supernatural phenomena. Anxiety, then, is not merely a thematic feature, but is 
incorporated into the structure of the work to become its defining element.” (F 28) Arguing that the 
"uncanny” is not a specifically literary mode, Jackson replaces it with the “mimetic”, ultimately 
placing her version of the fantastic “between the opposite modes of the marvelous and the mimetic.” 
(F 32)
"It is hardly surprising,” Jackson notes, “that the fantastic comes into its own in the nineteenth 
century, at precisely that juncture when a supernatural ‘economy’ of ideas was giving way to a 
natural one, but had not yet been completely displaced by it.” (F 25) So, where once “|t|h e  term 
demonic originally denoted a supernatural being, a ghost, or spirit, or genius, or devil and it usually 
connoted a malignant, destructive force at work” (F 54) .Jackson shows that during the course of 
the nineteenth century the demonic comes to stand for something internal to the subject; she 
describes a move from “a supernatural to a natural economy of images”, with the “natural” 
understood largely in terms of psychology interiority. “Over the course of the nineteenth century, 
tantasies structured around dualism - often variations of the Faust myth - reveal the internal origin 
ol the other.” (F 55) Here, in a simultaneous domestication of both the demonic and the 
unconscious, the “demonic” is no longer “supernatural, but is an aspect of personal and 
interpersonal life, a manifestation of unconscious desire.” (F 55)
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In a sense, Baudrillard accepts Jackson’s whole story, but, predictably, gives it a melancholy spin, 
whilst adding a biting cultural political critique. In Baudrillard’s terms, the narrative which places 
psychological interiority at the endpoint o f a disenchanted history is by no means innocent: it is part 
of a process by which modem western culture defines itself as the inevitable teleological destination 
of planetary process, appropriating “previous” cultures as its forebears. The destruction of the 
double goes hand in hand with the production of the (Christian) soul (the ultimate achievement of a 
"spiritualist” project). For Baudrillard, the rise of “psychological and pyschoanalytic interpretation" 
(SED 140) as the authorized forms of capitalist realism bring an end to “the primitive double.” (SED 
140) “Shadow, spectre, reflection, image” (SED 140), the primitive double haunts post- 
monotheistic, psychoanalytic culture, which appropriates it as a “crude préfiguration of the soul” 
(SED 140). Yet “soul and consciousness have everything to do with a principle of the subject's 
unification, and nothing to do with the primitive double. On the contrary, the historical advent of the 
soul’ puts an end to a proliferating exchange with spirits and doubles which, as a direct 
consequence, gives rise to another figure of the double, wending its way beneath the surfaces of 
western reason.” (SED 141) This - modem, western - double is inextricably connected with 
alienation; it is the double as the lost part of the self, “a fantastic ectoplasm, an archaic resurgence 
issuing from guilt and the depths of the unconscious.” (SED 141) The primitive double, however, is 
radically non-alienated because it “is a partner with whom the primitive has a personal and concrete 
relationship, sometimes happy and sometimes not.” (SED 141) Whereas the westerner always 
apprehends his double as the missing half o f a fragmented unity, the primitive has a reciprocal, non- 
symmetrical relationship with his double. The primitive “really can trade, as we are forever forbidden 
10 d°, with his shadow (the real shadow, not a metaphor), as with some original, living thing in order 
h> converse, protect and conciliate this tutelary or hostile shadow. The shadow is precisely not the 
reflection of an ‘original’ body, it has a full part to play, and it is consequently not an ‘alienated’ part 
1,1 l*le subject, but one of the figures of exchange.” (SED 141) Alienation, Baudrillard says, only
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comes into play when there is an internalization of an “abstract agency [...] - whether psychological 
(the ego and the ego-ideal), religious (God or the soul) or moral (conscience and the law) to which 
everything else is subordinated.” (SED 141) Once the introjection of these agencies is achieved, the 
double ceases to be an ambivalent figure and becomes associated (only) with death and madness, as 
Baudrillard establishes by reference to a whole tradition of horrific literature:
With the internalization of the soul and consciousness (the principle of identity and 
equivalence), the subject undergoes a real confinement, similar to the confinement of the mad 
in the seventeenth century described by Foucault. It is at this point that the primitive thought 
of the double as exchange and continuity is lost, and the haunting double comes to the fore as 
the subject’s discontinuity in death and madness. ‘Whoever sees his devil, sees his death". A 
vengeful and vampiric double, an unquiet soul, the double begins to prefigure the subject’s 
death, haunting him in the very midst of his life. This is Dostoevsky’s double, or Peter 
Schlemihl’s, the man who lost his shadow. We have always interpreted the double as a 
metaphor of the soul, consciousness, native soil, and so on. Without this incurable idealism 
and without being taken as a metaphor, the narrative is so much more extraordinary. We 
have all lost our real shadows, we no longer speak to them, and our bodies have left with 
them. (SED 142)
Baudrillard then turns to Freud specifically, and to his treatment of the double in his essay “Das 
Unheimliche” (‘The Uncanny”). The double features in Freud only as a kind of extension of the ego. 
Freud refers to Rank’s work, in which the double was “originally an insurance against the 
destruction of the ego, an ‘energetic denial of the power of death’”(PFL 14 356) As Baudrillard 
insists, Freud reads the double in terms of the soul: “probably the ‘immortal’ soul was the first 
double’ of the body” (PFL 356) Thoughts of the double, Freud speculates, must “have sprung from 
the soil of unbounded self-love, from the primary narcissism which dominates the mind of the child 
and primitive man.” (PFL 357)
C rucially, for Baudrillard, and for Rosemary Jackson, in ‘The Uncanny” (1919), Freud revives the 
correlation of “the old, animistic conception of the universe” (PFL 14 362) with the “omnipotence of 
thoughts’ (PFL 14 362) he had made in the earlier Totem and Taboo (1913). ‘The Uncanny” is - 
suPposedly - Freud’s attempt to give an account of a very particular feeling of “dread and horror”
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(PFL 14 339) ; although Gothic Materialism would prefer to regard the essay as an attempt to keep 
at bay - by means of subjectivization - exactly the dread and horror it affects to confront. Beginning 
with an inventory of usages of the terms, Freud famously shows that the meaning of the words 
unheimliche (unhomely) and its ostensible opposite heimlich (homely) continually bleed into one 
another: “among its different shades of meaning the word ‘heimlich' exhibits one which is identical 
with its opposite, unheimlich." (PFL 14 345) For Freud, the feeling of the uncanny arises from this 
disturbing combination of the strange and the familiar. First of all, referring to a certain "authority" 
on the uncanny, Jentsch, Freud dismisses the idea that the uncanny is directly connected with 
“’doubts whether an apparently animate being is really alive; or conversely, whether a lifeless object 
might not in fact be animate’” (Jentsch, qtd PFL 14 347) This feeling of intellectual "uncertainty”, 
Freud says, is not a feature of the uncanny as he understands it. Whilst the theme of the animate doll 
is, Freud notes, a factor in Hoffmann’s short story ‘The Sandman”, a story he takes to be exemplary 
of the uncanny, it is not its main theme; this, rather, is that of the sandman who threatens to tear out 
children’s eyes. Passing through the “substitutive relation between the eye and the male organ” (PFL 
14 352) Freud quickly decides that ‘The Sandman” is really about a fear of castration. Feelings of 
the “uncanny” can always be traced back to such repressed childhood experiences; "the uncanny is in 
reality nothing new or alien, but something familiar and old-established in the mind.” (PFL 14 363) 
The idea of dolls coming to life, a theme which, having apparently dismissed, Freud returns to, 
suggests another “factor from childhood” (PFL 14 355), although this seems to be attributable to 
intantile wish rather than to infantile fear. “We remember that in their early games children do not 
distinguish at all sharply between living and inanimate objects, and that they are especially fond of 
treating their dolls like live people.” (PFL 14 355)
Animistic” beliefs, for Freud, are to be regarded as belonging to the most primitive part of the mind, 
an ontogenetic equivalent of the phylogenetic stage of the “savage”. In Rosemary Jackson's 
reconstruction;
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Phylogenetic evolution Ontogenetic evolution
1 ANIMISTIC
Men ascribe omnipotence to
themselves.
NARCISSISM/
AUTO-EROTICISM
2 RELIGIOUS 
Power is transferred to gods, 
the individual believes he 
has some influence with them.
ATTACHMENT TO LOVE 
OBJECT
3 SCIENTIFIC
Leaves no room for human
ABANDONMENT TO 
REALITY PRINCIPLE
omnipotence. The subject becomes 
resigned to the laws of necessity, 
and the inevitability of death. (F 71)
Baudrillard cleverly turns these arguments against Freud. ‘This is how psychology, our authority in 
the depths, our own ‘next world’, this omnipotence, magical narcissism, fear of the dead, this 
animism or primitive psychical apparatus, is quietly palmed off on the savages in order then to 
recuperate them for ourselves as ‘archaic traces,”, Baudrillard fulminates. But Baudrillard shows -  
rather elegantly -  how it is Freud himself (and the “psychologistic culture” of which he stands as 
representative) which is guilty of projecting its own interior states onto the “savages.” The thesis of 
the “omnipotence of thoughts” applies less to primitive culture than to a modern -  and postmodern -  
culture which insists on the category of the “psychological” as a cross-cultural universal. "Freud 
does not think this is what he said in speaking of ‘narcissitic overvaluation o f ... mental processes’. If 
there is such an overvaluation of one’s own mental processes (to the point of exporting this theory, 
as we have done with our morality and techniques, to the core of every culture), then it is Freud’s 
overvaluation, along with our whole psychologistic culture.” (SED 143)
Freud’s dismissal of the double -  or, what amounts to the same thing, his psycho-reductive account 
»1 it -  constitutes a contribution to a “spiritual” project through which all previous cultures are 
absorbed and transformed into precursors, “archaic traces.” Freud’s supposedly atheistic 
Psychoanalysis is, for Baudrillard, actually continuous with a Christian westernization (whose moves
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it recapitulates, but even more successfully).‘This is what kills off the proliferation of doubles and 
spirits, consigning them once again to the spectral, embryonic corridors of unconscious folklore, like 
the ancient gods that Christianity vertefeult, that is, transformed into demons.” (S E D  142) This 
process of transformation is completed by Freud -  and Rank’s -  psychologization of the double. "By 
a final ruse of spirituality, this internalisation also psychologises doubles,” Baudrillard complains. "In 
fact, it is interpretation in terms of an archaic psychical apparatus that it is the very last form of the 
Verteufeleung, the demonic corruption and elimination of the primitive double.” (SED  142): '" But it 
may well be that children and “savages” have the last laugh.
\fachinism and Animism (or, Gremlins in the Hyperreal)
Gibson: “The new jockeys, they make deals with things . . . ” (CZ IM )
r
Gibson: "But did it wake, Kumiko wondered, when the alley was empty ? Did its loser vision scan
the silent fa ll o f midnight snow'/'' (MLO 174)
Kant: “[MJoral teleology compensates fo r  physical teleology and fo r  the firs t time supplies a basis 
for theology. For physical teleology on its own [ could not provide a basis for anything but a
demonology. ”*w
But if Baudrillard’s simulated history culminates here -  in the triumph of a code that can only be 
subverted by its own drive to perfectibility292 -  Gibson and Dcleuze-Guattari seem to open another 
set of possibilities for the connections between the demonic and the cybernetic. In contrast with 2901
290 Note Freud’s own reduction of the demon to the father figure in his “A Seventeenth Century Demonological 
Neurosis." Here Freud also discusses the process of verteu feu ll Baudrillard describes (the transformation ol gods into 
demons). "Concerning the Evil Demon, we know that he is regarded as the antithesis of God and yet is very close to 
lum in nature. His history has not yet been as well studied as that of God; not all religions have adopted the Evil 
Spirit, the opponent of God, and his prototype in the life of the individual has so far remained obscure. One thing, 
however, is certain: gods can tum into evil demons when new gods oust them. When one people has been conquered 
by another, their fallen gods not seldom lum into demons in the eyes of the conqueror. (...)
The contradictions in the original nature of God are [...] a reflection of the ambivalence which governs the relation ol 
the individual to his personal father. If the benevolent and righteous God is a substitute for the father, it is not to be 
wondered at that his hostile attitude to his father, too, which is one of hating and fearing him and of making 
complaints against him, should have come to expression in the form of Satan.” (Freud, "The Devil as Father- 
Substitute” in “A Seventeenth Century Demonological Neurosis”, 4(X)-401)
291 Kant, The C ritique o f  Judgem en t, trans. Werner S. Pluhar, Indianapolis: Ffacketl, 1987,
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Baudrillard’s cybernetics of control, the convergence of voodoo with cybernetics presents a 
vindication of the views of Freud’s children and "savages” -  a counter-narrative to Baudrillard s 
vision of cybernetic hyperrationalization which unsettles stable, linear temporalities by uncovering 
strange coincidences between the deeply archaic and the most gleamingly hypermodern.
At first sight, the Gothic elements in Gibson could appear to be merely vestigial, superstitions 
whose carry over into terminal culture is motivated by a psychological need to populate the 
Godless regions of cyberspace with familiar belief structures. This, indeed, is how one of the 
characters rationalizes it. ‘There’s a whole new apocrypha out there, really - ghost ships, lost cities 
[...] There’s a pathos to it, when you think about it. I mean, every bit of it’s locked into orbit. All of 
it manmade, known, own, mapped. Like watching myths take root in a parking lot. But I suppose 
people need that, don’t they?”’ (MLO 111) To the extent that this is true, Gibson would appear to 
he complied with a Weberian narrative of rationalization - what Weber, after Schiller, called "the 
disenchantment of the world”, a process characterized in part by the disappearance of the 
supernatural. This, in effect, is the narrative Baudrillard accepts: cybernetic control by the Code 
constitutes the final triumph of a post-Protestant culture which has stripped the world of its gods. 2‘”
Gibson himself is equivocal. His own theologizations (or demonizations) of cyberspace hesitate 
between a vision of technotheotelcogical transcendence, in which the Matrix -  as late-arriving 
cybernetic godhead” (MLO 238) redeems a human history it effectively culminates, and a Deleuzc- 
Guattari picture of a dehumanized cyberspace peopled by roaming intelligences. The following 
passage -  from Mona Lisa Overdrive -  summarises the two positions:
“The folklore of console jockeys, Continuity. What do you know about that?’ | ... |
^  l,irmiJla Baudrillard plays out perhaps most exhaustively in The Transparency o f Evil.
- 1 Since, from his point of view, the whole contemporary scene is complied with this dreary scenario,. Baudrillard's 
vsupe is into the past: he scans the cybernetic iron cage from the perspective of a simulated primitive gaze. It is this
-  enabling him to contrast the cold circuits of cyfoerculture with the frenzied rites of symbolic exchange -  that 
Sives a purchase to his critique.
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‘What would you like to know, Angie?’
‘ “When it Changed”
‘The mythform is usually encountered in one of two modes. One mode assumes that 
the cyberspace matrix is inhabited, or perhaps visited, by entities whose characteristics 
correspond with the primary mythform of a “higher people”. The other involves assumptions 
of omniscience, omnipotence and incomprehensibility on the part of the matrix itself.’
‘That the matrix is God?’
‘In a manner of speaking, although it would be more accurate, in terms of the 
mythform, to say that the matrix has a God, since this being’s omniscience and omnipotence 
are assumed to be limited to the matrix.’
‘If it has limits, it isn’t omnipotent.’
‘Exactly.’ [...]
‘How about the stories about - ‘, she hesitated, having almost said the loa, ‘about 
things in the matrix, how do they fit into this supreme being idea. ’
‘They don’t. Both are variants of ‘When it Changed’. Both are of very recent 
origin.’” (MLO 138-9)
The discussion is somewhat reminiscent of the theo-cybemetic debates in Wiener’s God and Golem, 
although -  in line with a certain cyber-transcendence -  Gibson plays with a possibility that is almost 
the reverse of the one Wiener entertained. As we saw in the last chapter, Wiener wondered what 
limits there were to the escape of machinic intelligence once the “dogmas” of omnipotence and 
omniscience are abandoned; Gibson, meanwhile (or his more mystico-transcendently-oriented 
characters), imagines “omniscience, omnipotence and incomprehensibility” emerging, as side-effects 
of the production of cyberspace. Against this picture of emergent oneness, the “stories about things 
in the matrix” posit the fragmentation of the Matrix into entities, paralleled -  or identified -  with the 
loa of Haitian voodoo. The crucial moment (retrospectively accorded mythic status) is the end of 
Neuromancer, when Wintermute and Neuromancer fuse into a Matrix which is itself 
metamorphosed: When it changed. On the one hand, what it changes into seems to be a familiar 
image of Science Fictional transcendence -  achieved sentience as the Mind of God ; on the other, 
'shat it changes into it is a properly cyberpunk -  and Gothic Materialist -  vision of teeming 
multiplicity (“things in the matrix”); Pandemonium (all the demons, and demons everywhere).2 '4
ln a sense, the opposition itself presupposes a set of monotheistic assumptions, whereby singularity and 
u plicity are necessarily thought of as contradictory; whereas what voodoo -  which does not oppose, so much as
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The cybernetic lexicon has shown a remarkable predilection for invoking the word “demon". For 
obvious reasons: cybernetic systems simulate conscious function without possessing it. The term 
"demonic” suggests both this possibility of agency-without-subjectivity and hints at the power of 
metamorphic becoming proper to entities of simulation. Wiener’s writings are replete with warnings 
about the “demonic” and “devilish” power of such cybernetic systems. Fearing that “the machine like 
the djinee, which can learn and make decisions on the basis of its learning, will in no way be obliged 
to make such decisions as we should have made, or will be acceptable to us” (HUF1B 1X5) Wiener 
refers to a “demoniac sanction” (F1UHB 130), and a “devilment” that scientists -  "apprentice 
sorcerers” - “are unable to stop.” (F1UHB 130) 295
From its very beginnings, the modem(ist) science of cybernetics was haunted by the resurgence of 
belief structures which, in Freud’s terms, would have to be considered vestiges from the most 
archaic parts o f the mind: beliefs he characterised as “animistic”. According to Wiener, when 
confronted with cybernetic machines, human beings found themselves behaving as if the systems 
possessed agency. Since the systems cybernetics produced behaved at least quasi-autonomously, 
they naturally gave rise to the belief in non-human (and non-subjective) agencies, as Wiener explains 
by reference to aircraft crews’ interaction with airplanes which used self-corrective cybernetic 
circuits: ‘The semi-humorous superstition of the gremlin among the aviators was probably due, as 
much as anything else, to the habit of dealing with a machine with a large number of built-in 
teedbacks which might be interpreted as friendly or hostile. For example the wings of an airplane are 
deliberately built in such a manner as to stabilize the plane, and their stabilization, which is of the 
nature of feedback [...] may easily be felt as a personality to be antagonized when the plane is forced
'. ** Christianity -  has in common with Deleuze-Gualtari is an intuition that singularity (which is not unity) is not
' | lerent Irom multiplicity (which is not an aggregation of unities)
~i . a*so positing of the “Maxwell Demon” which Cybernetics was keen to refute. (HUHB 28-30) Wiener also 
,UI d'Hinction between two types of “devil” the scientist is “fighting”: the "Augustinian" and the “Manichean". 
'nUHB, 34-35, 190).
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into unusual maneuvers.” Dealing with the cybernetic systems of these aircratt presented the 
aviators with many of the same -  perceptual -  clues as would interaction with another conscious 
being. Therefore, it was inevitable that they would posit another entity, rather than a technical 
system, when they were working in -  or, more properly perhaps, with -  the airplane. "Our 
consciousness of will in another person, Wiener argued, is just that sense of encountering a sell- 
maintaining mechanism aiding or opposing our actions. By providing such a self-stabilizing
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resistance, the airplane acts as if it had purpose, in short, as if it were inhabited by a gremlin.”
At the other end of cybernetic era, in Gibson’s near future, we find a Japanese businessman 
explaining to his daughter why personality-construct “cubes” are not “souls”. “(H)e’d explained that 
the cubes housed the recorded personalities of former executives, corporate directors. Their souls, 
she asked. No, he’d said. And smiled, then added that the distinction was a subtle one. ‘They are not 
conscious. They respond, when questioned, in a manner approximating the response of the subject. 
If they are ghosts, then holograms are ghosts.” (MLO 174) Given what Wiener has implied, the girl 
Kumiko’s confusion is a response more true to the complexities of cybernetics response than Is her 
lather’s confidence. One corollary of what Wiener says in connection with the aircraft gremlins is 
that the positing of personality (and of conscious mental process) is a side-effect of the perception of 
purposive function, which can now -  as one of the first principles of cybernetics insists -  be 
technicized. At any rate, Gibson is well aware that the development of cybernetic machines produces 
increasingly anomalous systems that suggest -  at the very least -  that the distinction between living 
and nonliving, between thing and entity, is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain.
296
1 Wiener, “Operationalism - Old and New” (1945), box 11, folder 570, Norbert Wiener Papers, collection MC-22, 
■istitute Archives and Special Collection, Massachussets Institute of Technology Archives, Cambridge. Mass., quoted 
" ^ cter Gallsion, ‘The Ontology of the Enemy: Norbert Wiener and the Cybernetic Vision”, 246
Gallison, 246. Gibson amusingly updates this in M o n a  Lisa O verd rive , by having a whole house -  Continuity -  
'".‘coming an interactive presence.
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Hence the return of animism, which can closely be paralleled with demonism. Which brings us back 
to the children Sherry Turkle discusses in her Life on the Screen, whom we encountered long ago (in 
our Introduction). Like Gibson’s Kumiko, these children -  confronted with cybernetic systems 
capable, of course, of an infinitely more subtle variety of responses and interactions than were the 
primitive aviation systems the wartime airmen encountered -  offer a complex account of their 
engagement with machines that defies many of the old ontological assumptions.
But we need to consider more carefully what is at stake in animist belief system, in part because 
Deleuze-Guattari make a point of distinguishing their machinism from animism. Significantly, this 
distinction is advanced during the course of a discussion of children. “Children are Spinozists,” (TP 
256) Delcuze-Guattari declare. “It has been noted that for children an organ has a ‘thousand 
vicissitudes,’ that it is ‘difficult to localize, difficult to identity, it is in turn a bone, an engine, 
excrement, the baby, a hand, daddy’s heart...’ This is not at all because the organ is experienced as a 
part-object. It is because the organ is exactly what its elements make it according to their relation of 
movement and rest, and the way in which this relation combines with or splits off from that of its 
neighbouring elements. This is not animism, any more than it is mechanism; rather, it is universal 
machinism: a plane of consistency occupied by an immense abstract machine occupied by an infinite 
number of assemblages.” (TP 256; emphasis added) This passage is implicitly aimed against Freud 
(whose Little Hans they discuss in the sentences immediately preceding it); the distinction of 
machinism and animism is no doubt impelled by a desire to separate their position from Freud's in 
Totem and Taboo” and ‘The Uncanny.” But is it possible to find a version of animism compatible 
with Deleuze-Guattari’s machinism?
187
One way of cashing out what Deleuze-Guattari’s say about machinism is in terms of a dissolution of 
an ontology of objects.298 What they emphasise is the irreducibility of dynamical process. It is not as 
if there are “objects” subject to (Spinozist) speeds and slownesses; there is only a continuum of 
speeds and slownesses (which are “then” apprehended as objects -  by subjects). The same “object” 
can be part of an infinity of different machines.
Conventionally understood, animism could be seen as the complement to Freudian explanation. 
Here, the natural world -  and, presumably, the world of cultural production - is treated as if it 
possessed the same features of intentionality which are supposedly unique to human beings, or -  at 
least -  to organisms.299 Jacques Monod offers a fairly conventional definition. “Animist belief [ ...] ,” 
in Monod’s summary, “consists essentially in a projection into inanimate nature of man’s awareness 
nl the intensely teleonomic function of his own central nervous system. It Is, in other words, the 
hypothesis that natural phenomena can and must be explained in the same manner, by the same 
laws,’ as subjective human activity, conscious and purposive.” 300 Whilst animism no doubt posits a 
single plane inhabited by human beings, “the natural world” , and technical machines, it is to follow 
Freud into a kind of psychologistic reductivism to assume that this must be a matter of projection. If 
a single plane is genuinely being posited, it makes no sense to say that it Is being “projected” by a 
psychological agent, precisely because the distinction between such agents and the world around 
them Is what is at issue. Understood in this way, animism would be merely the other side to 
organicism, with nonorganic processes understood to function (in many ways) like the way in which 
organisms are understood to operate. To reconcile machinism with animism entails holding onto the 
concept of a single plane -  Deleuze-Guattari’s “plane of consistency occupied by an immense
-lIK The ilittercntialion of their Spinozism from a Kleinian conceptualization of “part-objects” has more to do with a 
poMem with the concept of objects than of the concept ol parts -  although the notion of "parts” is ambiguous. If the 
concept of parts designates a components of a fragmented unity, then clearly it is in radical opposition to Deleuze- 
S toncePt of multiplicity. See ‘The Whole and its Parts” , AO 42, for a discussion of this.
Hence the so-called “omnipotence of thoughts.”
WO Jacques Monod, Chance and Necessity: An Essay on the Natural Philosophy o f Modern Biology, trails. Austryn 
wainhouse, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1997, 30
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abstract machine” -  but it equally demands the abandonment of any special organic feature (which is 
then, supposedly, projected onto the inorganic). On the plane of consistency, there is nowhere to 
project from (nor to). Ron Eglash gives a more interesting account, reinforcing the connection 
between animist conceptions and cybernetics by emphasising the informational circuitries with 
which he claims animist belief systems are concerned:
Although frequently reduced to ‘fetish worship’ or ‘natural spirituality’ in western 
descriptions, animism is, on the contrary, typically concerned with a cultural transfer of 
information or energy through physical dynamics. While animist religions are still active in 
Africa today, this conception of animated physical form is quite ancient, and is reflected in 
the myths of God creating humanity from clay. In some North African traditions, certain 
spiritualists could create their own clay robots, ‘golems.’ Goldsmith reports golem legends 
going back to the fourth century B.C.E., and describes their continuing popularity in Jewish 
legend. Norbert Weiner, the Jewish founder of analog cybernetics, was quite influenced by 
this concept of information embedded in physical dynamics [...] He made several references 
to the golem in his writing, and reported that, even as a child he was fascinated by the idea of
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making a doll come alive
Eglash’s position parallels Gibson’s, in positing connections between voodoo and contemporary 
cybernetic systems. But what is interesting about the children Turkle describes is that they do not so 
much seek to make the inanimate come alive; rather, they do not recognize that the distinction 
between animate and inanimate is equivalent to the distinction between entities capable of agency 
and those not. The issue, for the children Turkle studied, is that agency does not require life. ‘The 
most recent generation of children, who seem so willing to grant psychological status to not-alive 
machines, have become accustomed to objects that are both interactive and opaque. These children 
have learned what to expect of these objects and how to discriminate between them and what is 
alive. But even as children make those discriminations, they also grant new capacities and privileges 
to the machine world on the basis o f its animation if  not its life.’’™2 Agency can be distributed across 
a plane that is indifferent to “life.” This might, once again, establish a point of connection with
E?lash, “African Influences in Cybernetics”, in Gray, Chris Hables (ed). The C\horg Handbook, New 
' <>rk/London: Routledge, 1995, 22-23
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Spinoza, whose philosophy has no place for the distinction between life and death, but which, as we 
have seen above, in Deleuze-Guattari’s reconstruction, defines bodies in terms of speeds and 
slownesses, different quanta o f  animation. Turkle claims that, faced with computers, children 
assume that the technical system is not alive, but that it has a psychology. This is perhaps an 
unnecessary reterritorialization: Gothic Materialism finds the concepts of agency and entity much 
more congenial. Agency implies a capacity for response, but has no necessary suggestion of any 
interiority, or conscious reflection. The emergent mythos of demonism in Gibson’s cyberspace 
depends upon the notion of entities with which one can trade. ‘The new jockeys, they make deals 
with things.” (CZ 169) This emphasis on trade with an entity that is really different (not a 
pyschologistic projection) recapitulates, then, the relationship between Baudrillard's "primitive 
double” and the shadow: it is a matter of a real relationship with something exterior.
Capitalism  a s  Toy S tory: H y p e r f ic t io n ,S tra n g e  L o o p s  a n d  R h izo m es
It. in the context of cybernetics, Freud’s dismissal of animism seems hasty, so does his confinement 
ol children to an early stage of development. Turkle’s work reinforces the observation -  which, 
although well-worn, is more than glib cliche - that children know more about computers than their 
parents; and the early encounter with such cybernetic systems pre-emptively disables much of the 
metaphysics the adult world seeks to impose. Children, that is to say, increasingly live in a Gothic- 
Materialist chaosmos. “Children, instinctual animists, identify with toys and dolls, subjecting 
themselves to and projecting themselves onto the inanimate: every 12-year old knows that I is an 
other and another and another.”303 Under capitalism, the idea that toys do not have a certain agency 
becomes increasingly questionable. It may be the case that children take for granted, not only a
^0- Turkle, Life on the Screen, 83, emphasis added
Kodwo Eshun, More Brilliant than the Sun: Adventures in Sonic Fiction, London: Quartet, 1998. 108
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Freudian animism, but a neo-Marxian picture of “necromantic” capital. It would only be natural for 
children to share what, in Chapter 1, we saw Judith Halberstam characterize as Marx's "Gothic" 
picture of capitalism. Blitzed with capitalist hyperstimulus, children are already participants in 
capitalism. In many ways, children occupy the frontier-zones of capitalism, operating as probe-heads 
in what, for adults, is the future. Indeed, the Freudian model of regression could be radically 
reversed: it might be said that the child’s universe of animist presences and animal-becomings'"4 has 
far more purchase on capitalist (and schizophrenic) reality than adults’ continued belief in subjective 
interiority. ‘T o  a certain extent, we can look to children to see what we are starting to think 
ourselves.”* 105
Capitalism, it could be said, is giving an agency to toys far more far-reaching than was achieved by 
Hoffmann’s clunky automaton. Naturally, the role of fiction is absolutely central to the toy-child 
relation. But it is a fiction which enjoys a peculiar relation to the Real. Increasingly, children are 
presented with toys and fictional systems which emerge together, in a loop. Where once there was a 
serial trajectory -  comic books -  toys -  films or toys -  films -  comic books -  now toys, films, comic 
hooks (and innumerable other examples o f merchandising) are issued simultaneously. The notion of 
the original and the copy is systematically eroded by a digital uncanny which generalizes simulation 
by lusing capital and fiction. Take the example of Disney’s Toy Story (cybernetic capitalism’s riposte 
to Freud’s “Uncanny”?) Here, in a film that was entirely generated by computer animation, digitized 
versions of old toys are presented next to new, “fictionalized” toys. But fictionality has a new sense 
here: it no longer has anything to do with a fantastic unaltainabilily; on the contrary, the toys 
onscreen are available, immediately, as consumer objects, as soon as you leave the cinema. The toys 
really are toys. In an increasingly familiar pattern, the film functions as an advertisement for the toys, 
which lunction as an advertisement for it, in an ever-tightening spiral. The fictional is immediately
The fusion of animals with human beings is an obsessive refrain in toy production, of course. Indeed, die names 
"I many toys (Spiderman, Batman) almost sound like parodies of Freud's case studies.
105 Tmkle, Lie on the Screen, 77
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real, in the most palpable sense: it can be bought. This, then, is hyperfiction: a process whereby 
fiction and reality are radically smeared. Unlike metafiction, hyperfiction assumes no special role tor 
the author (or indeed for the text). On the contrary, it is only when the author and the text have 
become immanentized that a hyperfictional circuit is in place. (Who cares who wrote Toy Story7) 
What is crucial is not the representation of reality, but the feedback between fiction and the Real. 
(Toy Story doesn’t reflect reality, it actively intervenes in it, inducing children -  via their attached 
servomechanisms, parents -  to consume commodities.) Hyperfiction, then, can be defined as fiction 
which makes itself real. What connects hyperfiction with animism is precisely the escape of agency 
from the subject. Fiction itself gains an agency, an ability to intervene into the Real.
To elaborate the concept of hyperfiction entails taking, and deflecting a little, Baudrillard's favourite 
prefix -  hyper - ,  deterritorializing the term from its use in his work. Baudrillard, of course, 
characterises the hyperreal as the more real than real. We will take this to designate an intense 
amplification of processes of immanentization. As Baudrillard has established, to be involved in a 
hyper-relation is to be beyond questions of representation (as we have already seen, the hyperreal is 
where representation becomes impossible, in part because the map precedes the territory). 
Hyperfictional process is defined by an escape from the text, in particular from the mono-authored 
text. At least two characteristics must be in place for hyperfiction to be operating: (1) there must be 
a feedback relation between the fiction and the Real and (2) (closely related to the previous point) 
the fiction must operate to subtract supplementary dimensions. Hyperfiction escapes the text, not in 
the direction of transcendence (like Beckett’s Unnamable), but in the direction of radical immanence. 
What is inevitably destabilized is the authority of the text, and -  concomitantly -  the power of the 
reality principle. Even as it intervenes in the Real, hyperfiction subtracts the authority to represent 
•he Real trom texts. At the same time, it is directly effective upon its reader/ consumer.
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The concept of hype takes us close to the abstract machinic operations of hyper-process: using what 
Baudrillartl would call “sign value”, hype transforms (desired) end-products into potentials, which 
can be exploited precisely to bring about the desired end-products. Assuming the success of a 
commodity functions to make it successful. Radically looped into itself, feedback has become 
feedforward, pre-determining responses rather than being sensitive to them after the fact. It need 
hardly be pointed out that the economy increasingly functions in such hyper-spirals, as capital more 
than ever migrates from having any actual referent, towards Marx’s increasingly “fleeting” forms 
(futures etc). All that is solid melts into the abstract and the virtual. Marx’s analyses of exchange 
value anticipated Baudrillard in their recognition of the role that fictions (such as potentials) have in 
capitalism, but Baudrillard has given up any of Marx’s confidence that the fictional can simply be 
unmasked, that something “more real” lies beneath it. Deleuze-Guattari’s productively ambiguous 
notion o f  “fictional quantities” reinforces this intuition. It takes in both the idea o f  fiction that can be 
quantified, and of quantities that have to be conceived of as fictional. What is decisively broken 
down here is the conventional opposition between fiction and the Real: if fiction can be quantified, 
it belongs to the Real, but if quantities can be fictionalized, then the Real belongs to fiction. What 
could be more real than a quantity? Stripped of a Marxian referent like the labour theory of value, 
capital itself becomes exactly a fictional quantity: an entity, of course, with its own animistic agency.
The hyper must be opposed to processes with which it is often conflated: meta-processes, which, as 
we said above, are defined by an imploded transcendence. Baudrillard’s work is often read as if it 
were exclusively about the meta-, when it could more properly be seen as describing the oscillation 
between meta- and hyper- processes, or better yet, the (inevitable) collapse o f the former into the 
latter. As theorists dedicated to radical immanence, Deleuze-Guattari, naturally, can be placed on the 
side of the hyper-process. (Even as they identify a myriad of processes which are describable in 
terms of imploded transcendence: capitalism itself, for instance.)
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Whilst never actually posing the hyper/ meta distinction in quite the terms that it will be deployed 
here, Hofstadter’s Godel, Escher, Bach -  and its take-up into the analysis of fiction by Brian 
McHale -  has provided an indispensable resource for the typologization of recursive systems that 
follows. McHale’s valuable but partial analyses of fiction effectively concentrate on the question of 
recursion. Instead of mirroring the world, McHale’s postmodernist texts construct vortices which 
implode into themselves. But this is not the only kind of recursion there is. What Hofstadter locates, 
in Godel, Escher, Bach are, in effect, two types of recursion, one corresponding to what he calls 
"self-transcendence” (this is the kind of recursion with which McHale’s Postmodernist Fiction is 
principally concerned), the other corresponding to a radical immanentization. Escher's paintings 
often exemplify the first type of recursion (the best example here would probably be the drawing of 
two hands, each drawing the other306). An example of the second would be Godel or Cantor’s 
mathematics, which show the systematic hostility of numeric systems to “axiomatic” “overcoding”. 
Numbers can always escape any transcendent statement made about them.
Meta-systems behave as if they “believe” in the reality of transcendent description, which is to say, in 
the reality of the power of framing structures to “embed”, whereas hyper-systems are hostile to any 
attempt to hierarchize or stratify phenomena. Hofstadter has a term for this radical implexion: the 
strange loop, or tangled hierarchy. At one level, the strange loop is a way of describing chicken- 
and-cgg processes in which the product of any process is also one of its founding presuppositions. 
What should belong to an “embedded”, or subordinate, level of a system escapes to a "higher” level 
of the system.
Unlike meta-systems, which, as we have seen, are continually seeking transcendent dimensions, 
hyper-systems are continually seeking to eliminate any overcoding by unity. As Deleuze-Guattari 
write, “Unity always operates in a dimension supplementary to that of the system considered.” (TP
See G odel.E scher, B ach, 689, “Escher’s D raw ing H ands"  for Hofstadter’s analysis of this picture.
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6) It is the rhizome “or multiplicity”, o f  course, that for Deleuze-Guattari, “never allows itself to be 
overcoded, never has available to it over and above its number of lines, that is, over above the 
multiplicity of numbers attached to those lines.” (TP 9) The rhizome, then, constitutes the exemplary 
case of what we are calling a hyper-system: a system that is inherently opposed to transcendence and 
unity. Rhizomes, like all hyper-systems, subtract unity, just as they will not allow the emergence of 
an “overcoding” supplementary dimension. ‘The multiple must be made, not by always adding a 
higher dimension, but rather in the simplest of ways, [...] with the number of dimensions one already 
has available -  always n -1 (the only way the one belongs to the multiple — always subtracted).” (TP 
6) They are continually connecting up to an Outside. Think of Deleuze-Guattari’s description of the 
rhizomatized book: ‘The book only exists through the outside and on the outside.” (TP 4)
Hence the flatline, again, but in another guise. “All multiplicities are flat,” Deleuze-Guattari insist, 
"in the sense that they fill or occupy all their dimensions: we will therefore speak of a plane o f 
consistency of multiplicities [...] Multiplicities are defined by the outside: by the abstract line, the 
line of flight or deterritorialization according to which they change in nature and connect with other 
multiplicities. The plane of consistency (grid) is the outside of all multiplicities.” (TP 9)
The strange loop and the Deleuze-Guattari rhizome are closely related, although, interestingly, 
Holstadter ultimately denies real immanence to the strange loop, arguing that any (apparent) strange 
loop is underpinned by what he calls an “inviolable layer.” One example he gives is of an author “Z, 
[who] exists only in novel by T. Likewise T exists only in a novel by E. And strangely E exists only 
in a novel -  by Z, of course.” 307 Hofstadter says that this can happen, but only in something like a 
novel by author H, who remains suppelementary to -  which is to say -  transcendent of -  the 
tangled hierarchy.” Needless to say, though, Deleuze-Guattari put no limits on rhizomatic process: 
reality as such is constructed out of strange loops or rhizomes (which nevertheless can become
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"arborified”: closed down and hierarchized -  the production o f apparently “inviolable" layer is an 
effect of stratification, a Judgment of God). Which is to say: what might ultimately separate the 
strange loop from the rhizome is that, in the former, hierarchy is simply tangled, whereas in the latter 
it is radically abolished.
A C lo sin g  P a ra b le :  H yp erfic tio n  a n d  In the Mouth of Madness
Sutter Cane: "This book will drive you absolutely mad. It will make the world ready for the 
Change. It takes its power from new readers. That's the point, belief. Once people begin to 
lose the difference between fantasy and reality, the Old Ones can begin their journey back. 
The more people who believe, the faster the journey. And by the way the other books have
sold, this one is bound to be very, very popular. ”
Deleuze-Guattari: “I f  the writer is a sorcerer it is because writing is a becoming... ” (TP 240)
We will conclude with an analysis of a film which is very much about a strange-looped authorship 
relation, John Carpenter’s In the Mouth o f Madness (1994). In the Mouth o f Madness is a film 
which is about fiction as contagion, fiction as an artificial intelligence, fiction which makes itself real. 
In the Mouth o f Madness is perhaps the only film to merit the description hyper-Horror.“"' It is a 
film, that is to say, about Horror, which is by no means a parody or pastiche. Rather, it exploits the 
conventions of the genre -  descriptions of which it duplexes into the diegesis -  to amplify, instead 3078
307 Gotlel, E scher, B a ch , 688
308 Perhaps Cronenberg’s V ideodrom e  -  with its radically implcxed reality structure and thematics of the effects ot 
the Horror film -  is another candidate. But V ideodrom e  does not pursue implex in quite the same way that Carpenter's 
him does.
Wes Craven’s S crea m  (whose numerous sequels are all part of the -  threadbare -  joke), meanwhile, is certainly a 
candidate for being described as meta-Horror. The film self-consciously plays with die conventions of the slasher film 
(conventions established, funnily enough, by Carpenter in his 1978 H a llo w ee n ), recursively feeding them back into a 
narrative which meticulously plays them all out (except one: the sexually active heroine, who convention dictates must 
die, actually survives to the end of the movie). Watching Scream , one is left with an odd set of responses, familiar 
horn many postmodern artifacts; invited to examine (and ridicule) the structures of the film at the same lime as one is 
made subject to them, one is simultaneously (interpellated as) transcendent of the film (and of one's own experience of 
it) and manipulated by it. This is an important contrast with In the M ou th  o f  M adness, whose recursive structures may 
make us templed it to classify it as belonging to the same type. But where S crea m  clearly aims at self-transcendence 
(the sending up of the conventions, presumably, is an attempt to move outside or above them). Carpenter's film tends 
towards immanentization. Whilst rigorously adhering to many of the conventions it (via John Trent's ridicule) 
enumerates, it does so to in tensify, rather than to deflate, the Horror: it is Trent’s attempt to ridicule the Horror genre 
dial is the object of all the film's jokes. Recursion, that is to say, attacks, rather than lamely shores up, the viewer's 
(simulated) subjective interiority.
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of disintensifying, feelings of dread and disquiet. In Hofstadter’s terms, it is a film which perceives -  
and recursively processes -  its own “programming” as a Horror film, without attempting to tni/cend  A 
itself. In the Mouth o f Madness takes on all the themes familiar from Baudrillard we discussed above 
-  especially the idea of the fictional invading and destroying the Real -  but it does so more in the 
spirit of Gothic Materialism than in the terms of Baudrillard’s melancholia.
Carpenter’s Lovecraft-saturated film is a deliberate redescription of the Horror genre in terms of 
capitalism and schizophrenia. Beginning with shots of pulp Horror novels being mass produced, it Ls 
a film about crazes, about “fictional quantities” which erode the reality principle. The film's anti-hero 
is the insurance man, John Trent. Trent is hired by a publishing company to investigate the 
disappearance of their most successful novelist, the Horror writer, Sutter Cane. Trent is warned -  in 
what he thinks of as a hype -  that reading Cane’s work has a powerful, destabilizing effect on some 
readers. But, contemptuous of the Horror genre and confident in his own subjectitvity (“I’m my own 
man; no-one pulls my strings”), Trent laughs this off, displaying, at first, a bluff G. E. Moore-type 
empiricism (“I know what’s real”).
Following a set of clues, Trent is drawn to the town of Hobbs End109: a town, it was previously 
thought, which had never existed outside Cane’s fiction. Naturally, Trent at first assumes that he has 
been set up as part of a publicity stunt: Cane’s disappearance, even Hobbs End itself, have been 
fabricated as part of a particularly elaborate simulation. But he learns that, whilst Cane’s 
disappearance was, initially, planned, the subsequent events had spiraled out of control. Aspects of 
Cane’s fiction had begun to make themselves real. Meanwhile, the socius is becoming gripped by 
Cane-mania -  crazed mobs hungry for a fix of Cane’s prose have beset bookshops, turning them into 
riot zones. Trent, meanwhile, becomes subject to strange glitches in space and time, and increasingly
309 One of many references to other Horror films with which In the Mouth of Madness is replete: Hobbs End is the 
name of the fictional tube station in Hammer’s Qualermass and the Pit. Note also references to Videodrome (there's a
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loses his grip on reality. This reaches its schizophrenic pitch when he meets Cane, who tells hint that 
he is merely a character in the new novel he is writing, entitled, of course, In the Mouth of Madness 
(Cane to Trent: “I think therefore you are”). Ultimately, Trent -  now incarcerated in an asylum - no 
longer tries to hold onto any solid sense of reality, no longer seeks the truth behind appearances, nor 
aims to distinguish fantasy from reality. He has been drawn into the hyperreal: a reality fatally 
contaminated by fiction.
Cane is a composite Horror novelist: the SC initials recall the SK of Stephen King, while what we 
hear of Cane’s prose -  in theme and style -  closely resembles Lovecraft (a favourite author of 
Deleuze-Guattari’s, of course, who is invoked in a number of places in A Thousand Plateaus). In an 
overblown, typically Lovecraftian style, Cane invokes the return of the “Old Ones" Lovecraft had 
continually foretold. As with Lovecraft, for Cane Horror resides not so much in the empirical 
encountering of “hideous unholy abominations” as in the transcendental trauma such encounters 
produce: faced with such anomalies, it becomes impossible to hold onto any stable sense of reality,|H. 
Horror, that is to say, cannot be disassociated from schizophrenia. But what Cane adds to Lovecraft 
is a stress on the role of Horror fiction as an agent of this process. Cane’s novels, as he explains to 
Trent, provide a necessary prerequisite -  the softening of the boundaries between the fictional and 
the Real -  “for the Old Ones to return.” Initially, this seems like another version of McHale-Barth’s 
"analogy of the author with God”: but, in the end, Cane sees himself as a machine-part of an 
impersonal process. He is merely a conduit through which the Old Ones’ schizo-signal can pass. 
Although he “thought [he] was making it all up”, they -  the Old Ones, the creatures from the Other 
Side - were “giving him the power to make it real. And now it is. All those horrible slimy things 
trying to get back in. They’re all true.” A strange loop is in place. What should be inside Cane’s texts
character called Renn) and Rosemary’s Baby (one of the Doctors is named after the malevolent gynecologist, 
Sapperstein.)
'  10 Horror in Lovecraft frequently entails the collapse of familiar structures of lime and space. In a particularly 
complicated section of “Memories of a Sorcerer”, for instance, Deleuze-Guattari discuss Lovecraft's account of 
dimensionality. (TP 251)
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-  the Old Ones as fictional presence -  are in fact responsible for the existence of the texts, the 
fictions, themselves. It is they who were, secretly, the agents behind his fiction, not Cane himself. 
And their line of flight is constituted precisely by a fiction becoming real (and a real becoming- 
fictional). “Do you want to know the problem with [...] religion?” Cane asks Trent. “It's never 
known how to convey the anatomy of Horror. Religion seeks discipline through fear. No-one's ever 
believed it enough to make it real. The same can’t be said of my works.” When Trent objects thal 
"books aren’t real” , Cane points out that his books “have sold over a billion copies. I've been 
translated into eighteen languages. More people believe in my work than believe in the Bible.”
"That’s what matters,” Cane tells Trent, “belief.” In a sense, though, the emphasis on belief places us 
back in an economy that Cane’s novels have dismantled, since it seems that the process of fiction 
making itself real is more dependent upon hype than it is on “belief’. The Old Ones hype themselves 
back into existence, emerging only when humanity’s picture of reality has fallen apart. Yet Cane’s 
sense of belief, naturally, has a special skew, which tends towards an equation with hype. It Is 
"belief’ in a cybemetically active, rather than an epistemologically passive sense. It is belief in this 
sense that Deleuze-Guattari refer to when they write of the “beliefs and desires” that "are the basis 
of every society, because they are flows and as such are ‘quantifiable’; they are veritable social 
Quantities.” (TP 219) Similarly, as the epidemeological spread of Cane’s fiction shows, Quantities 
can become “beliefs.” To believe in Cane’s novels is to contribute -  via intense feedback - to the 
destruction of any stable sense of the Real.
Like Deleuze-Guattari, In the Mouth o f Madness participates in the hyperfictionalization of 
Lovecraft. In treating Lovecraft as an authority or source (rather than as just as a literary text to be 
the subject of readings), A Thousand Plateaus shifts him from being a “fantasy” author. The 
treatment of particular Lovecraft formulations as if real, in Carpenter’s film, as in Dcleuze-Guattari, 
distributes them beyond their (original) textual instantiations. Lovecraft’s work, which has been
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supplemented by numerous other authors, including Ramsey Campbell and Brian Lumley. has 
already hyperfictionally propagated far beyond his original corpus of writings. And, right at the heart 
of this process is the hyperfictional text, the Necronomicon, a work supposedly invented by 
Lovecraft'11, which has nevertheless been written about as i f  real. Questions about the 
Necronomicon s ontological status -  does it exist? -  do not in any way contribute to the stabilization 
of its relation to the Real, they add to the Necronomicon's hyperfictionality. In the Mouth of 
Madness raises the possibility that, even if Lovecraft thought he was making the Necronomicon up, 
the text may yet be real. Perhaps the Necronomicon is only (as yet) a potential text, to be retro- 
assembled from Lovecraft’s fiction, and commentary about i t ...
Like Videodrome, In the Mouth o f Madness can be seen as, in part, a parody of what the censorship 
lobby say: Horror will rot your brain. And it points to the massive, self-sustaining economic circuits 
that swarm around particular Horror novelists.'12 The sheer quantitative scale of the consumption of 
Cane’s work is itself, immediately, a social fact -  the Gothic processes of capitalism (its anorganic 
propogative patterns) are laid bare in novels whose very sales accelerate those selfsame processes. 
Ultimately, of course. In the Mouth o f Madness is stopped from spiraling into schizo-implex by the 
lact that it depicts, rather than constitutes, a strange loop. It goes as far as it can go, implexing the 
lilm into itself, by presenting In the Mouth o f Madness, the movie, as part of the promotion of 
Cane’s novel. But when we leave the cinema, we cannot buy Sutter Cane novels (in the same way 
that we can buy the toys of Toy Story -  a fact which, when we reflect upon it, might make the
31 I But never written -  except in the form of fragments occasionally quoted by Lovecraft when be refers to the 
abominable text.
312 Compare, for instance, the situation with Stephen King. According to Skal: “C arrie  had a first printing ol 30.0(H) 
in 1974; •S a lem ’s  Lot, the following year, had an initial run of 20,000. By the late seventies, however, spurred by the 
exponentially expanding delivery systems of the chain stores, King’s public exploded. Following The Shin in g (1977), 
King's next three books, The S ta n d  (1978), The D ea d  Z o n e  (1979), and F iresta r ter  had first printings of 7(>,<XH>, 
80.000, and 100,000 copies, respectively. His first book for Viking, C hristine , hit the quarter million point, and, 
beginning with It in 1986, virtually all of King’s novels have had first hardcover printings of one million copies or 
above." (The M o n s te r  Show , 360). For Skal, King’s fiction “has almost nothing to do with the aims and goals of 
mainstream literary publishing, and constitutes a category of its own.” (365) Its sheer quantitative scale of his sales 
makes the circuit between King and his readership effectively independent of the bourgeois publishing industry. Skal 
points out. It is a Sutter Cane-type cultural contagion.
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Disney film the more terrifying of the two movies). There is, that is to say, one of Hofstadter’s 
"inviolable layers” protecting reality from the strange loop (both Cane and the Old Ones belong to 
the fictional narrative of the film In the Mouth o f Madness -  for now, at least). That is why In the 
Mouth o f Madness remains a Gothic Materialist parable. Nevertheless, if what we have said about 
cybernetic fiction and Gothic Materialism holds, the circuits it describes are all-too-(hyper)real: it is 
not as if capitalism and schizophrenia are merely Hollywood hokum we can dismiss as we leave the 
cinema. We might be well advised, then, to use In the Mouth o f Madness as John Trent learns to use 
Cane’s fictions, as a “guide book” to the increasingly strange terrain of capitalism and schizophrenia 
(to be read, perhaps, alongside Deleuze-Guattari’s two volumes). As one of the townsfolk of Hobbs 
End cries out, “First it took the children... Now it’s coming for us.”
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CONCLUSION
'To call up a demon you must first learn its name,” Neuromancer tells Case. “Men dreamed that 
once, now it is true, in another sense.” This thesis has tried to think about what this other sense is. 
What are the demons that haunt Cyberspace?
The thesis has been about three themes: cybernetics, the Gothic and fiction. More than that, though, 
it has been about the way the three themes smear into each other. And this thematics of smearing, of 
escape, has also been a guiding preoccupation throughout the study. From the Golem running amok 
to Wintermute fleeing Tessier-Ashpool to Sutter Cane’s fictions escaping his texts, the theme of 
flight has been recurrent. And flight is always in the direction of immanence. The name we gave to 
this condition of immanence, borrowed from William Gibson, is the flatline, which we encountered in 
various guises throughout the thesis. In Chapter 1, it was cybernetics and postmodernism that were 
ilatlined; in Chapter 2, the body; in Chapter 3, reproduction, and in Chapter 4, fiction itself. The role 
of the philosopher, Deleuze has said, is to produce concepts. Accordingly, as a work of Philosophy 
and Literature, this study has aimed to consider these flatlines in the light of a cluster of concepts it 
has machined: Gothic Materialism, cybernetic realism, hypematuralism and hyperfiction.
The Gothic and fiction are hardly strange bedfellows, of course; they have been partnered together 
since at least the end of the eighteenth century. (It’s not uncontroversial, of course, to consider the 
contemporary novel as a descendant of the Gothic hypergenre). But what this thesis has hoped to 
add to Gothic studies is some greater sense of precision about what is at stake in the Gothic. 
Invoking the Gothic has often involved calling up a Frankenstein’s monster inexpertly sewn together 
out of historical revivalism, morbidity, supematuralism and sensationalism. It is perhaps 
understandable that a genre which has as its “object” something “teeming, foaming, spreading” 
should be so ill-defined. And, all too often, the Gothic has been little more than a murky fog of 
associations, lacking focus. Here, it has been Wilhelm Worringer and Deleuze-Guattari who have 
provided that focus, with their emphasis on nonorganic continuum. It is this theme which unites 
Mary Shelley with Gibson, even as - potentially - it disqualifies many of the classics of “Gothic” 
literature. The inclusion of Ballard here - a writer entirely lacking many of the trappings
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conventionally associated with Gothic fiction - would go along with the exclusion ol Mrs Radclilfe - 
a writer conventionally considered to be synonymous with the Gothic genre. In part, what is 
involved is a shift from the focus on the Gothic as a genre - the empirical-historical study of 
particular characteristics as they have accreted, more or less arbitrarily , around groups of texts - to a 
focus on the Gothic as a theme; a theme that has been explored, not only in a heterogeneous range 
of literary texts, but which has been expressed, confronted and inhibited in all kinds of other texts, 
too. In any case, the concept of nonorganic continuum provides us with a principle for identifying 
the Gothic.
The Gothic and materialism have not often been so closely linked as have the Gothic and fiction. 
Indeed, conventional readings of the Gothic have tended to place the Gothic against materialism. 
Gothic Materialism, as has repeatedly been emphasised, attempts to sever the Gothic lrom the 
supernatural. It rates as a decisive turning point the moment in Mary Shelley’s famous novel when 
Frankenstein passes from magic to modem science, giving up his study of Paraselsus and alchemy in 
favour of contemporary physics (incidentally founding - and anticipatively critiquing - Science 
Fiction as he does so). Either magic is superseded, or it is vindicated; but if it is vindicated, it is by 
entirely material means. Frankenstein’s creation, like Shelley’s, is a product of science, not the 
supernatural.
As was made clear towards the end of Chapter 1, and again in Chapter 4 , Gothic Materialist fiction 
is continuous with the Naturalist tradition’s antagonism towards the fantastic and/or the marvellous. 
It departs from Naturalism only in pursuing materialism beyond the limits of the “realistic” text. In 
classic Naturalism, character was opposed to environment, even as it was reduced to it; in 
hypematuralism, character and environment tend to become indistinguishable. Hence Worringer- 
Deleuze’s “broken line which forms no contour by which form and background might be 
distinguished.” As we sought to establish in Chapter 2, Ballard’s “geo-traumatics” Is absolutely 
continuous with this Gothic line. Ballard’s exploration of a concept of landscape might be the fullest 
flowering yet of a rigorously anorganic fiction. Ballard’s key theory-fictional concepts such as the 
“spinal landscape”, like Gibson’s “television sky”, point to ways of seeing the contemporary "media 
landscape” (itself one of Ballard’s phrases) in terms of Gothic continuum.
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The collocation of the Gothic with the cybernetic is, it is hoped, one of the innovations that this 
thesis has been able to make. But, as we have seen, when you consider cybernetic theory, a whole 
(repressed?) Gothic undercurrent swells up very quickly. This is not surprising, given that 
cybernetics was bom out of the decoding of the boundary between nature and culture, and - 
ultimately - between the living and the dead. As we have seen, Wiener - the founder of cybernetics - 
was very aware of these Gothic themes. His warnings about the dangers of feedback , as we saw in 
Chapter 3, invoked the Gothic figure of the Golem.
Needless to say, the convergence of the Gothic with cybernetics is not to be blithely equated with 
psychological regression. Against this Freudian hypothesis. Gothic Materialism contends that rather 
than being not the return of reassuring belief structures, the Gothic line confronts what cybernetics 
has often shied away from. Deleuze-Guattari call this repressed possibility schizophrenia. As Chapter 
2 established, it is Baudrillard who has been most explicit about linking the new cybernetic 
communication systems with schizophrenia. Another name for schizophrenia as Deleuze-Guattari 
understand it is radical immanence.
The era of immanence, as Baudrillard repeatedly tells us, is also the era of code. It is code in which 
the names of today’s demons - as written in Neuromancer’s “long formal names of programs” - are 
rendered. And Deleuze-Guattari and Baudrillard have made a point of using this more loaded term in 
place of the ostensibly neutral cybernetic buzzword ‘information’. Code entails stratification (and 
vice versa). Baudrillard’s remarks that fiction and theory are collapsing into one another are 
impelled in part by the postwar emergence of code as a crossdisciplinary hyperconcept. Code is both 
the means by which the bio-social is controlled and manipulated and a kind of fiction (but fiction 
without an author, fiction beyond the text). Fiction, in Baudrillard and Deleuze-Guattari’s 
theorizations, moves beyond the textual and the specifically “literary” ; in Deleuze-Guattari’s terms, it 
becomes a “machine.”
Fittingly, then, this has not been a work of literary criticism as such. Nor has it been 
straightforwardly, about the application of theory to literary texts. A key emphasis has been on
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seeing theory in terms of fiction as much as the reverse. Thus, as we began to say in Chapter 1, we 
would want to consider Deleuze-Guattari not only as theorists of the Gothic, but as contributors to 
it, as themselves Gothic writers. Like Baudrillard, Deleuze-Guattari have delighted in the embrace of 
the fictional. The move beyond the representational takes us quickly into the realms of theory-fiction 
(and into what we have called here hyperfiction). And, once again, Deleuze-Guattari and Baudrillard 
have, in their different ways, developed and pioneered the theory-fictional as a mode. Needless to 
say, this has implications both for theory and for fiction. Some of these implications we tried to 
consider in the final chapter. If theory is a mode of fiction, then fiction is already theoretical. In his 
many writings on fiction, Deleuze, for instance, has exploited to the full both these possibilities. But 
what still remains a largely unconsidered question - and one that could only be opened up here - is 
what is at stake in calling something fictional? If the question of the nature of literature has been 
endlessly rehearsed, the nature of the fictional remains substantially underthought. As opposed to the 
literary - whose attendant problems of canonical hierarchization, etc, do little to challenge 
representation - the fictional is inseparable from the simulacrum, and all the tricky, demonic 
philosophical issues it raises. The Gothic Materialist aspects of this problematic have been explored 
in cyberpunk’s positing of new, “artificial” realities, implexed zones, worlds within worlds. The 
concept of hyperfiction, and the theorization of hyper versus meta, might contribute towards moving 
the analysis of these issues beyond the standard terms of postmodern debate (which, even as they 
have invoked the hyper-prefix have, in effect, tended to remain trapped in the meta). Consideration 
of hyperfiction - immanentized fiction, let us remember - takes us back to the llathne, and to the 
theme of escape which we referred to above. Even in its coventional form, Gothic fiction has often 
been about the escape of fiction from the text; about writing as contagion. From Northonaer Abbey 
to In the Mouth o f Madness, the Gothic has been obsessed with the power of fiction to alter - mutate 
- its readers’ bodies (and minds). To read is to risk contamination. It is perhaps fitting to end on this 
possibility.
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